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ABSTRACT 
'The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, i0th 
pieces thatjust don'tfit together'(Black 1976, p. 5). A number of researchers provide 
insights, theoretical as well as empirical, into the dividend policy puzzle. However, the 
issue as to why firms pay dividends is as yet unresolved. Several rationales for the 
corporate dividend policy propose in the literature, but there is no unanimity among 
researchers. Everyone, however, agrees that the issue is important, as dividend 
payment is one of the most commonly observed phenomenon in corporations world- 
wide. 
Several studies have been conducted on dividend policy and behaviour, and 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends but a very few studies have 
been conducted on emerging markets, therefore, a quite lot of issues of the emerging 
markets are still unresolved. Therefore, the existing published evidence is of limited 
relevance in identifying the appropriate dividend policy and behaviour, and security 
price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. 
The objectives of this thesis are threefold: firstly, to identify the detenninants of 
dividend policy, secondly, to investigate the dividend behaviour, and thirdly, to 
identify the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging 
market. 
The empirical results identify leverage, size, insider ownership, and 
collateralizable assets as the major determinants of dividend policy. However, the 
empirical results document that dividend decision is primarily governed by cash flow 
for measuring the capacity of the companies to pay dividends and dividends paid in the 
previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. The empirical results also identify Brittain's 
(1966) partial adjusted model as the best-fit dividend behavioural model. Furthermore, 
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as insiders trade in the market, so, information used to be adjusted with the share 
prices before announcement and consequently dividend announcement does not carry 
any new information to the market. Therefore, the empirical results document no 
significant impact of dividend announcements on the security prices of an emerging 
market. Finally, the empirical results identify that the emerging markets are inefficient. 
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DIVIDEND POLICY AND BEHAVIOUR9 AND SECURITY PRICE REACTION 
TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF DIVIDENDS IN AN EMERGING MARKET 
A Study of Companies Listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0. Introduction: 
'The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzz--le, with 
pieces thatjust don'tfit together'(Black 1976, p. 5). A number of researchers provide 
insights, theoretical as well as empirical, into the dividend policy puzzle. However, the 
issue as to why firms pay dividends is as yet unresolved. Several rationales for the 
corporate dividend policy are proposed in the literature, but there is no unanimity 
among researchers. Everyone, however, agrees that the issue is important, as dividend 
payment is one of the most commonly observed phenomenon in corporations world- 
wide. 
Corporate dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial 
literature. Thus far, this issue has been examined under the assumption that the firm is 
one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximise its market value (Miller 
and Modigliam, 1961; Brennan, 1970; and Miller and Scholes, 1978). Some 
researchers believe that dividends increase stockholders wealth (Gordon, 1959), on the 
other hand, some others believe that dividends decrease stockholders wealth 
(Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979). However, others believe that dividends are 
irrelevant (Miller and Modigliam, 1961; and Miller and Scholes, 1978). 
Gordon and Shapiro (1956), Gordon (1963), Solomon (1963), and Walter (1963) 
first introduced bird-in-the-hand models. In brief, all of those models argue, after the 
security analyst's "bible" of Graham and Dodd (1934), that investors buy stocks in 
order to receive dividends. In contrast, Miller and Modigliani (1961) view that in a 
perfect capital market dividend policy is irrelevant, i. e., the investors are indifferent 
between dividend payments and capital gains. 
2 Introduction 
This study attempts to resolve the issues of dividend policy and behaýiour, and 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends and special reference to the 
emerging markets. The major objective of this chapter is to give a bnef outline of the 
whole thesis including the research problem, objectives, justification, and the structure 
of the thesis. The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The outline of the 
research problems along with the stated research questions is included in section 1.1. 
Section 1.2 provides a bnef outline of the empirical aspects of this study. The rationale 
and justification for conduction of this research is incorporated in section 1.3. Section 
1.4 describes the structure of the thesis. Finally, the summary and concluding remarks 
are included in section 1.5. 
I. I. Outline of the Research Problem: 
Black (1976, p. 5) poses the question, 'Why do corporations pay dividends? ' In 
addition, he poses the second question, 'Why do investors pay attention to dividend? ' 
Although the answers to these questions may appear obvious, he concludes that they 
are not. After over two decades since Black's paper, the dividend puzzle persists. 
Finns raise equity capital in order to invest in real assets that are expected to 
produce future cash flows. The shareholders have a claim on these cash flows. 
However, the firm's management has the power to determine whether these cash flows 
are paid directly to the shareholders as dividends or retained as a source of fund for 
further investment within the business. Hence the dividend decision is of potentially 
great importance to both shareholders and the fim-1 (Glen et al. 1995). The main 
objective of the financial management is to maximise shareholders wealth (Van Home 
and Wachowicz, 2001). The managers can maximise shareholders wealth sometimes 
by paying dividends and sometimes by retaining earnings for further investment. It 
depends on the growth prospects or available investment opportunities of the firin. If 
the firm is a growing firm or if the firm has available investment opportunities with 
positive expected returns, then usually the firm retains the earnings for ftirther 
investment because it is normally the cheaper and more dependable source of finance. 
If the firm is a declining firm, i. e., the firm has no suitable investment opportunities 
Nvith positive expected returns, then it is better to distribute earnings to shareholders as 
dividends (Gordon, 1962; and Walter, 1963). In practice, firms neither distribute all of 
their earnings to shareholders as dividends nor retain all of their earnings for further 
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investment. Usually, the firms distribute a portion of earnings to the shareholders as 
dividends and retain the remainder for further investment or as a reserve. 
It is worth drawing attention at this point to the fact that it is very much known to 
all that the stock prices heavily influenced by the payment of dividends. Previous 
studies suggest that stock prices increase for increasing dividends and on the other 
hand stock prices fall for reducing or cut dividends (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; 
Healey and Palepu, 1988; and Michaely et al. 1995). However, in practice, some 
companies declare stable dividends as well as some others declare fluctuating 
dividends closely related to their income and sometimes related to their policy and 
strategy for retaining goodwill in the competitive market. Moreover, we also see that 
some companies consistently pay increasing dividends, some companies pay 
decreasing dividends, and some others pay no dividends at all. Therefore, this research 
will concentrate on these research questions: one, what are the criteria to determine 
dividend, two, how does dividend policy behave and is there any difference between 
the behaviours of dividend policy of developed markets and emerging markets, and 
three, how does security price react to the announcement of dividends and do security 
prices react differently in an emerging market in comparison to developed markets? 
Several studies have been conducted on the developed markets in different issues 
of dividend policy and behaviour but a very few have been conducted on the emerging 
markets, so, the existing evidence is of limited relevance in identifying the appropriate 
dividend policy and behaviour in an emerging market. However, it is known from 
experience that the companies listed on the emerging markets are quite different from 
the developed financial markets in all respects. So, dividend policy and behaviour of 
the emerging markets are also likely to be quite different in these markets from 
developed markets. Moreover, it is also known that the emerging markets enlisted 
companies are insider controlled closely held fin-ns and as informed insiders, brokers, 
and exchange employees play their role in the market as speculators, which causes 
information asymmetry and irrationality in the emerging markets. Because of these 
reasons, the behaviour of the Dhaka Stock Exchange as an emerging market is likely to 
be quite different from what typically is the case in respect of an efficient market, such 
as the NYSE. The behaviour of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange is also 
different from the companies listed on efficient markets. The dividend behaviours of 
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firms listed on these two markets are also assumed to be different. That is it is 
seen that the behaviour of the companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange appear 
differently from what might be expected from reading the literature derived from 
developed financial markets and knowledge of financial markets denved from finance 
text books. 
As there is no such strict rule to pay dividends to shareholders in each year but it 
is rather very much flexible and solely depends on the decision of the financial 
management of the company. However, the financial managers make this decision by 
taking the financing and investment policy of the firm, the company's own policy and 
strategy and many other aspects into account. 
As there is no hard and fast rule regarding the optimum dividend to declare, the 
first phase of this study will deal with the first research question that is to identify the 
criteria to determine the dividend policy in an emerging market. It will also investigate 
whether dividend policy is determined in an emerging market the same way as 
developed markets. However, it has been mention earlier that the behaviour of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange is likely to be quite different from developed markets because 
of differential nature of these two markets. Therefore, the second phase of this study 
will also deal with the second research question of this study, i. e., to investigate the 
dividend behaviour of an emerging market. This study will also investigate whether 
dividend policy behaves the same way as developed markets or differently. However, 
the previous studies suggest that stock price increases with the announcement of 
increasing dividends and stock price falls because of dividend cuts (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1983; Healey and Palepu, 1988; and Michaely et al. 1995). Therefore, the 
final empirical phase will deal with the third research question that is to examine 
whether stock price reacts to the announcement of dividends or not and if it does then 
how it reacts to the announcement of dividends. However, this study will also 
investigate whether security price reacts to the announcement of dividends in an 
emerging market in the same way as developed markets or differently. 
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1.2. Objectives of the Study: 
1.2.1. Broad Objectives: 
Introduction 
The major objectives of this study are threefold: firstly, to identify the 
determinants of dividend policy; secondly, to identify the dividend behaviour; and 
thirdly, to identify the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an 
emerging market. 
1.2.2. Specific Objectives: 
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
(a) As no recognised study has been conducted to identify the determinants o 1ý'i en 
policy in emerging markets and also given that empirical studies have lagged behind 
theoretical studies; the first objective of this study is to identify the determinants of 
dividend policy in an emerging market and to minimise the gap between empirical and 
theoretical studies. For these purposes, this study will primarily shed light on the 
dividend theories and then will identify the deten-ninants of dividend policy in an 
emerging market. Firstly, this study will review the theoretical and empirical evidence 
on dividend theories and at the end this study will also try to identify the unresolved 
research questions on the issue of dividend theories. Secondly, this study will build up 
hypotheses and will test the hypotheses on the dividend theories. Finally, this study 
will identify the determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market based on 
dividend theories, which will ultimately serve the first objective of this study. 
(b) However, given the lack of sufficient studies on dividend behaviour in emerging 
markets , it is very 
difficult to identify the dividend behaviour of an emerging markets 
from the available studies. Therefore, this study attempts to identify the dividend 
behaviour of emerging markets to serve the second objective of this study. Firstly, this 
study will review the major studies on the dividend policy and behaviour to raise the 
unresolved research questions of dividend behaviour and to build up primary ideas 
about the dividend behaviour of emerging markets. Secondly, this study will develop 
the hypotheses and then will use partial- adjustment models to test the predetermined 
hypotheses about the dividend behaviour of emerging markets. 
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(c) In addition, previous empirical studies suggest that security prices react to the 
I ing announcement of dividends but there is no such study has been conducted in emergi 
markets testing security piece reaction to the announcement of dividends. Therefore, 
this study will solve the final research problem and will serve the final objective of this 
study. Firstly, this study will review the previous theoretical and empirical studies to 
identify the unresolved research problems and to develop the hypotheses of this 
research question. Secondly, this study will test the predetermined hypotheses to 
identify the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in emerging 
markets. However, as this study employs event study methodology to solve the final 
research question, so, this study will also test the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency of the emerging markets. 
1.3. Main Area of Research: 
The issue of dividend policy is important for several reasons. Firstly, researchers 
have found that a firm uses dividends as a mechanism for financial signalling to the 
outsiders regarding the stability and growth prospects of the firm. Secondly, dividends 
play an important role in a firm's capital structure. Yet another set of studies have 
established the relationship between firin dividend and investment decisions (Saxena, 
1999). 
This research attempts to investigate the dividend policy and behaviour, and 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. The 
empirical parts of this study concern about the major research questions. The empirical 
parts are divided into three phases based on the three main research questions. 
Empirical Phase 1: 
This phase of the research is based on the first research question. Primarily, this 
study will observe the dividend policy of an emerging market. This study will then 
attempt to identify the criteria that determine dividend policy in an emerging market or 
to identify the influential factors to determine dividend policy in an emerging market. 
In addition, this phase of the study will also investigate whether there is any difference 
between developed markets and emerging markets in the determination of dividend 
policy. This study will also investigate whether the criteria to determine diý'Idend in an 
erneroing market supports the previous empincal studies and the dividend theories or 
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not. At the end of this phase, this study will indicate the major contribution of the 
study to the existing research and as well as to finance theory. 
Empirical Phase 11: 
This phase of the study will deal with the second research question of the 
study. In this phase, the study will investigate the dividend behaviour of an emerging 
market, i. e., to identify how dividend policy behaves in an emerging market. This 
study will conduct an empirical investigation on the partial-adjustment models to 
identify whether partial-adjustment models can explain dividend policy in an emerging 
market or not. This study will also identify whether there is any difference between the 
dividends behaviours of emerging markets and developed markets. Finally, this study 
will identify the best-fit partial adjustment model in an emerging market. At the end of 
this phase, this study will also indicate the major contribution of the study to the 
existing research and as well as to finance theory. 
Empirical Phase III: 
This phase of the study will deal with the final research question of this study, 
I. e., to investigate the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an 
emerging market. Firstly, the study will investigate whether security price reacts to the 
announcement of dividends or not. Secondly, if it does, then this study will investigate 
how security price reacts to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. 
This study will also identify whether there is any difference between the security price 
reactions of developed markets and emerging markets to the announcement of 
dividends. In addition, this study will investigate whether security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends of an emerging market supports the dividend theories and 
previous empirical studies or not. Moreover, this study will investigate whether 
announcement of dividend works as a signalling device to influence the stock prices in 
an emerging market or not. At the end of this phase, this study will indicate the major 
contribution of the study to the existing research and as well as to finance theory. In 
addition, this study employs event study methodology to identify the security price 
reaction to the announcement of dividends, which is a tool of testing semi-strong form 
of market efficiency. Therefore, this study Nvill also test whether the emerging markets 
are semi-strong forrn efficient or not. 
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1.4. Rationale of the Study: 
Introduction 
Several studies have been conducted on dividend policy and behaviour but a 
very few studies have been conducted on emerging markets. Therefore, many issues of 
dividend policy and behaviour of an emerging market remain unresolved. Although a 
great many studies have been conducted on dividend signalling and information 
content of dividend in developed markets, there is no such recognised study found 
about the effectiveness of the dividend announcement as a signalling device to 
influence the security prices of an emerging market. Therefore, the existing published 
evidence is of limited relevance in identifying the appropriate dividend policy and 
behaviour, and security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an 
emerging market. 
Although a few studies have been published on emerging markets, these studies 
are not sufficiently able to answer either of the present research questions. Therefore, it 
directs to conduct this research to solve the current research problems of an emerging 
market. However, the dividend policy of emerging markets appears to be largely 
unpredictable from previous studies. So, whether or not the main reason for this 
unpredictable behaviour is irrational decision-making or is related to some 
fundamental economic variable(s) is something which this thesis will investigate. This 
research will also find out the clear difference between the emerging markets and 
developed markets and that will obviously help to identify how far the position of 
emerging markets diverges from developed markets. In addition, it has not yet been 
tested whether established dividend theories work in the emerging markets or not. This 
research is the first attempt to identify whether dividend theories are applicable only 
for developed markets or are also applicable to emerging markets as well. 
In addition, until now there is no study conducted on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
to identify the dividend policy and dividend behaviour, and secunty pnce reaction to 
the announcement of dividends of the companies listed on this market. So, this is an 
emerging need to conduct the proposed research to identify the dividend policy and 
behaviour of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies. This research will also 
attempt to identify the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies on which no study has yet been conducted. 
9 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis: 
Introduction 
As we have already been mentioned earlier that this chapter will give a very brief 
outline of the whole thesis, i. e., dividend policy and behaviour, and security price 
reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. For these purposes, 
the whole thesis has been dividend into five sections. Section one is basically for the 
building up the general conception of the empirical study on the dividend policy and 
behaviour in an emerging market. Section two, three, and four are for the empirical 
phase one, two, and three respectively. The descriptions of the main sections of this 
thesis are explained in the following paragraphs. 
Section one: this section is the general overview of the thesis. This section is 
divided into three parts. Part one concentrates on the capital market of Bangladesh. The 
objective of this part is to discuss the position of Bangladeshi capital markets as an 
emerging market. It provides a brief review of Bangladesh capital markets as a whole 
and then a comparative analysis is made with the developed, emerging, and markets in 
the region. Part two a description of the Dhaka Stock Exchange. This part provides an 
extensive description of the Dhaka Stock Exchange including growth and development, 
general characteristics and the remarkable features of the listed companies, and the 
performance of the Dhaka Stock Exchange at a glance. However, as non-financial 
sector companies are considered as the sample of this study, this part also provides a 
brief description of the remarkable features of the non-financial sector companies listed 
on the Dhaka Stock Exchange including the size of the companies, payment pattern, 
risk and return, and the ownership pattern in order to have a clear understanding about 
the companies of the sample. Part three describes the general research methodology of 
the thesis. This part provides an extensive description of the research methodology of 
this study including the justification of choosing quantitative research method and data 
analysis techniques. 
Section two: this section provides the detailed description of the empirical phase 
one, i. e., determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market. This section is 
divided into two parts. Part one reviews the major dividend theories including the 
revicxv of previous empirical studies for and against the dividend theories. Part two 
examines the ernpirical results of phase one, i. e., deten-ninants of dividend policy in an 
cinerging market, which are based on existing dividend theories. Part two provides the 
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detailed explanation of the empirical results on the deten-ninants of dividend policy of 
the companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Section three: this section is framed for the empirical phase two, i. e., testing 
partial adjustment dividend behavioural models in an emerging market. This section is 
also divided into two parts. Part one provides an extensive literature revie\N' on the 
major studies of dividend policy and behaviour. Part two is designed for the empirical 
study on the dividend policy and behaviour in an emerging market and especially to 
test the partial adjustment models. This part provides the detailed explanation of the 
empirical results on the partial adjustment models. 
Section four: this section is fon-nulated for the empirical phase three, i. e., security 
prices reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. This section 
is also divided into two parts. Part one provides an extensive literature review on the 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in developed markets. Part 
two is designed for the empirical analysis on the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends in an emerging market. This part explains the empirical 
results of the security price reaction to the announcement of dividend in an emerging 
market. Finally, a brief summary of the thesis along with major contribution of this 
thesis to the theories of finance and to the existing research, implications of the 
research, limitations of the research, and suggested further research are included in 
summary and conclusion chapter. 
1.6. Conclusion: 
The objectives of this thesis are threefold: firstly, to investigate the determinants 
of dividend policy, secondly, to investigate the dividend behaviour, and thirdly, to 
investigate the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an 
emerging market. The empirical phase one concludes that the major determinants of 
dividend pay-out ratio in an emerging market are leverage, size, insider ownership, and 
collateralizable assets. However, the empirical phase two concludes that dividend 
decision is primarily governed by cash flow for measuring the capacity of the 
companies to pay dividends and dividends paid in the previous years, i. e., lagged 
dividends in an emerging market. The empirical studies also conclude that Brittain's 
(1966) partial adjusted model offers satisfactory explanation of dividend behaviour in 
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an emerging market. However, the empirical phase two also strongly supports 
Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment model. Finally, the empirical phase three concludes 
that there is no significant impact of dividend announcement on the security prices of 
an emerging market because as insiders trade in the market so the information is used 
to adjust the share prices before announcement, and therefore the announcement of 
dividends do not carry any new information to the market. However, this empirical 
phase also concludes that emerging markets are inefficient. 
As no significant study has been conducted yet on dividend policy and 
behaviour, and security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in emerging 
financial markets, there is an emerging need to conduct this study and especially to 
deal with the unresolved issues of dividend policy and behaviour, and security price 
reaction to the announcement of dividends. However, this study will sufficiently be 
able to solve the research problems raised for emerging markets on dividend policy 
and behaviour, and security price reaction to the announcement of dividends. 
This study arises to be the benchmark of the empirical studies on dividend policy 
and behaviour, and security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in the 
emerging markets. Moreover, this study will draw attention to the portfolio investors, 
security analysts, policy-making bodies, and especially regulatory bodies of the 
emerging markets. This study will obviously provide a clear guideline to the parties 
associated in the market and especially to the outsider investors and to the regulatory 
bodies. Finally, it could be concluded that, 'it is the right attempt at the right time'. 
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Chapter Two: The Capital Market in Bangladesh 
2.0. Introduction: 
No economy can flourish unless an environment conduci,,,, e to growth is 
provided (DSE Annual Report 1998). Historically and empirically, positive correlation 
exists between health of the economy and capital market which simply implies that 
changes in the capital market affect the economy and more obviously changes in 
economy affect the market. The activities of buying and selling of shares on the market 
are extremely important for the allocation of capital within economies. In a capital- 
starved country like Bangladesh, effective allocation of scarce resources is of vital 
importance. 
The major objectives of this chapter are twofold: one, to provide a brief 
description of the capital market in Bangladesh, and two, to discuss the perforinance of 
the capital market in Bangladesh in comparison to developed, emerging, and regional 
markets. For these purposes, this chapter basically focuses on the major aspects of the 
capital market in Bangladesh in relation to the main issues of this study and specially 
in relation to the dividend policy. However, to view the overall position of the capital 
market in Bangladesh in comparison to the world capital markets, this chapter also 
provides a brief comparison and discussion of the capital market in Bangladesh with 
developed, emerging, and regional markets and specific reference to dividend policy. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. A brief description of the capital 
market in Bangladesh along with the growth and development of the capital market in 
Bangladesh incorporates in section 2.1. Section 2.2 discusses the regulatory framework 
of the capital market in Bangladesh and its drawbacks. The impact of taxation policy 
changes on the dividend policy of the capital market in Bangladesh in comparison to 
world capital markets incorporates in section 2.3. Section 2.4 includes the overall 
performance of the capital market in Bangladesh in comparison to developed, 
emerging, and regional markets and specially in connection with the main issues of 
this study. Finally, section 2.5 includes the summary and concluding remarks. 
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2.1. The Capital Market in Bangladesh: 
Efficiency is the prime consideration in the economic growth process under a 
free enterprise system. Bangladesh Government is now set for liberalisation and 
privatisation. An efficient capital market is of paramount importance in this process. 
Capital market in Bangladesh is at its infant stage and the public issues of corporate 
units are limited. 
The stock market is a pivotal institution in the financial system of a country. 
The stock exchanges are recognised by the government and function within the 
purview of the Securities Exchange Ordinance and related bye-laws and regulations. 
Presently, there are two stock markets in Bangladesh, one in Dhaka entitled Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) and the other in Chittagong namely Chittagong Stock Exchange 
(CSE) are in operation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
established under the SEC Acts 1993 as a central regulatory agency overseeing the 
activities of the entire capital market including issue of capital, monitoring the issue of 
stocks and operation of the stock markets including regulating of portfolio market. The 
SEC has also a mandate to protect the interest of investors in order to speed up the 
industrialization process, and to this end, new measures are underway to strengthen the 
role and capability of the SEC. 
Total listed issues in the Dhaka Stock Exchange are 223 of which 203 are shares, 
II debentures and 9 mutual funds. The number of the listed companies in the 
Chittagong Stock Exchange are 131 with 9 Mutual funds and 4 debentures. Investment 
Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) is the public sector player in the capital market. Both 
the Stock Exchanges have gone for automation in 1998. Currently, Merchant Banks 
Research institutions are in operation in stock markets (The DSE and CSE Annual 
Reports 1998). 
2.1.1. Growth and Development of the Capital Market in Bangladesh: 
Capital Market of Bangladesh was in a dormant stage dunng the decades of 
ies. During this period, few compani sixties, sevcilties and early part of eighti II ies accessed 
in capital market and investors were not interested or familiar in corporate securities. 
The market registered an impressive growth particularly from late eighties to mid- 
nineties. 
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The origin of the stock market in Dhaka goes back to 1954 when a Stock 
Exchange was formed in Narayanganj- Later in 1958 the Stock Exchange NNýas 
transferred to Dhaka. The Companies Act 1913 and the Capital issues (Continuance of 
Control) Act 1954 were two pieces of legislation governing the stock market in the 
country. Later, the Securities and Exchange Ordinance was promulgated in 1969. This 
ordinance required the companies to take permission from the Controller of Capital 
Issues (CCI) for issuing capital and making public offer of securities. It also required 
the companies to submit annual reports and to provide information as required. In 
addition, this ordinance required the stock exchange to take registration from the CCI. 
The capital market in Bangladesh made significant progress until the 
independence of the country. However, the post liberation nationalisation of industries 
and socialistic policies of the government left no choice but to suspend the operation of 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The era of opening up the economy began in 1976 and the 
operation of the Exchange resumed in that year. The Securities and Exchange Rules 
1987 defined more than one decade after the resumption the stock market, disclosure 
requirements by the company. Although the CCI was responsible for monitoring the 
securities market , in practice it 
failed to do so partially because of lack of necessary 
powers. In spite of the existence of legislation, many companies did not behave 
properly to serve the interest of the investors. Delayed holding of annual general 
meeting, delayed payment of dividend and refund warrants, lack of timely reporting 
and non-compliance with disclosure requirements were common experiences. This era 
ended with the adoption of the Securities and Exchange Commission Act in 1993. By 
this major piece of legislation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) came in 
existence to monitor the securities market and to protect the interest of the investors. At 
the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission (Amendment) Act 1993 
repealed the Capital Issues Act. The formation of Securities and Exchange Commission 
brought the listed companies under the supervision of SEC. With its power to make 
regulations, the SEC promulgated two pieces of regulations, namely, the Securities and 
Exchange (Brokers, Dealers, Sub-Brokers) Regulation 1994 and the Securities and 
Exchange (Insider Trading) Regulation 1994. TNvo other regulations for merchant 
bankers and portfolio managers and for mutual funds are in progress. Another major 
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development in the legislation was the enactment of the Companies Act 1994 (see 
www. secbd. org). 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange in the independent Bangladesh began its journey in 
1976 with only 9 companies. The nationalisation of the major local companies after 
independence left little scope for the development of the stock market at that time. The 
number of listed securities grew at a slower rate during the period 1976 through 1982. 
At the end of 1982, the number of listed companies were only 29. But the growth in 
the number of listed companies was relatively higher during the period 1983 through 
1988. After 1988, the growth in number of listed securities slowed down somewhat. By 
the end of 1993, the number of listed securities stood at 132. A good number of new 
public issues were made during 1994 and the number of listed securities increased to 
150 by the end of 1994 and to 209 by the end of 1997 (DSE Annual Reports 1976-98). 
The country's second stock market was formed in the second biggest city of 
Bangladesh in Chittagong in 1995. That was really the growing demand for the people 
of Bangladesh and incorporation of the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) was the 
right decision of the Governinent to fulfil the excess demand of the people. The CSE is 
conducted by Computerised Automated Trading System like the DSE and the CSE is 
also a self-regulated private sector company which must have their operating rules 
approved by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Chittagong Stock 
Exchange started its operation with 72 listed companies in 1995 and stands at 138 in 
1997 (CSE Annual Reports 1995-98). 
The growth in market capitalisation was also relatively slow from 1976 through 
1982. By the end of 1982, the market capitalisation stood at Taka, 812 million. The 
new issue of securities and the growth of market capitalisation gained some momentum 
after 1983. The year 1987 experienced a relatively big rise in market capitalisation 
with 92 listed companies. The rise of market capitalisation in 1987 has been attributed 
partially to the overreaction in the market. The unusual overreaction appears to have 
been responsible for a subsequent decline in market capitalisation in the next two years 
aflei- 1989. It took another tNvo years to recover from the decline in market 
capitalisation. Another possible reason for the decline of the market during 1989 
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through 1991 was a decline in investors' confidence because companies did not comply 
with timely holding of annual general meetings, timely payment of dividends and 
refund warrants, and disclosure requirements, etc. 
The year 1994 was remarkable for the capital market in Bangladesh, which 
experienced a significant growth in terrns of market capitalisation, transaction vollime 
and number of new issues. The significant growth of the securities market in 
Bangladesh in 1994 has been attributed to three major factors. First, the liberalisation 
in the foreign exchange policy and Taka convertibility made the way for foreign 
portfolio investment giving a large boost to the demand side. It has been estimated that 
the foreign portfolio investors in the Bangladesh stock market have invested a total of 
Taka 6800 million by the end of 1994. Second, the monitoring of the companies and 
stock exchange by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) restored investors' 
confidence in the market. Third, the willingness of potential companies to make public 
issue and relatively relaxed policy of pricing initial public issues gave boost to new 
issues in the market. In this year, public issue of 29 securities (including 4 debentures) 
was made, market capitalisation rose by more than 100 percent and there was a 
tremendous increase in the volume of transaction. By the end of 1994, the market 
capitalisation stood at Taka 41,771 million. The transaction value in 1993 was Taka 
580 million, which jumped to Taka 4290 million in 1994. The increase in the volume 
of transactions is not merely due to the increase in market capitalisation, but also due to 
a significant increase in the depth and breadth of the market. This is evident in the 
sharp rise in the ratio of transaction volume to market capitalisation. In 1993, the ratio 
was only 3.30 percent, which increased to 10.26 percent in 1994. The depth and 
breadth of the market, however, has still to develop substantially to improve efficiency. 
The market capitalisation of the Dhaka Stock Exchange stood to Taka 50211 million in 
1995 and increased to Taka 71255 million in 1997. While the price-earning ratio of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange in 1986 was only 6.8, it jumped to 20.6 and 23.9 respectively in 
1987 and 1989, and to 40.0 in 1996 but fall to 11.32 in 1997. However, the second 
capital market of Bangladesh (CSE) earned the market capitalisation of 23959.2 million 
Taka in the year of commencement but that stood to Taka 52435.6 million in 1997 
(DSE Annual Reports 1976-98 and CSE Annual Reports 1995-98). 
' Taka 80 = fl. 
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However, the market continues with the steady growth to achieve the target 
until June 1996. After the general election in June 1996, the market witnessed the 
biggest ever boom. Large number of investors entered the capital market. The ne", 
issues multiplied and speculative fever gripped the market. Trading volume rose 
sharply and indexes reached at 3648 points on 14 th November 1996. Price Earning 
Ratio soared and shares were traded at 80 times. On the other hand, at the same time 
the Chittagong Stock Exchange gained approximately 1057% in only one-year time. In 
November 1996, the inevitable happened and the market crashed. In a span of twenty 
months, the DSE index has come down to 650 points in June 1998. Now, the drama is 
over and the market is passing through a process of consolidation. Fundamentals and 
rationality have replaced speculations and rumours. Regulations have become more 
comprehensive. The capital market in Bangladesh is now poised to achieve higher 
degree of maturity. And, as the market matures, a more meaningful risk return parity 
will emerge (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). 
2.2. Regulatory Framework and Its Drawbacks 
Certain rules and regulations as elsewhere govern the securities market in 
Bangladesh. Regulatory authorities of the capital market in Bangladesh consists of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC fon-nerly CCI), Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies (RJSC), DSE, and CSE. Securities and Exchange Commission is under the 
Ministry of Finance and the RJSC is under the Ministry of Commerce. On the other 
hand, DSE and CSE are the corporate bodies under the Companies Act 1913. The 
RJSC partially implements the Companies Act 1913. 
The Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) operated under the Capital Issues 
(Continuous of Control) Act 1947. Under this Act the Government ives consent 9 
based on certain documents, to the issue of any security. The Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance of 1969 and Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 (SER 1987) are also 
implemented by the SEC to regulate the securities market and the dealings in 
securities. These provide protection to investors, and regulate the secunties market as a 
NN'liole. The Ordinance establishes listing procedures regulates insider trading, prohibits 
fraudulent act, false statement, etc. However, no definite mechanism as regards 
monitoring and implementation of the above provisions was spelt out. Even the 
provision in the Securities and Exchange Rules 1971 to constitute a Securities and 
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Exchange Authority of Bangladesh was omitted in SER 1987. In the absence of an%, 
definite authority for implementing the rules and regulation, securities market 
practically became nobody's business causing, inter-alia, improper trading, insider 
trading, fictitious trading, sleeping brokers, creative reporting and delayed reporting. 
However, recently SEC 1993 has been framed to supervise the securities market of 
Bangladesh. The companies Act 1913, which did not see any material change since 
1936, appears to be weak in protecting the investors' interests. The time limit for 
allotment of shares and debentures after the issuance of prospectus, for issuance of 
share or debenture certificates, for registration of transfer of shares and debentures, for 
presentations of accounts and for holding of AGM after the last AGM within 180 days, 
3 months, 9 months and 15 months respectively is too long compared to those of other 
countries like India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, US, and LTK. Besides, the Act is silent about 
the time limit for refund of excess application money and for payment of dividend. 
Experts' reports on capital market in Bangladesh (Ahmed, Khan, and Islam, 
1993) had recommended alterations; modifications and changes of these regulations. 
In Bangladesh, the regulatory framework is rather weak. The more striking is that the 
existing regulations are not implemented properly. The office of the RJSC, which 
implements the companies Act 1913, is incapable of enforcing the law because the 
professionals do not staff it. Consequently the law is simply ignored by companies. 
Allegations are found about non-holding of general meetings, regularly non-payment 
of dividend in time , irregular publication of 
financial statements, delay in disbursement 
of excess application money and so on. These are all against the interest of investors 
and thereby undermine investor confidence in the securities market. 
The DSE and CSE, which are self-regulating, have their own listing rules. As 
we know that self-regulatory stock exchange generally creates the possibility of 
broker-favoured bias, abuse of the system and exploitation of loopholes between 
various laws (Agtmael, 1984). Corporate listing with the DSE and CSE, in many cases, 
is influenced by the requirement of the regulatory authorities or the financial 
institutions, Nvhich impose listing requirement as a condition for getting credit 
attaching lesser importance to the other benefits of stock listing. However, there is 
some weakness in its regulatory framework regarding methods of trading, protection of 
customers and conduct of members. The security exchanges have their own listing 
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rules, but they are generally outdated, and lacks objectivity and detailed provisions for 
listing and administration of listed stocks. The DSE and the CSE do not ensure 
disclosure of infon-nation on listed companies in order to protect the interest of 
investors. It does not enforce disciplinary regulations so that the violation of rules and 
regulations is minimized. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a government body under the 
Ministry of Finance. It is the successor of the office of the Controller of Capital Issues 
(CCI). The Controller of Capital Issues had the responsibility of controlling the stock 
market. Prior to the establishment of SEC, indiscipline in the stock market was 
prevalent. Many companies failed to hold AGMs within time requirements, pay 
dividends on time, delivery the refund warrants on schedule and meet the disclosure 
requirements as prescribed by the law. The CCI could not curb the indiscipline in the 
market partially because it did not have necessary power to do so. In this backdrop, the 
formation of a body to regulate the stock market with appropriate power and authority 
became an utmost necessity. The establishment of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1993 was a significant step to this end. 
The laws and regulations pertaining to the supply of securities in the market are 
the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Amendment) Act 1993, the Companies Act 1994, the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance 1969, the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987, the Securities and 
Exchange (Brokers, Dealers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations 1994, the Securities and 
Exchange (Insider Trading) Regulations 1994 and the Dhaka Stock Exchange and 
Chittagong Stock Exchange Listing Rules and bye-Laws. 
Although there are the specific regulations of the SEC regarding the brokers, 
dealers, and insider trading, the insiders, exchange employees and brokers are engaged 
with the speculations of the markets whereas the SEC is simply not capable to control 
all of these affairs perfectly that is why Government was bound to take action against 
the speculators, NvIlich causes a big mess in the market in 1996-97 (Emerging Stock 
Market Factbook 1998). However, as we know that the exchanges are self-regulated 
which is the basic obstacle of the controlling system of the capital market in 
Bangladesh. Even though the SEC introduced different Laws but failed to implement 
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perfectly in the market because both the exchanges and SEC failed to work together in 
many occasions. 
2.3. Tax System and Its Impact on the Dividend Policy of the Capital Nlarket in 
Bangladesh: 
The process of economic liberalisation in Bangladesh started in 1976. As a part 
of this process, the Dhaka Stock Exchange resumed its operation. Since then, 
Bangladesh Government took different initiatives and gave different incentives (e. g., 
corporate tax incentive) to encourage the supply side of the stock market. The corporate 
tax rate was 40% in 1990, which is reducing now days by the govenu-nent of 
Bangladesh to encourage the companies to pay more dividends. However , in FY1998- 
99 Government introduced lowest corporate tax ever in Bangladesh history and the 
same corporate tax is applicable for all listed companies (35%), which is a very big 
initiative by the Government and also a big drive for the companies to take more 
suitable financing, investment, and dividend decisions. On the other hand, the 
corporate tax rates of Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, UK, US, and 
Zimbabwe are 70.9%, 59.3%, 49.8%, 26.4%, 18.6%, 42.5%, 43.2%, 56.1 %, and 49.7% 
in 1990 and 72.8%, 59.3%, 7.8%, 34.4%5 33.2%5 44.4%, 41.8%, 59.5%, and 48.2% in 
1999 (World Development Indicators 2001). 
Bangladesh Government introduced exemption of income tax on dividends 
income up to a certain limit (e. g., Taka 60,000 in FY1996-97). However, individual 
shareholders used to get an exemption of total income for tax purpose up to a certain 
limit and the rest of the income used to taxed based on individual's slab of income 
(e. g., basic rates were in between 10%-15% and the maximum rate was only 25% in 
FY1996-97). On the other hand, in case of capital gain taxation, if the capital gain 
arises within five years from the acquisition of the capital assets then capital gains used 
to taxed at 15% (lower rate) and 25% (higher rate); and if the capital gain arises after 
five years of the acquisition of the capital assets then the capital gain used to taxed at 
15% (FY1996-97). In addition, Bangladesh Government changed the tax policy of 
dividend income in FY1998-99 and introduced flat rate of tax on dividend income 
irrespective of the slab of income. It is said that in respect of dividend income denN'ed 
by indiN, idLial tax payers, the tax Nvill be deducted at source at the rate of 10 percent on 
the amount of dividend and this will be treated as the final settlement of tax liability 
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(Finance Minister's Budget Speech 1998-99). This type of flat rate on dividend income 
is an another boost for the individual shareholders to prefer dividends to capital gairls. 
One the other hand, the tax rates on divIdend and capital gains of Canada, Denmark, 
France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Thailand, UK, and US are 59.3%, 
43.5%, 18.7%, 65.4%, 62.2%, 21.7%, 12.8%, 26.2%, 43.2%, and 56.1 % in 1990 and 
59.3%, 43.1%, 20.9%, 67.4%, 65.5%, 25.6%, 27.8%, 33.3%, 41.8%, and 59.5% in 
1999 (World Development Indicator 2001). Therefore, it is clear that Bangladeshi 
companies and investors are enjoying absolute advantage and they are also quite 
benefited for the encouraging taxation policy of Bangladesh Government in 
comparison to other economies. 
2.4. Performance of the Capital Market in Bangladesh: 
2.4.1. Developed Markets vs. Bangladesh 
The number of companies listed on the capital market in Bangladesh are very 
insignificant in comparison to the developed markets. There were only 134 companies 
listed in the capital market in Bangladesh in 1990 whereas 6599 companies were listed 
in US market and 1701 companies were listed in UK market. However, the listed 
companies increased to 224 in 2000 in Bangladesh, which is completely insignificant 
compared to 7651 in US and 1945 in UK. The market capitalisation of Bangladesh was 
only US$0.341 billion in 1990 whereas US$3059.434 billion in US and US$848.866 
billion in UK. However, the capitalisation of the capital market in Bangladesh 
increased to US$1.66 billion in 1997, which is also very insignificant in comparison to 
US$11308.779 billion in US and US$1996.225 in UK. Furthennore, the turnover ratio 
of Bangladesh market was only 1.5% in 1990 whereas 53.4%. in US and 33.4% in UK. 
The turnover ratio of Bangladesh market increased to 12.6% in 1997, which is also 
quite insignificant compared to 103% in US and 44.4% in UK (World Development 
Indicator 2001). 
Even though the capital market in Bangladesh is not too impressive in connection 
xvith size and transaction volume but it is one of the best performers in the world capital 
markets in the last fe\N, years (e. g., 1994 and 1996). Bangladesh, market gained 115.8% 
in 1994 whereas both US and UK markets lost 2% and 5.2% respectively. Howevcr, 
Bangladesh market lost 17.5% in 1999 and gained 28.5% in 2000 whereas both US and 
UK markets gained 19.5% and 14.5% respectively in 1999 and both of them lost 10.1% 
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and 10.2% respectively in 2000 (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98, NVorld 
Development indicator 2001). 
The pay-out ratio is very attractive in Bangladesh. The dividend yield in 
Bangladesh was 7% in 1988, which is almost double in comparison to US (3.82%) and 
UK (4.58%). The dividend yield increased to 7.7% in Bangladesh in 1991, whIch is 
also double the amount of US (3.15%) and UK (5.11 %). However, the dividend ý, ield 
of Bangladesh market reduced to 5.7% in 1994 and to 5.37% in 1997, which is not 
even worse than US (2.87% and 1.73%) and UK (4% and 3.49%). Therefore, although 
the capital market in Bangladesh is very small in size we see that the performance of 
Bangladesh market and pay-out ratio is appreciating in comparison to US and UK 
markets (Emerging Market Factbook 1995-98, and World Development Indicator 
2001). 
2.4.2. Emerging Markets vs. Bangladesh 
Emerging equity markets have long been characterised as having higher risk but 
also higher return than developed equity markets. Since 1991, most investors in these 
markets have focused primarily on the high returns available; 1994 will be remembered 
for refocusing investor attention on the risks. That was a year in which many emerging 
markets experienced dramatic price swings and most markets ended the year at lower 
levels. Nonetheless, 1994 was also a year of substantial progress in emerging markets, 
with important advances made in their transaction efficiency, effectiveness as capital 
rising mechanisms, and in the introduction of sophisticated investment techniques. 
Despite the roller-coaster performance of emerging markets occasioned by sharp 
sell-off and frequent bad news, the broad IFC Global (IFCG) Composite Index, 
representing returns for 1,266 stocks from 24 emerging markets, fell Just over 2% in 
dollar terrns in 1994. The IFC Investable (IFCI) Composite Index, which measured the 
returns from 890 emerging market stocks eligible for foreign portfolio investment and 
therefore reflecting foreign investor reactions more directly fell substantially more, 
losing 13.8% for the year. All of the IFC's regional indexes also suffered declines in 
1994, though there were specific periods in each region when losses tended to 
accumulate. The bottom fell out of virtually all-einerging markets for investors with 
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Mexico's severe peso devaluation on December 20,1994 (Emerging Stock Market 
Factbook 1995). 
Nonetheless, many emerging markets experienced quite strong returns in 1994 
and were the best performing markets at the global level. At year-end, out of the 20 
best performing equity markets in the world, 19 were emerging markets. It is 
interesting to note that the leaders among these top markets were typically smaller, 
6 6pre- emerging" markets most of, which are not currently included in any of the leading 
indexes. Kenya, for example, topped the list with a 179% increase over the year, 
followed by Egypt, Bangladesh, and Tunisia, which each increased well over 100%. 
Among the major emerging markets, Brazil was up by 65% in the dollar terins as 
measured by its IFCI index, followed by Peru (up 47%), and Chile (up 42%) (Emerging 
Stock Market Factbook 1995). 
However, in a pattern now familiar to emerging market investors, emerging 
markets also constituted eight of the ten worst performing markets in 1994. Indeed, 
some of the markets that were among the top performers in 1993 were some of the 
world's worst performers in 1994. In dollar term, Turkey was down by 43%, Poland by 
43%, and Argentina and Mexico by 42% on their IFC indexes (Emerging Stock Market 
Factbook 1995). 
Emerging stock markets had a difficult year in 1995. The IFC Investable 
Composite Index (IFCI Composite), which tracks share prices for 1,200 stocks in 26 
emerging markets that are open to foreign investors around the world, registered an 
overall decline of 10.3%, while the broader IFC Global (IFCG) Composite Index, with 
over 1,600 stocks from 27 markets, lost 13.9% (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 
1996). 
For the year, IFCI Latin America Index and IFCI Asia Index dropped 19% and 
7% respectively, while the lFCI Europe/Mideast/Africa (EMEA) Index soared 20%, 
thanks largely to solid gains in the heavily weighted IFCI South Africa Index 
(Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1996). 
26 The CapitalAlarket in Bangladesh 
The top perfon-ners of the emerging markets in 1995 are South Affica (14.9%). 
Zimbabwe and Jordan respectively (10.6%), Indonesia (9.9%), Peru (9.3%), and 
Argentina (8.7%). And the top five losers of the emerging markets in 1995 are Sri 
Lanka (39.6%), India (35.2%), Pakistan (32.6%), Venezuela (31.7%), and Taiwan 
(31.5%). However, Bangladesh lose only 1.3% in 1995 (Emerging Stock Market 
Factbook 1996). 
Emerging stock markets posted their first positive collective return since the 
boom of 1993, as measured by the IFC Global (IFCG) and Investable (IFCI) Composite 
indexes. The IFCG Composite Index rose about 5.8% during 1996. It is the broadest 
indicator of emerging stock market performance available, covering 1,779 stocks in 27 
markets during 1996. The IFCI Composite Index, with 1,224 stocks in 26 markets, is 
the broadest index available, designed to measure returns on emerging market stocks 
that are legally and practically open to foreign portfolio investment, and is a widely- 
used benchmark for international portfolio management purposes. The IFCI Composite 
gained 6.75 in 1996 (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1997). 
On a regional basis, the largest gain came in Latin America. The IFCI Latin 
America Index was up 14% in 1996, followed by an 8.9% gain in the IFCI Asia Index, 
and a loss of about 5.2% in the IFCI Europe/Mideast/Africa Index (Emerging Stock 
Market Factbook 1997). 
While share price performance in most emerging markets was positive, individual 
performance among the emerging markets in 1996 was as diverse as the features of the 
markets themselves. As in many years past, emerging markets could be found both at 
the top and bottom of the list of the world's best performing stock markets. For 
instance, emerging markets swept the top 15 spots for annual performance measured in 
dollar ten-ns, from a list of 76 world stock markets. Only Spain and Sweden from the 
developed markets made the top 20 on this list, which included 54 markets from 
developing countries and 22 from developed countries. The top five performers for 
1996 Nvere Bangladesh (up 196%), Russia (up 156%), Venezuela (up 132%), Hungary 
(up 95%), and China (up 89%). It is noteworthy that the largest gains tended to come 
from some of the smaller, less-knowii emerging markets not contained in any index 
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producer's composite index, though the relatively large Taiwanese market made 18 th on 
the list with a 36% increase (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1997). 
The worst performing markets were also concentrated in emerging markets. 
Twenty-one world equity markets dropped in price in 1996, of which 19 were emerging 
markets. Bulgaria was nearly wiped out as stock prices continued to post losses in 
dollar terms after trading was suspended from September 1996, in light of radical 
currency devaluation. As a consequence, the IFCG Bulgaria Index lost nearly 83% over 
the course of 1996, making it the world's worst performing stock market in 1996. 
Large emerging markets like Korea, Thailand, and South Africa also suffered heavy 
losses, with their IFCI indexes falling 39%, 38%, and 19% for the year in reaction to 
domestic economic problems (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1997). 
Emerging markets' performance was mixed in 1997, with steep losses in Asia 
and strong gains in Latin America highlighting some of the disparities In emerging 
market equity performance. Overall, markets performed poorly in 1997, with the IFC 
Investable Composite Index (IFCI) falling more than 16%, the sharpest one-year 
decline in the index's 10-year history. The sharp 57% fall in the IFCI Asia Index 
easily outweighed the 10% rise in the IFCI Europe/Mideast/Africa (EMEA) Index and 
the nearly 26% rise in the IFCI Latin America Index. The 32-market IFC Global 
(IFCG) Composite Index posted similar results to the IFCI Composite Index. The 
IFCG Asia Index fell 44%, less than IFCI Asia, largely due to strong gains in Chinese 
A-shares, which are not open to foreign investment. In contrast to emerging market 
returns, the U. S. S&P 500 surged 31 % for the year, beating all but eight of the 32 
IFCG market indexes. Other developed stock market returns, with the exception of 
those in Asia, were generally strong across the board (Emerging Stock Market 
Factbook 1998). 
The top perfon-ners of emerging markets in 1997 are Russia (142.8%), Turkey 
(109.9%), Trinidad and Tobago (109.3%), Botswana (99.8%), and Hungary (60.9%). 
The top five losers of emerging markets in 1997 are Thailand (80%), Indonesia 
(74.1%), Malaysia (72.3%), Bulgaria (70.5%), and Korea (69.4%). However, 
Bangladesh Nvere the 6 th losers in 1997 by declining 67.7% (Emerging Stock Market 
Factbook 1998). 
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Although there were only 93 companies listed in the Bangladesh capital market 
in 1988, which is not too bad in comparison to other emerging markets, for example, 
205 in Chile, 483 in Egypt, 102 in Nigeria, 50 in Turkey, and 53 in Zimbabwe. 
However, the listed companies increased in Bangladesh to 128 and to 209 in 1992 and 
1997 respectively, which are pretty good compared to 245 and 295 in Chile, 656 and 
650 in Egypt, 153 and 182 in Nigeria, 145 and 257 in Turkey, and 62 and 64 in 
Zimbabwe. Bangladesh achieved 87 th position in the world ranking of the average 
th th company size whereas Nigeria ranked 79th, Zimbabwe 74 , Egypt 71", Turkey 37 , 
and Chile 3 9th in the world average company size in 1997 (World Development 
Indicator 2001). 
Furthermore, the market capitalisation of Bangladesh was only US$430 million 
in 1988 whereas the market capitalisation of Chile, Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey, and 
Zimbabwe were US$6849 million, US$1760 million, US$960 million, US$1135 
million, and US$774 million respectively. The market capitalisation of Bangladesh 
market increased to US$314 million in 1992 and to US$1668.78 million in 1997 
whereas the market capitalisation of Chile, Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey, and Zimbabwe 
were US$29644 million and US$72046 million, US$3259 million and US$20830 
million, US$1221 million and US$3646 million, US$9931 million and US$61090 
million, US$628 million and US$1969 million respectively in 1992 and 1997 (World 
Development Indicator 2001). 
In addition, the value traded of Bangladesh was only US$4.1 million in 1988 
whereas the value traded of Chile, Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey, and Zimbabwe were 
US$610 million, US$60 million, US$5 million, US$101 million, and US$39 million 
respectively. The value traded of Bangladesh market increased to US$11.2 million in 
1992 and to US$3829.41 million in 1997 whereas the value traded of Chile, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Turkey, and Zimbabwe were US$2029 million and USS7445 million, USS195 
million and US$5859 million, US$14 million and US$132 million, USS8191 million 
and US$59105 million, US$20 million and US$9 million respectively in 1992 and 
1997. However, Bangladesh achieved 12.6% turnover ratio and got 60th position in the 
world stock market tumover whereas Turkey achieved 129.7% and got 7'h position, 
Egypt achieved 33.5% and got 46 th position, Zimbabwe achieved 19% and got 54 th 
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1 1997 (World Development position, and Chile achieved 10.8% and got 61" position 
Indicator 200 1 ). 
The pay-out ratio in the capital market in Bangladesh are excellent in 
comparison to other emerging markets. The dividend yield was 5.7% in Bangladesh in 
1994, which is many times better in comparison to Indonesia 1.5%, China 2.3%, 
Philippines 0.4%, and Taiwan 0.7%. However, the dividend yield of Bangladesh 
reduced a little bit to 4.85% in 1995 and increased to 5.37% in 1997 but still kept the 
same position in the world emerging markets whereas the dividend yield of Indonesia, 
China, Philippines, and Taiwan were 1.5% and 2.9%, 3.2% and 1.3%, 0.6% and 1.4%, 
and 1.2% and 0.6% in 1995 and 1997 respectively (World Development Indicator 
2001). 
Therefore , it 
is also clear from this part that the position of the capital market in 
Bangladesh is very good in comparison to all other emerging markets in all respects. 
2.4.3. Regional Markets vs. Bangladesh 
The stock market in Bangladesh has grown enormously during the last few years. 
But the size of the market is very small compared to the size of the other Asian 
emerging markets. The total market capitalisation of Bangladesh was US$ 1.049 billion 
in 1994 compared to US$ 127.515 billion in India, US$ 12.263 billion in Pakistan, 
$191.778 billion in South Korea and $199.276 billion in Malaysia. However, the 
Bangladesh stock market is also very small compared to the size of the economy. The 
market capitalisation in Bangladesh was only 4.07 percent of GDP in 1994, as against 
25.77 percent in Pakistan, 24.03 percent in Sri Lanka, 104.14 percent in Thailand and 
294.56 percent in Malaysia. Although the market capitalisation of Bangladesh stock 
market increased to US$ 4.551 billion in 1996, which was approximately 15% of GNP 
of Bangladesh but that is still very low in comparison to the other regional countnes 
(Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98). 
Two other features of the underdeveloped stock market in Bangladesh are less 
liquidity of the market and smaller size of companies. Both of these two Indicators 
improved significantly in 1994, but did not reach the level of other emerging markets. 
The tunioN-er ratio, a measure of liquidity of the market, was 14.3 percent for 
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Bangladesh in 1994, compared to 24.1 percent in India, 26.9 percent in Pakistan, 60.9 
percent in Thailand, 58.7 percent in Malaysia and 174.1 percent in South Korea. 
However, the turnover of Bangladesh market drops to 12.6% in 1997 compared to 
43.0% in India, 106.2% in Pakistan, 37.5% in Thailand, 73.4% in Malaysia, and 
188.4% in South Korea (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98). 
The average size of companies in Bangladesh was only US$ 6 million at the end 
of 1994 and increased to US$ 7.5 million at the end of 1997 in terms of market 
capitalisation. Bangladesh ranked 77'h in 1994 and 87 th in 1997 by average size of 
companies among 82 stock markets listed by IFC in 1994 and 96 stock markets listed 
by IFC in 1997. On the other hand, the average company size for Malaysia was US$ 
132.2 million, South Korea US$ 54.0 million, India US$ 22.0, Pakistan US$ 14.0, and 
Sri Lanka US$ 8.8 million and ranked 41't'57 th 578 
th 
581 
St, and 84th respectively by IFC 
in 1997 among the 96 stock markets. Therefore, turnover ratio and company size 
indicate that Bangladeshi capital market's position is not too bad compared to other 
Asian markets (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98). 
The annual change in stock price index was significant despite decline in price 
indices in most of the South Asian markets. The stock price index in Bangladesh rose 
by 115.8 percent in 1994 and rose by 196% in 1996. However, Bangladesh ranked as 
the top five performers by the change in price index amongst 76 countries in 1996 by 
IFC. On the other hand, the stock market index in India rose by 8.6% and declined by 
2.7%, Malaysia declined by 23.8% and rose by 24.4%, Pakistan declined by 5.3% and 
9.6%, Sri Lanka declined by 0.3% and 9.4%, Thailand declined by 19.2% and 5.4%, 
and South Korea rose by 18.6% and declined by 26.2% in 1994 and 1996 respectively. 
However, the Bangladesh stock market massively crashed in 1997 by losing 67% of its 
stock market index. In contrast, Indian market gained 16%, Malaysian market lose 
52%, Pakistani market gained 28.9%, Sri Lanka market gained 19%, Thailand market 
lose 55.2%, and South Korean market lose 42.2% (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 
1995-98). 
The price earning ratio in Bangladesh was only 10.1 in 1994 compared to 17.6 
in Sri Lanka, 23-33 in Pakistan, 26.7 in India, 34.5 in Korea and 29 in Malaysia. 
However, the price earning ratio in Bangladesh increased to 13.5 in 1997 compared to 
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.7 in Sri Lanka, 14.8 in Pakistan, 15.2 in India, 17.9 in Korea and 9.5 in Malaysia 
(Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98). 
As it has already been mentioned earlier that the pay-out ratio is extraordinary 
in Bangladesh in comparison to any capital markets. The dividend yield was 5.7% ill 
Bangladesh in 1994, which is many times better in comparison to India 1%, Pakistan 
1.6%, Korea 1.3%, Malaysia 1.8%, Thailand 2%, and Sri Lanka 1.7%. However, 
although the dividend yield of Bangladesh reduced a little bit to 5.37% in 1997, which 
kept the position of Bangladesh almost at the same level except the few whereas the 
dividend yield of India 1.8%, Pakistan 3.2%, Korea 3%, Malaysia 4%, Thailand 7.7%, 
and Sri Lanka 2.6% (Emerging Stock Market Factbook 1995-98). 
Therefore, this part also gives the same conclusion that although the capital 
market in Bangladesh is small in size but Bangladesh are still perfon-ning very fine iii 
comparison to the regional markets. 
2.5. Conclusion: 
Bangladesh still has potential for substantial rise in stock price and because of 
relatively lower stock price, the investments produce high dividend yield in the capital 
market in Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh market also showed signs of increasing 
maturity in terms of capital raising power. Almost all shares floated in the market were 
overwhelmingly subscribed. The most impressive side the capital market in 
Bangladesh is that even though the share price fell at times, aggregate value traded 
continued to rise with even rising market capitalisation. 
However, because of exemption of tax on dividend income and income tax 
incentives and high return level against the backdrop of low interest rate, local 
investors have involved themselves heavily in the securities market. Huge idle money 
is being geared to the stock exchanges making the securities market more liquid and 
vibrant than before. Moreover, Government is considering more augment steps to make 
the securities market vibrant as it has already established itself as the most significant 
tool for the country's private sector development initiatives. 
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The capital market in Bangladesh successfully faced the aften-nath of the 
Mexican crash and despite a huge off load of shares by foreign investors, the market 
did not collapse, rather its trading volume increased in multiple effect absorbing almost 
all those off loaded shares by the local investors. Although Seok and Park 2 (1992) 
explain the underdeveloped nature of stock market of Bangladesh but the scenario has 
changed in couple of years. As we have observed from the past experience that 
Bangladesh market outperformed in 1994 and 1996. In both of the years Bangladesh 
market perforrns best among the world capital markets. Therefore, it is quite clear that 
although the capital market in Bangladesh is very small in size and really a baby in the 
list of capital markets but they are working very fine in comparison to the world capital 
markets (developed, emerging, and regional). 
2 Seok and Park presented a comparison of the stock market statistics for Bangladesh Nvith four selected 
South East Asian countries. 
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Chapter Three: The Dhaka Stock Exchange: An Introduction 
3.0. Introduction: 
As a member of the emerging markets, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) was 
not much stable since its formation but was rather volatile. The market grew at a slow 
but steady rate since 1976 and continued until 1988. However, the market lost about 
25% in 1990 but re-gained and moved back to the position in 1991 and again 
continued with the steady growth rate until 1994. The market also took a short break in 
1995 (DSE Daily Price Quotations 1976-95). Therefore, these unstable trends of the 
market remind again and again that the market is not only dependent on country's 
economic factors but also largely depend on many other non-economic factors 
including internal political situations. 
The most remarkable years for the Dhaka Stock Exchange are year 1996 and 
year 1997. In 1996 the DSE gained 196% and on the other hand, losses 68% in 1997. If 
1996 was the phenomenal year of gains for Bangladesh equities, 1997 was equally 
impressive for its sizeable losses. Along with the regional financial crisis and local 
political tunnoil, there was no reason for Bangladesh equities to gain in 1997. The 
forsaken state of the equities market resulted in a 67.1% loss for the DSE All-Share 
Price Index in Taka terms while the dollar-based IFCG Bangladesh Index crashed by 
67.7% (Emerging Market Factbook 1998, p. 258). 
The major objective of this chapter is to describe the major features of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. For this purpose, this chapter will basiclly focuses on the main 
issues of the DSE and specially the issues related to this thesis and dividend policy. As 
this chapter is performed to discuss the issues of the DSE in relation to this thesis, so) 
this chapter incorporates tax clientele of dividend, dividend payment pattern, 
ownership structure, and all other issues related to this thesis. The rest of the chapter is 
divided into five sections. The general overview of the DSE including the history and 
development of the DSE are incorporated in section 3.1. Section 3.2 contains the major 
characteristics of the market including tax clientele of dividend policy, share and 
capital, tumover, and market capitalization in the DSE. The performance of the DSE in 
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the last ten years along with the payment of dividends, IPO, and price index are 
included in section 3.3. Section 3.4 incorporates the remarkable features of the DSE 
listed non-financial sector companies. Finally, a summary and concluding remarks are 
included in section 3.5. 
3.1. General Overview of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
3.1.1. History and Development of the Dhaka Stock Exchange: 
In the early part of 1952, about five years after the independence of erstwlille 
Pakistan in 1947, the Calcutta Stock Exchange prohibited transactions of Pakistani 
stocks and shares. This necessitated forination of a Stock Exchange in the erstwhile 
East Pakistan and following a series of discussions in a number of forums whether the 
then East Pakistan should have an independent Stock Exchange or have a branch of a 
Stock Exchange with the headquarter in the then West Pakistan, the East Pakistan Stock 
Exchange Association Ltd., an independent Stock Exchange was incorporated on April 
28ý 1954. It changed name to the East Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. on June 23,1962 
and finally to its present name of the Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. on May 14,1964. 
Although incorporated in 1954, formal trading on the East Pakistan Stock Exchange 
Association Ltd. was started in 1956 at Narayanganj. In 1958, the Stock Exchange was 
shifted to Dhaka and started functioning at the then Narayanganj Chamber Building in 
the Motijheel Commercial Area, now known as the Metropolitan Chamber of 
Commerce Building. The Dhaka Stock Exchange purchased its own land and moved to 
its own building at 9F, Motijheel Commercial Area, Dhaka in 1959 (see 
www. dsebd. org). 
It may be worthwhile to mention here that in 1971, prior to the emergence of 
sovereign Bangladesh, there were 196 securities listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
with a total paid-up capital of Taka 4 billion. Daily average transaction of shares during 
that period was about 20,000. After the independence of Bangladesh, the trading 
activities of the Stock Exchange remained suspended up to 1976 due to the economic 
policy pursued by the then Government. With change in the Government policy in 
1976, the trading activities were resumed with only 9 companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange and the operational activities since then have considerably expanded, the 
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momentum being very significant since 1983. n ies I The growth pattern of listed secu iti 
from the year 1976 is given in Table 3.1. 
It is clear from Table 3.1 that during the recent years not only the number of 
listed companies on the Dhaka Stock Exchange have increased but also the intrinsic 
strength of the stock market have significantly increased. This healthy trend outlines the 
role of the Dhaka Stock Exchange in the development of a stable capital market 
fonnation in Bangladesh. 
Table 3.1: Growth Pattern of Listed Securities: 
Year Listed Companies Listed Securities 
(in Million) 
Paid-up Capital (in 
Million Tk. ) 
Market Capitalisation 
(in Million Tk. ) 
1976 9 13.61 137.50 146.00 
1977 11 14.65 230.50 248.50 
1978 14 18.45 281,30 305.40 
1979 17 21.23 365.10 393.70 
1980 23 22.23 405.90 436.90 
1981 26 26.65 528.10 603.20 
1982 29 32.42 725.60 811.60 
1983 49 44.37 1001.50 1211.30 
1984 58 62.35 1546.60 2256.50 
1985 69 86.45 2059.70 3492.64 
1986 78 99.59 2653.00 5730.60 
1987 85 105.28 3094.70 12635.10 
1988 93 123.06 3663.70 13557.00 
1989 105 149.68 4539.20 15351.00 
1990 116 161.37 5361.10 11486.00 
1991 120 167.64 5586.59 10397.00 
1992 128 172.34 6020.34 12299.00 
1993 132 195.06 8201.74 18098.73 
1994 150 241.50 11673.80 41770.70 
1995 175 341.78 19438.05 56518.14 
1996 191 397.43 23052.40 168106.00 
1997 209 510.48 28159.80 71255.54 
Source: Dhaka Stock Exchange annual Reports and Monthly Reviews (1976-98). 
Besides, the market is growing in all aspects day by day and moving towards 
the maturity phase. A summary statistics about the overall growth and development of 
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3.2. Characteristics of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
3.2.1. Remarkable Features of the DSE: 
3.2.1.1. Share and Capital: 
There are approximately 5 10 million securities listed on the DSE. Among them 
99.3% are shares, 0.5% are mutual funds, and 0.20% are debentures. These figures 
indicate that the market is completely covered with shares. The total issued capital of 
the market is approximately 28160 million in Taka. The average size of the company is 
218 million in Taka. However, there are some big companies enlisted in the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange whose issued capital is over 1000 million Taka including Shine Pukur 
Holdings Ltd. (2520 million Taka), Rahima Food Corporation (2000.002 million Taka), 
Rupall Bank (1250 million Taka), and Monno Fabrics (1150 million Taka). Moreover, 
there are also some very small companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange whose 
issued capital is less than 5 million Taka including Hill Plantation Ltd. (1.5 million 
Taka), The Engineers (2 million Taka), and Monno Staflers Ltd. (4.00 million Taka). 
3.2.1.2. Market Capitalisation: 
Market capitalisation of the Dhaka Stock Exchange was only 146 million Taka 
in 1976, which increased at a steady rate until 1989 but slowed down a little bit in 
1990-1991. However, market capitalisation got back to the position in 1992 and kept 
continuing until 1995. Moreover, the most remarkable years are 1996 and 1997. In 
1996, market capitalisation increased about 235% but declined sharply in 1997 by 58%. 
The average market capitalisation is roughly 5% of GDP (Table 3.2). 
3.2.1.3. Turnover of Shares: 
The turnover of shares in the Dhaka Stock Exchange has moved dramatically in 
the last few years. The trading volume of the DSE shares were not much substantial 
until 1993 but increased sharply by 640% in 1994 and remained almost the same in 
1995. However, the trading volume again increased by 550% in 1996. The trading 
volume in the DSE stood at 98,292,050 shares in 1997. In addition, duringl997-98 
volume declined by 18%, on the other hand, value declined by 64%. 
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During 1996-97, the DSE turnover was Tk. 35413 million and the same 
declined to Tk. 12616.9 million during 1997-98. The average daily turnover declined 
in tenns of value by 61% from Taka 126.0 million in 1996-97 to Taka 49.3 million in 
1997-98. However, because of introduction of automated on-line trading the daily 
turnover showed vital growth and stood at Tk. 550.0 million on 28th September 1998 
(Table 3.2). 
3.2.1.4. Tax Clientele of Dividend in the Dhaka Stock Exchange: 
The tax rate on the dividend income for the institutional shareholders is 15% in 
Bangladesh. However, the tax rate on the dividend income for the individual 
shareholders varies depending on the individual shareholder's slab of income, so, the 
tax rate for the individual shareholders vary one group to the other. But recently the tax 
rate has flatted to 10%, which is deductible at source irrespective of the slab of income 
(FY1998-99). This is the lowest tax rate on dividend income ever for individual 
shareholders in Bangladesh. It is, however, notable that the lowest tax rate on dividend 
income usually encourages the shareholders to prefer dividends to capital gains. Now 
let's find out whether the shareholders prefer dividend to capital gain in practice. 
However, before flatting the dividend income tax rate to 10% for all classes of 
individual shareholders in the financial year 1998-99, individual shareholders used to 
get an exemption of total income for tax purpose up to a certain limit and the rest of the 
income used to be taxed at the differential rates depending on the slab of income. And 
the basic rate was in between 10-15% and the highest rate was 25%. 
Moreover , in case of capital gains, 
if the income arises within 5 years from 
acquisition of capital assets then lower tax payers would be taxed at 15% and higher 
tax payers would be taxed at 25%; and if the income arises after 5 years of acquisition 
of capital assets then both the tax payers would be taxed at 15%. 
In addition, the tax rate for capital gains have been changed in 1997-98 as: if the 
income arises within 5 years from acquisition of capital assets then lower tax payers 
would be taxed at 10% and higher tax payers would be taxed at 25%; and if the income 
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arises after 5 years of acquisition of capital assets then lower tax payers would be taxed 
at 10% but higher tax payers would be taxed at 15%. 
3.2.1.4. a. Tax Clientele in the Dhaka Stock Exchange in FY 1995-96 and 1996-97: 
Tax on Dividend Income: 
Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Tax Rates on Dividend Income p=0p= . 15 p =. 25 
Capital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Arises within 5 years of acquisition z=0 z=. 15 z =. 25 
Where, 
tax on dividend 
z= tax on capital gain 
Therefore, we see that p=z, so, all the tax payers are indifferent for choosing 
either capital gains or dividends in this case. 
Capital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Arises after 5 years of acquisition z == 0 z= . 15 z= . 15 
In this case, we see that p>z, so, tax exempt and low tax payers are indifferent for the 
preference but higher tax payers will prefer capital gains to dividends. 
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3.2-1.4. b. Tax Clientele in the Dhaka Stock Exchange in FY1997-98: 
Tax on Dividend Income: 
Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Tax Rates on Dividend Income p=01 P=. 10 1 P=. 25 
Capital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Arises within 5 years of acquisition z=0 z=. 10 z= . 25 
Therefore, as p=z, so, all the tax payers are indifferent for choosing either dividends 
or capital gains. 
Capital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Arises after 5 years of acquisition z=0 z =. 10 z 15 
Tax exempt and low tax payers are indifferent but higher tax payers will prefer capital 
gain to dividend in this case because p>z. 
3.2.1.4. c. Tax Clientele in the Dhaka Stock Exchange in FYI 998-99: 
Tax Rates on Dividends: 
Tax rates on Dividend Income 
Tax Status of the Shareholders 
Basic or Lower Higher Rate 
Rate 
p=. 10 p= . 10- 
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Capital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
LoNver Rate 
Rate 
Arises within 5 years of acquisition z=0 z=. 10 z= . 25 
Canital Gain Tax: 
Period Tax status of the shareholders 
Exempt Basic or Higher 
Lower Rate 
Rate 
Arises after 5 years of acquisition z=0 z=. 10 z= . 15 
The exempt shareholders will prefer capital gains to dividend because they are 
not getting tax exemption in dividend income. However, the basic tax payers will be 
indifferent between capital gain and dividend because both the rates are the same. And 
the higher tax payers will prefer dividend to capital gain because they are supposed to 
pay 10% tax on dividend income whereas they are supposed to pay more taxes on 
capital gains. 
3.2.1.5. Ownership Structure: 
It is observed the closely held nature of the ownership in the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange because a large proportion of stocks held by insiders (directors, employees, 
and group management). However, Bangladesh govenunent also plays a vital role iii 
holding stocks in the DSE. Bangladesh govenu-nent holds the major shares of some 
companies and small amount of shares of many of the companies. Moreover, 
Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) also plays an important role in holding 
shares in the DSE. As an underwriter and as well as the operator of the DSE listed nine 
mutual funds, the ICB holds a large many of shares of different companies. Howcvcr, 
arriong the institutional shareholders, the ICB is the major shareholder in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, foreign owiicrs are also largely holding the shares of different companies. I 
Even though foreigners do not hold the major proportion of shares but foreign 
t ownership exists more or less in each and ever-. v compan-Y of the DSE. In addi ion, on 
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an average the general shareholders are holding 25% of the shares of the market. 
Finally, as we see the closely held nature of ownership in the DSE, which Indicates 
clearly that the outsider owners are unprotected, so, it is assumed that the insiders 
usually maximise their own benefits by profit transfer and asset striping and 
consequently the firms go for higher amount of external financing. However, it is also 
clear that the shareholders obviously get a very lower amount of dividends. 
3.2.1.6. Group of Companies: 
So far, there are eight groups of companies in the DSE and each and every 
group of company has about 8/10 companies listed in the DSE. Among the group of 
companies BEXIMCO group is the largest in the DSE and this group is the most 
influential group in the DSE. BEXIMCO group consists of ten companies, which are 
listed, in the DSE. Among them three are from pharmaceuticals and chemicals, four are 
from textiles, and one each from services and real estate, foods and allied, and 
miscellaneous sectors. Among others, APEX group, ISLAM group, and MONNO 
group of companies are remarkable. It is worthy to mention that as the group of 
companies are more powerful owners of the market, so, they have a major influence on 
their group enlisted companies and as well as on the market as a whole. Therefore, the 
closely held nature also confirms here by the higher amount of insider control here, 
which ultimately discourages the dividend payment in the market. 
3.3. Performance of DSE 
3.3.1. Performance of DSE: At a Glance: 
3.3.1.1. All Share Price IndeX5: 
The price index, a barometer of price movement of all the listed securities, 
witnessed a steady movement since 1983 but massive changes in 1996 and 1997. Year 
1996 makes an extraordinary bullish movement of the market and bearish spell during 
1997-98. The index moves to 2300 points in 1996 and remarkably moves to 3648 
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against I 111.55 points on 30-6-97. The price index in June 1998 was the lowest ever 
since 1994. 
Due to regional economic depression and the re-allocation of international 
portfolio investment, the price index of almost all the emerging economics in East Asia 
declined during 97-98 which may be seen from the data given in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Re2ional Markets: 
Country Price Index (24.6.97) Price Index (24.6.98) % Decrease 
Thailand 496 264 47% 
Hong Kong 15065 8665 43% 
Indonesia 713 431 46% 
Pakistan 1566 867 45% 
DSE 1097 678.23 38% 
3ource: L)naKa L 'ýIOCK Excnange AnnualKeport 1991-98. 
In comparison with the industrially developed countries in Asia, the position of 
the DSE is rather better than other markets. 
3.3.1.2. Initial Public offering (IPO): 
Since 1993-94 a significant number of companies are using the market to raise 
capital. The market is now capable of handling big flotation. As the market is 
successful to attract the investors, new companies are relying more on the market rather 
than on banks to raise capital. In 1997-98 public offerings of shares and debentures 
valued at Taka 438.5 million were made and against that there was a public response 
for Taka 1149.4 million. Even in the depressed market (FYI 997-98), most of the issues 
were over subscribed except one or two specialised issues (see Table 3.4). 
3.3.1.3. Responsibilities of Listed Companies: 
The DSE considers that the listed companies have a great responsibility to 
sustain investors' confidence and protect their interests. Disclosures of their accounts, 
transparency in their statements as well as availability of broader financial products will 
go a long way towards further strengthening the activities of the securities market. 
Bringing accounting standards to international norms has also become a pri n I'D "o ity whose 
implementation will help to improve iiivestor confidence both local and international 
arena. It is Nvorthy to note that the financial operations of the listed companies are 
44 The Dhaka Stock Exchange 
gradually improving. During the fiscal year 1997-98,124 listed companies out of 213 
declared dividends ranging from 5% to 150% and showed better perforinance in their 
operations (Table 3-5). 
3.3.1.4. Payments of Dividends: 
The figures show that even though as a member of the emerging markets the 
payment pattern of the DSE listed companies is appreciating. Approximately 70% of 
the companies held AGM and 50% of the companies declare dividends in each year. 
However, pay-out rate is not too bad in comparison to other emerging markets. The 
average divided rate is approximately 20%, which is better in comparison to the time 
deposit interest of Bangladesh. 
3.4. Characteristics of the DSE Listed Non-financial Sector Companies 
3.4.1. Remarkable Features of the Non-financial Sector Companies of the DSE: 
3.4.1.1. Market Capitalisation: 
Different sizes of non-financial sector companies are listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. There are some very small companies whose market capitalisation are even 
less than 5 million in Taka. However, there are also some very big companies whose 
capitalisation are over 1000 million in Taka. The average market capitalisation of the 
DSE listed non-financial sector companies is approximately 218 million in Taka. The 
market capitalisation of the non-financial sector companies is almost 70% of the total 
market capitalisation of the DSE. 
3.4.1.2. Payment Pattern: 
Approximately 93% of the non-financial sector companies hold Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) in every year and almost 55% of the companies pay dividends. 
However, 3-4% of the companies pays stock dividends and 34% of the companies also 
declares fight shares as well. The average dividend payment is approximately 20%. 
Moreover, some of the companies pay very lower amount of dividends, e. g., less than 
5% and on the other hand, some companies also pay very higher amount of dividends, 
e. g., 200-300%. But majority of the companies pay moderate dividend, e. g., 
approximately 15%-25% (Table 3.6, and Table 3.7). 
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3.4-1.3. Risk and Return: 
The average Dimson'S6 (1979) beta for the non-financial sector companies is 
approximately 15-20% except 2/3 years, which is quite good for a market like the DSE. 
However, the security return is very low in comparison with other emerging markets, 
which is approximately 2-3% only (Table 3.8). 
3.4.1.4. Ownership Structure: 
Insiders (directors and sponsors, employees, and group management) hold the 
major shares of the DSE listed non-financial sectors companies. The insiders hold 
approximately 30% of the shares. However, general shareholders hold approximately 
27% of the shares. Moreover, the institutional shareholders hold only 15% of the 
shares. Among others, foreigners hold approximately 11 % and Bangladesh Government 
holds approximately 6-7% of the shares. Therefore, these figures also indicate the 
closely held nature of the non-financial sector companies in the DSE (Table 3.9). 
3.5. Conclusion 
The stock market in the independent Bangladesh began its journey in 1976 by 
starting the activities of the DSE with only 9 companies. The growth of the market was 
relatively slow until 1982 but started to move up since 1983. The year 1996 was the 
year of the boom for the DSE but suddenly the market crashed in 1997. The main 
reason for that crash was the bad economic condition in the region. Apart from that, the 
market is growing in size and moving up on a steady rate. However, the pay-out 
patterns of the market especially cash dividend is about 20%, which is not too bad as an 
emerging market and in comparison with the bank interest in Bangladesh as well. 
Moreover, it is observed a closely held nature of ownership in the DSE listed 
companies, which is really a bad news for market as a whole. Although DSE is a baby 
in the list of capital markets but it is walking through step by step. 
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However, as we have already been mentioned earlier that fully computerised 
automated trading system established in the Dhaka Stock Exchange in 1998, to reap the 
full benefits of automation it is an emerging need to establish a central depository 
System (CDS). Since automation, the DSE daily turnover has increased to as high as 
Taka 550.0 million and it is anticipated further growth in the future. The introduction 
of a CDS will eliminate the labour intensive nature of the DSE's present settlemelits by 
ending the physical delivery and execution of transfer deeds. Under this system, all the 
securities will be kept deposited at the CDS bank, which will record and transfer the 
securities from one account to the another and accordingly the risks of losses; forgeries 
and duplication will also be reduced. 
Furthermore, the government of Bangladesh has recently reasserted their 
determination to plough ahead with the privatisation of a number of SOE's (State 
Owned Enterprises) as well as allowing pension and trust funds to participate in the 
market. For investors with an appetite for risk the rewards are tangible; as one venture 
capitalist recently pointed out, "Bangladesh is a venture capitalist dream compared to 
other economies in the region". 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.0. Introduction: 
Research is defined as any organised inquiry carried out to provide information 
for the solution of problem (Emory, 1980). However, research methodology is the 
process where there is a clear purpose and objective, define the research problem, and 
develop strategies for the solution of problems that have been identified. In general, the 
research methodology consists of four major stages: exploration of the situation, 
development of the research design, data collection, and analysis and interpretation of 
the results (Emory, 1980). 
Moreover, research methodology is the way to handle research problems. There 
are two methods of research: one, nomothetic, and two , ideographic. These two research 
methods are also known as quantitative or deductive method and qualitative or 
inductive method (Bryman, 1988). Typically, quantitative technique deals with either 
primary or secondary data and solves the research problem through parametric or non- 
parametric statistical tests. On the other hand, qualitative technique deals with the 
theoretical issues and concerns about different other dimensions of the research, e. g., 
behavioural or theoretical research. This chapter primarily discusses general 
characteristics of the research methodologies and explains the justification of choosing 
quantitative research method for this study. This chapter also explains secondary data 
collection procedure, secondary data analysis techniques, and justifies the choice of 
secondary data analysis techniques for this empirical study. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. An overview of the 
alternative research methodologies including the explanation of choosing quantitative 
research method for this study is incorporated in section 4.1. Section 4.2 provides a 
general discussion on the data and sample of the study along with the discussion of 
sample selection criteria, sample size and period, and secondary data collection for the 
empirical phases. The suitability of secondary data analysis and the justification of 
choosing secondary data analysis techniques for this study are discussed in section 4.3. 
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The secondary data analysis techniques for each of the three areas of empirical work 
including the explanation of the alternative techniques and the justification for choosing 
the data analysis techniques is incorporated in section 4.4. Finally, section 4.5 contains 
the general summary and concluding remarks of this chapter. 
4.1. Choice of Research Methodology: 
There are two types of research methods: one, nornothetic and two, ideographic. 
Nomothetic methodologies have an emphasis on the importance of basing research upon 
systematic protocol and technique (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This is epitomised in the 
approach and methods employed in the natural science, which focus upon the process of 
testing hypotheses in accordance with the standards of scientific rigour. Standardised 
research instruments of all kinds are prominent among these methodologies. Emphasis 
is therefore placed upon covering-law explanations and deduction, using quantified 
operationalisations of concepts in which the element of motive/purpose/meaning is lost, 
because of the need for precise models and hypotheses for testing (Gill and Johnson, 
1997). This research is also called deductive method of research. A deductive research 
method entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical structure prior to its 
testing through empirical observation (Gill and Johnson, 1997). Ideographic 
methodologies (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), on the other hand, emphasise the analysis of 
subjective accounts that one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involving 
oneself in the everyday flow of life. There is an emphasis upon theory grounded in such 
empirical observations, which takes account of subjects meaning and interpretational 
systems in order to gain explanation by understanding (Gill and Johnson, 1997). 
However, this method is also called induction method of research. The logical ordering 
of induction is the reverse of deduction as it involves moving from the ýplane' of 
observation of the empirical world to the construction of explanations and theories 
about what has been observed (Gill and Johnson, 1997). In addition, Easterby-Smith et 
al. (1991) named these two methods as positivism and phenomenology. Positi'vism 
views reality as external and objective, with the role of research cast as making reliable 
and valid observations of this reality in order to test fundamental laws hypothesised 
from existing theory. In contrast, phenomenological approach is inductive in that 
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researchers build theories and propositions only following a detailed understanding of 
expenence (Creswell, 1994). 
These two research methods are also known as: quantitative method and 
qualitative method. Bryman (198 8) defines quantitative research as, 
'Quantitative research is, then, a genre which uses a 
special language which appears to exhibit some 
similarity to the ways in which scientists talks about 
how they investigate the natural order - variables, 
control, measurement, experiment'(p. 12). 
Bryman (1988), however, defines qualitative research as, 
'The best known of these methods is participant 
observation, which entails the sustained immersion 
of the researcher among those whom he or she seeks 
to study with a view to generating a rounded, in- 
depth account of the group, organization, or 
whatever'(p. 45). 
Quantitative research is often conceptuallsed by its practitioners as having a 
logical structure in which theories determine the problems to which researchers address 
themselves in the form of hypotheses derived from general theories (Bryman, 1988). 
However, Creswell (1994) indicates that quantitative studies are characterised by the 
use of deductive form of logic wherein theories and hypotheses are tested in a cause- 
and-effect order. Concepts, variables, and hypotheses are chosen before the study 
begins and remain fixed throughout the study (see Figure 4.1). 
However, Bryman (1988) mentioned that, quantitative research, then, could be 
seen as linked partly to positivism and partly to diffuse and general commitment to the 
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practices of the natural scientist. While all of the characteristics of what is 
conventionally taken to be positivism can be divined in quantitative research, not all of 
its preoccupations can be directly attributed to positivism. Rather, It seems more 
sensible to see more of them as a manifestation of a vague commitment to the ways of 
the natural sciences. It is also seems that there may be aspects of the general approach 
of quantitative researchers which are not directly attributable to either positivism or to 
the practices of the natural sciences. Moreover, qualitative research is interactiVe 
research. As such, the biases, values, and judgement of the researcher become stated 
explicitly in the research report (Creswell, 1994). 
Figure 4.1: The Logical Structure of the Quantitative Research Process: 
Main Phases Intervening Processes 










Q , niirce- Creswell ( 1994). 
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However, Ghaun et al. (1995) noted that the main difference between qualitative 
and quantitative research is not quality but procedure. In qualitative research, statistical 
methods or other procedures of quantification do not arrive at findings. The difference 
between quantitative and qualitative methods is not just a question of quantification, but 
also a reflection of different perspectives on knowledge and research objectives. 
Table 4.1: The Major Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research are: 
Aspects of Difference Quantitative Qualitative 
1. Role of research Preparatory Means to exploration of actor's 
interpretation 
2. Relation between researcher and Distant Close 
subject 
3. Researcher's stance in relation to Outsider Insider 
subject 
4. Relationship between theory Confirmation Emergent 
concepts and research 
5. Research strategy Structured Unstructured 
6. Scope of findings Nornothetic Ideographic 
7. Image of social reality Static and Processual and socially constructed 
external to by actor 
actor 
8. Nature of data Hard, reliable Rich, deep 
Nource: unauri et al. (199D). 
Moreover, quantitative research is typically taken to be exemplified by the social 
survey and by experimental investigation. In contrast, qualitative research tends to be 
associated with particular observation and unstructured, in-depth interviewing (Bryman, 
1988). 
Closely allied to the two philosophical paradigms is the choice between 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies (Creswell, 1994). Maanen (1983) 
defines qualitative methods as an array of interpretative techniques which seek to 
describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or naturally occurring phenomena in the social world. The 
primary techniques associated with qualitative methods are interviews5 observation and 
dairy methods. However, qualitative methodology provides the researcher with an 
opportunity to probe a small number of samples in depth to uncover new clues, open up 
new, dimension of a problem and secure vivid, accurate and inclusive accounts that are 
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based on personal experience. Moreover, qualitative design is inherently complex and 
time consuming as design rules and procedures are not fixed (Creswell, 1994). 
It is well known that quantitative method is more suitable for testing the 
consequence of theory. Researchers agreed that quantitative research method is suitable 
and easier in case of longitudinal studies, i. e., working with larger sample and longer 
period. Besides these, the basic problems of qualitative research are: one, the ability of 
the investigator to see through other peoples eye and to interpret events from their point 
of view; two, the relationship between theory and research in the qualitative tradition; 
and three, the extent to which qualitative research deriving from case studies can be 
generalised (Bryman, 1988, p. 72). In contrast, the major strength of quantitative 
research are: one, reliable data source, two, logical structure, three, theories deten-nine 
the research problems, andfour, hypotheses derived from general theories. 
This study conducts quantitative research method for many reasons: one, nature 
of research problem of this study, which is measurable and objective rather than 
subjective; two, this study tests the consequence of theories in practical world; three, 
quantitative method possesses high internal validity and generallsed; four, quantitative 
method is easily applicable for longitudinal study; and five, quantitative method 
stimulates further studies and it is easily reliable, which eventually helps to verify the 
findings as well as provides direction for the acceptance, modification, or necessary to 
formulate new theory. Therefore, the logical structure of the quantitative method and 
the nature of research problem of this study directs to prefer quantitative research 
method for the proposed research. 
There are two ways of collecting data for quantitative research: one, primary 
data collection; and two, secondary data collection. It is worth mentioning that primary 
data is quite unable to deal with the nature of the research problems and research 
questions of this thesis. However, while primary data collection procedure considers 
different dimension and aspects into the research (e. g., opinion survey), this process is 
problematic for many reasons: one, lack of response; Avo, unreliable data; three, 
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different opinion from open end questionnaire; four, less consideration of opinion in 
case of close end questionnaire; five, difficult to conduct panel study; six, Costly; and 
seven, time consuming. On the other hand, secondary data collection is easier and less 
time consuming. It is also possible to explore the data for patterns of change and 
continuity (longitudinal analysis of data) as opposed to a static cross-sectional analysis. 
However, secondary data is free from subjectivity. Secondary data can also provide a 
means of triangulating data (Blumer, 1984). In addition, as this research employs panel 
study, it needs to collect data for the same companies for several years (10 years), which 
is virtually complicated in case of primary data collection. Therefore, these are the 
reasons to collect data from secondary sources for the proposed study. 
Finally, in order to solve the proposed research problems in the emerging 
markets, this study employs quantitative research methodology and conducts secondary 
data collection procedure to collect data from the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 
companies. 
4.2. Data and Sample: 
4.2.1. Sample Selection Criteria: 
Primarily, the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed all companies (209) took into 
account. 
Investment companies (10 mutual funds) are then excluded because these are the 
portfolios of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed securities. 
Banking and Insurance companies (32) are then excluded from the sample 
because of their differential accounting system. 
(IV) The companies are then excluded from the sample which have all company data 
missing. 
(v) The companies are then excluded from the sample which have all market data 
missing. 
(vi) The companies or particular years for certain companies are excluded from the 
sample where outliers massively pushing up or pulling down the average 
tendency of any particular variable. 
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4.2-2. Sample Size and Period: 
(a) Sample Size: The final sample consists of 153 Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 
companies. 
(b) Sample Period: Ten years period (1988-1997) is considered for this study. 
Table 4.2: Year-wise Listing, De-listing, and Sample Included Non-financial Sector Companies of 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange: 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Listed 93 105 116 120 128 132 150 175 191 209 
Companies 
De-listed - - - - - - 2 6 7 - Companies 
Financial Sector 16 18 21 21 21 23 28 37 40 42 
Companies 
Non-Financial 77 87 95 99 107 109 122 139 152 167 
Sector 
Companies 
Sample Included 73 83 88 91 99 101 113 130 143 153 
Companies 
I 
The final sample includes 153 Dhaka Stock Exchange listed non-financial 
companies classified as nine sectors (engineering, food and allied products, fuel and 
power, jute, textile, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, paper and printing, services and 
real estate, and miscellaneous sector). However, it is classified all these 153 non- 
financial sector companies as engineering, food and allied products , jute and textile, 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and miscellaneous sector for this study. 
Table 4.3: Sector-wise Sample Distribution is as Follows: 
Name of Sector Number of Companies 
Engineering 21 
Food and Allied Products 28 
Jute and Textile 43 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 24 
Miscellaneous 37 
Total 153 
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There were 93 companies listed in the DSE in 1988 but that increased to 105 in 
1989, to 116 in 1990, and to 209 in 1997. So, it is observable that the listed companies 
of the DSE are increasing every year because of new listed companies. This study 
considered all the DSE listed non-financial companies for the ten years period (1988- 
97) as the sample, i. e., it conducts panel study. However, as the sample size is not same 
for every year but rather the sample size increases every. This type of panel is called 
unbalanced panel (Classens el al. 1996). This study conducts ten yearly average cross- 
section models and pooled models (time-series and cross-section together). As Classens 
et al. (1996) mentioned that average cross-section models and pooled models work very 
fine with unbalanced panel data, so, there is no problem to conduct the secondary 
analysis of this study with unbalanced panel data. However, the number of observations 
in pooled regression analysis would be ((SAMPLE SIZE * NUMBER OF YEARS) - 
MISSING CASES) because of the unbalanced panel data. For example, in case of this 
study, the number of observations in the pooled model would be ((153*10)-missing 
cases). 
4.2.3. Secondary Data Collection: 
4.2.3.1. Empirical Part One: Determinants of Dividend Policy 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange listed all non-financial sector companies over the 
period of 1988-1997 is primarily considered as the sample of this empirical phase. 
However, as we have already been mentioned earlier, a few number of companies are 
excluded from the sample because either all of the company or market data of those 
companies are unavailable. So, the sample size became smaller than the actual 
companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Therefore, the final sample consists of 
153 Dhaka Stock Exchange listed non-financial sector companies for this empirical 
part. All the company data are collected from the annual reports of the listed non- 
financial sector companies of the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period of 1988-1997. 
A part of the market data (1988-1991) are collected from the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
price quotations, published records of the Dhaka Stock Exchange, and the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange computer database. The rest of the market data (1992-1997) are 
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collected from the data channel (Datastream). However, the macro-economic data are 
collected from the published reports of National Board of Revenue of Bangladesh. 
4.2.3.2. Empirical Part Two: Testing Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour 
Models 
As previous studies suggest that researchers always consider different company 
and market characteristics in selecting sample for testing behavioural models, this 
motivates us to consider a wide-variety of company and market characteristics ill 
selecting the sample for this study. The Dhaka Stock Exchange listed all non-financial 
sector companies are primarily considered as the sample of this study. Companies are 
then selected for this study by considering the regularity of paying dividends and non- 
negative profits (net profit after tax). The Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 83 non-financial 
sector companies are then taken into account after screened out for this study. 
Companies are then filtered by considering the dividend payment records, e. g., at least 
five years among the sample period (1988-97) and also considering different other 
dimensions, e. g., selected sample should represent all the sectors (incorporation of 
companies from all sectors of the market), different sizes (large, medium, and small), 
product diversity (single product and multiple products), activity (active and inactive), 
frequency of dividend payments (companies always pay dividends and companies 
sometimes pay dividends), and the range of dividend payments (high, medium and low 
pay-out) for selecting the final sample. However, the final sample then reduced to 51 
Dhaka Stock Exchange listed non-financial sector companies. All the required data for 
empirical investigation on the partial adjustment dividend behaviour models are 
collected from the published annual reports of the selected companies. 
4.2.3.3. Empirical Phase Three: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of 
Dividends 
This part of the thesis employs event study methodology to examine the security 
price reaction to the announcement of dividends. It is defined the announcement day as 
the event day (Day = 0), which is the day before the day on which di,,, -idend 
annomicement news are published in the daily news papers or daily stock price 
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quotation. It is considered -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days of the event day as 
the observation period and +60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 days of the event day 
as the comparison period for this study. 
Measurement of Abnormal Performance technique is used to compare the 
abnormal returns between observation period and comparison period of this study. All 
the cash dividend announcements of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 153 non-financial 
companies over the period of 01-01-1988 to 31-12-1997 are considered as the sample of 
this study. A part of the market data (1988-1991) are collected from the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange price quotations, published records of the Dhaka Stock Exchange, and the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange computer database. The rest of the market data (1992-1997) 
are collected from the data channel (Datastream). The announcement dates are 
obtained from the Dhaka Stock Exchange daily price quotations for this study. 
4.2.4. Problems for Collection of Secondary Data: 
As the proposed study is conducted on an emerging market, this study collects 
data from the listed companies of the Dhaka Stock Exchange only. While fully 
computerised automated trading system established in the Dhaka Stock Exchange since 
1998, the current study is conducting on the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period of 
1988-97 this is why in the data collection stage we faced a great many problems. 
Firsth, most of the data are manually collected because we got little help from the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange computerised database. Secondly, because of very poor filing 
system and the carelessness of the responsible officers of the Dhaka Stock Exchange in 
keeping company records, we got a very small support from the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
to collect company data. Therefore, we collected the company data by collecting 
published reports of each and individual company. Finally, the reasons mentioned 
earlier and for many other reasons (e. g., weak data management) the process of 
secondary data collection from emerging market is very much time consuming, costly 
and complicated. 
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4.3. Choice of Secondary Data Analysis: 
Secondary data analysis has long fon-ned a central component of social science 
research, being present in the work of Karl Marx, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Emile 
Durkheim (e. g., Suicide) and so on. A number of existing data sets also cover 
considerable periods of time (e. g., population census data). 
Hakim (1982) defines secondary data analysis as, 
(i any further analysis of an existing data set which 
presents interpretations, conclusions, or knowledge 
additional to, or different form, those presented in 
the first report on the inquiry as a whole and its 
main results " (p. 1). 
Some researchers see secondary analysis as being in some way 'Inferior' to the 
collection of primary data. This may reflect a brief that primary data collection and 
analysis represent the principal means of adding to the stock of knowledge. Yet often 
there is considerable scope to generate new findings on the basis of 'old' data. 
Therefore, secondary data analysis can also fon-n a complement to new research. 
Secondary data can be used in both descriptive and explanatory research. The data 
used may be of both quantitative and qualitative kind. However, Dale et al. (1988) note 
that ethnographic data and data generated through unstructured inter-views are hard to 
subject to secondary analysis. It is commonly argued, therefore, that statistical data 
generated through surveys, or data derived from official records, documentation etc. are 
far more amenable to secondary analysis. While some problems could be associated 
with the secondary analysis, i. e., the question asked in the survey may have been only 
partially relevant to the current research, definitions of variables may have changed over 
time, the theoretical and analytical objectives of the original researchers may diverge 
significantly from the current research, secondary analysis is cost worthy, time saver, 
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and provide better quality of research. Therefore, all of these considerations lead the 
current research to choose secondary data analysis. 
4.4. Secondary Data Analysis Techniques: 
4.4.1. Alternative Data Analysis Techniques in Empirical Part One: Determinants 
of Dividend Policy 
4.4.1.1. Regression Analysis: 
(1) Multiple Regression Equation: 
Typically, the researchers identify the dependent and independent variables and 
choose the proxies for the variables depending on the previous empirical evidences in 
this case. Researchers are then run the multiple regression equation based on the 
selected proxies. In this approach, more emphasis is given to the previous studies for 
identifying variables. Michaelsen (1961), Gerber (1988), Holder et al. (1998), and 
Saxena (1999) adapted this approach in their empirical studies. 
(ii) System Equation: 
In this approach different stages of least square regression equations run at the 
same time for the interrelated factors. The researchers run separate regression equations 
with specific variables for each and every individual factor. This approach is usually 
used in case of the empirical study for two or more interdependent factors. Jensen et al. 
(1992) considered this approach in their empirical study. 
(Iii) Optimum / Equilibrium Equation: 
In this approach the determinants are used to identify an equilibrium point for an 
optimum dividend policy. It is considered the dividend policy as an optimum policy and 
the determinants are identified only at an equilibrium point. Rozeff (1982) adapted this 
approach in his empirical study. 
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4.4.1.2. Factor Analysis: 
This method chooses a set of factors that represents the combinations of several 
variables and a set of latent dimensions. Primarily some factors identify by considering 
different aspects and then each and every factor considers a few variables. However, 
this approach considers a set of different dimensions at the same time. Alli et al. (1993) 
considered this approach in their empirical study. 
4.4.1.3. Discriminant Analysis: 
This method considers that a change in dividend is a discontinuous function of a 
set of independent variables. In other word, it assumes that a change in the dividend 
payment is a clearly defined action by management and that there is a clear distinction 
between a change and no change in the dividend payment. 
The statistical methodology employed to test multivariate statistical method is 
known as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA). The objective of MDA is to classify 
objects, by a set of independent variables , into one of two or more mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive categories. The classification is made by comparing the object's 
discriminant score (z), which is a linear function of the individual variables, with the 'z' 
score derived for the entire sample. Given this statistical methodology, the intent of the 
study is to determine that linear combination of financial characteristics which best 
discriminates firms which increase their dividend from those which maintain the level 
of payments. Gillespie (197 1) adapted this approach in his empirical study. 
4.4.1.4. Rank Correlation: 
The rank correlation coefficient is the Pearson's correlation coefficient based on 
the ranks of the data. If the original data for each variable have no ties, the data for each 
variable are first ranked, and then the Pearson's correlation coefficient between the 
ranks for the two variables is computed. Like the Pearson's correlation coefficient, the 
rank correlation range between -1 and +1, Nvhere -1 and +1 indicate a perfect linear 
relationship between the ranks of the two variables. The iII interpretation is therefore is the 
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same except that the relationship between ranks, and not values, is examined. 
Michaelsen (196 1) considered rank correlation in his empincal study. 
4.4.1.5. Justification of Choosing the Analysis Technique in Empirical Phase One 
This phase considered multiple regression analysis approach to identify the 
determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market. This method best suits this 
study because we took the dividend theories into account and then selected the variables 
for each and every theory. 
As this study considers the dividend theories to identify the detenninants of 
dividend policy, this is completely new in this area, which adds new value to the 
research and also attempts to minimise the gap between theoretical studies and 
empirical studies. However, this study brings the dividend theories into the empirical 
investigation, which will obviously help to minimise the gap between theoretical and 
empirical study. 
As previous researches suggest that averaging works very well with the 
unbalanced panel data, which motivates to conduct ten yearly average cross-section and 
pooled multiple regression analysis for this study. However, multiple regression 
analysis is more suitable to deal with the research problem and data set for the current 
research. 
4.4.2. Alternative Analysis Techniques in Empirical Phase Two: Testing Partial 
Adjustment Models 
4.4.2.1. Direct Approach: 
Typically, the researchers test the partial adjustment models straight way 
without any change for the empirical investigations. Some researcher test the renowned 
behavioural models and some researchers test some specific models depending on the 
data, market, and the objective of the study. This approach helps the researchers to test 
the specific model to different markets in keeping the individualism of the models. 
Fama and Babiak (1968) considered this approach in their empirical study on dividend 
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behaviour and found that dividend policy is primarily governed by the current 
profitability and lagged dividends. 
4.4.2.2. Extended Approach: 
Usually, in this approach the researchers primarily consider the partial 
adjustment dividend behaviour models and then modify either by expanding or by 
reducing the models to some extent. The researchers usually add, deduct, or modify the 
model to some extent by taking different variables into account. This approach does 
neither solely depend on the dividend behavioural models nor consider only different 
other variables but rather a combination of both. Garg et aL (1996) and Mishra and 
Narendar (1996) adapted this approach in their empirical studies on dividend behaviour. 
4.4.2.3. Justification of Choosing Analysis Technique in Empirical Phase Two 
The empirical phase two of this thesis adapts the direct approach by testing the 
partial adjustment dividend behavioural models straight way rather than any 
modification. There are two reasons, which make this method as more suitable approach 
for this study: 
(a) This method helps the empirical study to keep the individualism of 
behavioural models intact, and 
(b) This method also helps to identify the effect of the specific behavioural 
models. 
4.4.3. Alternative Data Analysis Techniques in Empirical Part Three: Security 
Price Reaction to the Announcement of Dividends 
4.4.3.1. Measurement of Abnormal Performance: 
(a) T-Test Approach: 
In this method, abnon-nal returns are calculated for the event period and then it is 
tested whether t-statistics of the abnormal returns between the observation period and 
comparison period are significantly different from zero or not. 
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Abnormal returns are calculated according to the following equation: 
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) ................................ (1) 
Where, 
ARit = Abnon-nal Return on day T, 
Rit = Daily Stock Price Returns on day T, and 
E(Rit) = Expected Returns on day T. 
The daily stock price returns are estimated according to the equation below: 
Rit = (Pit - Pit-, ) / Pit-, ....................... (2) 
Where, 
Rit = Share Price Return on day T, 
Pit = Share Price on day T, and 
Pit-, = Share Price on day 't-l' 
The expected return is derived using the well-known market model (Sharp, 
1963). Brown and Warner (1985) find this model to be well specified for event studies 
using daily stock return data. 
The expected return is: 
E(Rit) = 6c + 6Rmt (3) 
Where, 
The alpha and beta hats are the predicted value of constant and predicted ýýalue 
of beta coefficient respectively. The predicted value of constant ((x) and the predicted 
value of beta coefficient (P) are estimated through Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression between individual security return and market return. 
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(b) Cumulative Effects of Abnormal Returns (CAR) Approach: 
It is calculated the cumulative abnormal returns the days surrounding the 
announcement dates by surnmarising the abnormal returns over the event time: K= 
observation days, 0 (event time), and comparison days. 
k 
CAR C ý: AR 
I. =-10 
Where, 
AR = Abnon-nal Retums. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) and Fehrs et al. (1988) used both of these 
approaches. However, Abeyratna et al. (1997) used only t-test approach. 
4.4.3.2. Buy-and-hold Strategy: 
This method is useful to evaluate the performance of firms of dividend initiation 
and omission before, during, and after the event. 
The procedures of this approach are: 
(a) Calculate the return from a buy and hold strategy: 
For each stock, the excess return is defined as the geometrically compounded 
(buy and hold) return on the stock minus the geometrically compounded return on either 
(i) the equally weighted index including dividends, (ii) the appropriate market- 
capitalisation decline, (iii) the equally weighted market index adjusted for the beta of 
each stock, or (iv) a matching firin in the same industry (two digit SIC code) that is 
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Where ERj(a, to b)= excess returns for firin 'J' from time period 'a' to V. For the three 
day event period, the time period (a to b) is trading days t=-1,0, + 1. For the monthly 
periods before or after the event, the returns are calculated assuming 21 trading days for 
each month. That is, the 12-month return is actually a 252 trading days (12*21) return. 
Rjt = raw return for observation firm 'J' on day 't'. MRt = return on the equally weighted 
or beta adjusted market index, the market capitalisation decile, or the industry-and-size 
matched firm on day 't'. 
The average excess returns for each period are then: 
1N 
ER =- ERj 
IN j=I 
(b) Compare those returns to benchmark portfolio returns 
Michaely et al. (1995) adapted buy-and-hold strategy and used CRSP equally 
weighted excess returns as the benchmark. 
4.4.3.3. Comparison Period Return Approach (CPRA): 
Test for statistically significant security price movement around dividend 
changes. Using monthly returns, Brown and Warner (1980) have shown the CPRA to be 
at least as powerful as market-adjusted approaches in detecting significant price 
movements for unclustered events. Masulis (1980a) noted that this conclusion is in even 
stronger when using daily returns due to the very low and often insignificant 
relationship of the market when applied on daily basis. 
Mean daily returns around and on the event date are computed by averaging 
security returns by day. The means of return distributions for the event day and 
surrounding days are compared to ascertain the market's perception of dividend 
changes. 
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CPRA Process: 
Given that the return generating process is stochastic in nature, a security's 
return (rit) over time can be specified as: 
j, + 
The expected return ýtjt of a security is a function of a market-determined pricing 
process (in the spirit of the capital asset pricing model) and of a security's return 
characteristics. The stochastic error term (Fit), which has an empirical value of zero and 
is serially correlated, reflects both market wide developments and security specific 
influences. 
If returns are stationary over time, the impact (if any) of new information on 
security prices may be discovered through an examination of Eit's. To determine if the 
Eit's around an event date are nonzero, a test is conducted to determine if the mean daily 
return of the event period (observation period) is statistically different from the mean 
daily return of some other representative time period (the comparison period). The mean 
daily return for the comparison period is actually an estimate of ýtjt, the expected daily 
return in the equation. To minimise error in the estimation of ýtjt, portfolios of securities 
are formed in event time around the announcement dates. If security returns are 
independent and stationary over time with finite variances, portfolio daily returns in 
large samples approach normal distributions. Therefore, a student 't' for the difference 
in population means can be employed to test for equality of event period and 
comparison period mean returns. 
T-statistics between comparison and observed period to test whether the returns 
(the mean daily returns (MDRs) and the mean percentage of daily returns greater than 
zero (MPRZ) for the days surrounding unexpected dividend increase (decrease) 
announcements) are significantly different from zero or not. Woolridge (1983) used this 
method in his empirical study. 
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4.4.3.4. Regression Model: 
Stock price reaction relates positively to the size of dividend change (Asquith 
and Mullins, 1983; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988). Eddy and Seifert (1992) investigated 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividend and their empirical evidence 
support the view that stock price response for the announcement of dividend is a 
positive function of percentage of dividend change. Abnon-nal stock returns for the 
changes of dividend are a function of size (percentage of change of common 
announcement). Therefore, the dependent variable is the abnormal return and the 
independent variable is the changes of dividends. 
4.4.3.5. Mean Adjusted Returns Method: 
Eddy and Seifert (1992), and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) use the mean-adjusted 
return technique to estimate abnormal price reaction to dividend or earnings 
announcements. Brown and Warner (1985) find that when announcements are 
unclustered, this technique works as well as or better than other procedures. This 
technique essentially compares the average returns of securities around an event (in this 
case the announcement) with the average returns of the same securities during a 
comparison period. Eddy and Seifert (1992) used standardised returns, Brown and 
Warner (1985) suggest using standardised returns instead of raw returns because the 
distribution becomes more like a t-distribution, and the power of the tests should be 
greater. 
4.4.3.6. Justification of Choosing Data Analysis Technique in Empirical Part Three 
The empirical phase of this thesis adapted the Measurement of Abnormal 
Perfon-nance with T-test approach. In this method it is calculated the abnormal returns 
for the event period and test whether the returns between the observation period and 
comparison period are significantly different from zero or not. The are four reasons that 
makes this approach more suitable for the current study: 
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(a) This method calculates abnon-nal returns (AR) by differentiating the actLial 
returns and expected returns where expected returns calculate based on previous 
performance. 
(b) Abnormal returns (AR) are the best reflection for the announcements 
(c) T-test is the best way to compare mean. 
(d) As the Dhaka Stock Exchange in an inefficient emerging market, so, it ", as 
important to conduct event study on a longer period, which this method helps to do. 
4.4.4. Problems of Secondary Data Analysis: 
In the data analysis stage, this study faced few problems. Basically those problems 
arise or many reasons including: (i) abnormal market fluctuation in 1996, (11) both 
active and inactive companies are listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange, (111) different 
sizes of companies are listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange, i. e., some companies are 
very big and some are very small, (iv) big difference in the payment of dividend, i. e., 
some companies pay very higher rate of dividends e. g., 200% -300% or even more and 
some others pay very lower rate of dividends e. g., 5% or even less. In the data analysis 
stage we mainly faced the outlier problems. It is found that in some cases outliers made 
a real difference. So, it is identified the cases where outliers played a vital role and it is 
simply excluded that particular case from the analysis in bringing normality in the 
variable. For example, when it is conducted descriptive analysis for the dividend pay- 
out ratio (dividend / operating income) with all companies then we got X=0.8922 and 
cy = 15.0464 but we found three outliers (Company ID 302 year 1994 = 370.19, 
Company ID 302 year 1992 = 291.67, and Company ID 613 year 1991 = 10.78), which 
were really overstating the average dividend pay-out ratio and also increasing the 
standard deviation. However, when it is excluded these outliers from the analysis then 
the X comes to 0.2001 and a comes to 0.3672. 
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4.5. Conclusion: 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain the general research 
methodology considered and the suitability of choosing a specific method for this 
research. The first section of this chapter discusses the alternative research methods and 
justifies the choice of quantitative research method for this study. The second section of 
this chapter provides an explanation of the data and sample including sample selection 
criteria and secondary data collection procedure. This section, moreover, provides the 
data collection procedure for each and every area of research. At the end of this section, 
the major problem faced for collecting secondary data for this study are identified. The 
third section provides a brief outline of the secondary data analysis techniques for each 
of the three areas of research and justification of choosing a specific type of technique 
to analyse the collected data for handling the research problem. This chapter also 
describes the typical problems faced by the researchers to deal with emerging market 
secondary data including secondary data analysis. 
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Chapter Five: Review of Dividend Theories: Dividend Signalling, Tax Clientele, 
Agency Cost, Transaction Cost, Residual Theory, and Pecking Order Theory 
5.0. Introduction: 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) established the irrelevance of dividends in perfect 
capital markets. However, several theories have appeared in the literature that explains the 
payment of dividends and variations in dividend pay-out policy by focusing on market 
imperfections (Alli et aL 1993). All of those studies after Miller and Modigliani (1961) are 
basically concentrated and focused on the dividend theories, e. g., signalling information 
content of dividend, tax clientele of dividend, agency cost explanation of dividend, and 
transaction cost, residual theory, and pecking order theory of dividend. 
This chapter reviews all of the dividend theories. The objectives of this chapter are 
threefold: one, to have a clear understanding about the dividend theories, two, to know the 
latest developments of dividend theories, and three, to develop the research questions 
regarding the applicability of the dividend theories in emerging markets. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into two sections. The reviews of all the major 
dividend theories along with main argument, critical evaluations and empirical evidences, 
and opponent views are included in section 5.1. Section 5.2 contains a brief summary and 
concluding remarks. 
5.1. Dividend Theories: 
5.1.1. Dividend Signalling: 
5-1.1. i. Introduction: 
One of the most recent and faddish explanations of dividend pay-out in spite of 
differential tax rates has been dividend- signalling models. These models have been born 
out of the theory that dividends carry informational effects (Gerber, 1988). In fact, Miller 
and Modigliam (1961) were the first to introduce the hypothesis of "information contew 
of thi4dend. " They argue that when a firm follows a policy of dividend stabilisation, 
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investors may interpret a change in the dividend pay-out ratio as a change of 
management's views of the fin-n's future profitability. 
Furthermore, Miller and Modigliani (196 1) introduced the idea that dividends could 
convey information about future profitability. In addition, the extensive investigation of 
Griffin (1976), and Charest (1978) suggest that dividend payments do indeed convey 
information. More recently, Aharony and Swary (1980) report similar results after 
controlling for contemporaneous quarterly earnings reports. These studies indicate that 
announcements of dividend changes do convey information to the market. However, the 
question 'What information is contained in dividend announcements? ' has not been fully 
resolved. 
5.1.1. ii. Main Argument: 
The financial literature has related dividend to the firm's ftiture profitability. 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) explain optimum dividend payments as 
signals of future profitability. Dividends always signal about the future earnings of the 
firm. Higher dividend payments signal about the higher future earnings and vice-versa. 
The dividend announcement provides shareholders and the marketplace the missing 
piece of information about current earnings upon which their estimation of the firm's 
future (expected) earnings is based. The latter, of course, determines the current market 
value of the firm. In this respect, we can clearly see the role played by dividends. The 
dividend announcement provides the missing piece of information and allows the market 
to establish the firm's current earnings. These estimates are then used in predicting future 
earnings. 
Finns usually do not like to reduce or eliminate dividend payments (Ghosh and 
Woolridge, 1988 and 1991), hence, they make announcements of dividend initiation or 
increases only when they are confident of keeping up with their good performance. 
Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) find a time-series relation bemeen annual 
dividends and earnings that is consistent with the view that dividend-paying firms increase 
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their dividends only when management is relatively confident that the higher payments 
can be maintained. If managers have information about future and/or current cash flows 
that investors do not have, investors will interpret a dividend increase as a signal that 
management anticipates higher cash flows, and a dividend decrease as a signal that 
management expects permanently lower cash flows. The dividend signalling models 
developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), 
and Denis et al. (1994) predict that dividend announcements convey information about 
future and/or current cash flows. 
5.1.1. iii. Empirical Evidence: 
Lintner (1956) provides empirical evidence that managers consider past as well as 
future earnings in setting current dividends. However, Pettit (1972) found that the market 
uses announcements of changes in dividends in evaluating a security. Pettit (1972) argues 
that his results are the justifications for management's fear of reducing dividends from one 
quarter to the next and of increasing dividends before they are confident that the new level 
can be maintained in the future. 
The financial economists (Bhattacharya, 1979; Kane et A 1984; John and Williams, 
1985; and Miller and Rock, 1985) also mention that dividends can convey information 
about current and future level of earnings. However, Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979) 
have argued that dividend policy could be employed as a signalling mechanism, whereby 
firins with profitable projects are able and willing to pay higher dividends in order to 
segregate themselves from firms with less profitable projects. They provide a rationale for 
value maximising firms paying positives when the risk premiums per unit of dividend 
yield is positive in equilibrium. Stem (1979) has argued that such information signalling 
via dividends is excessively costly. Makhija and Thompson (1986) have used 
Bhattacharya's (1979) signalling model. This model is also used by Ross (1977), and 
follows Spence (1974). Makhija and Thompson (1986), however, bring out the pivotal 
role of the characterisation of the cross-section of the firms and show that dividend and 
profitability of the least and the most profitable firms affect the nature and feasibility of 
such signalling equilibrium. Makhija and Thompson (1986) argue that, for dividends to 
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signal profitability, both the least and most profitable firm must satisfy conditions that 
have not been recognised in the literature. 
In addition, Jensen et al. (1992) mentioned business risk as the key indicator of 
future profitability. Greater business risk makes the expected direct relationship between 
current and expected future profitability less certain. Therefore, they hypothesised that 
greater business risk will be associated with lower dividend payments. However, Gerber 
(1988) found strong support of past earnings uncertainty for the measurement of ex-ante 
earnings uncertainty. 
5.1.1. iv. Opponent View: 
Despite the significant number of studies document that dividends convey 
information (Pettit, 1972; Aharony and Swary, 1980; and Asquith and Mullins, 1983), 
there is still considerable controversy about what dividends actually signal. Empirical 
results by Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978), and Penman (1983) indicate that dividends are 
not good predictors of firm's future earnings. However, using a theoretical model, Kumar 
(1988) shows that changes in dividends signal changes in the finn's prospects, but they, 
per se, are very weak predictors of earnings. Moreover, Kalay (1979c) proposed a test of 
the relationship between a firm's pay-out rate and the uncertainty of earnings but he found 
no evidence that pay-out ratios are related to earnings uncertainty. In addition, Friend 
(1986) views that management is very reluctant to cut dividends which ensures that 
dividends are likely to be a relatively insensitive signal of changes in earnings. Friend 
(1986), however, points to strong empirical evidence against the signalling explanation of 
dividend pay-out. 
While, many theorists hypothesise that managers use dividends to signal their vieNý, 's 
of future earnings prospects (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Bhattacharya, 1979; John and 
Williams, 1985; and Miller and Rock, 1985), DeAngelo et al. (1996) assess the empirical 
importance of dividend signalling in a sample of 145 NYSE corporations whose annual 
earnings decline after nine or more consecutive years of growth and they employ a ý, ariety 
of model specifications and definitions of favourable dividend actions to assess the 
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empirical importance of dividend signalling in their sample but their tests yield no 
indication that favourable dividend decisions represent reliable signals of superior future 
earnings performance for these firms. However, DeAngelo et al. (1996) observe a similar 
pattern of disappointing future earnings for various sub-samples in which managers 
announce especially large dividend increases. DeAngelo et al. (1996) also investigate a 
variant of the dividend-signalling hypothesis in which dividend decisions conforin to a 
separating equilibrium: managers of firms with relatively good prospects use dividend 
increases to differentiate their companies from other firms in seemingly similar situations 
that have comparatively poor prospects. Almost all of their (DeAngelo et al. 1996) 
evidence is inconsistent with this separating equilibrium argument. 
In addition, DeAngelo et al. (1996) explore six possible explanations why sample 
finns' favourable dividend actions are not informative signals of future prospects: 
(i) Current earnings are so informative about future earnings that there is little additional 
useful signalling content to non-earnings sources. 
(ii) Managers reduce capital outlays, so that the dividend increases are primarily free cash 
flow payoffs rather than favourable signals about future earnings. 
(iii) The dividend increases are lagged responses to prior earnings increases, not 
favourable signals about future earnings. 
(1v) Managers mistakenly send favourable dividend signals, but these mistakes are 
understandable given the information available at the time. 
(v) Because managers tend to be overly optimistic about company growth, they send 
signals that are overly optimistic about future earnings. 
(vi) Managers make only modest cash commitments when they increase dividends, which 
undermine the reliability of such signals. 
DeAngelo et al. 's (1996) evidence does not support (i) through (Iii), but does 
suggest that (v) and (vi), and perhaps (Iv), can help explain their findings. Although (B) 
does not apply systematically, it does have merit for a few sample fin-ns. Regarding (\, ), 
they find evidence that Jensen's (1993, pp. 847-848) behavioural hypothesis - that 
managerial and corporate culture often make managers overly optimistic about continued 
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growth - helps explain why many sample firms increase dividends when earnings go"N, th 
ends. Their (DeAngelo et al. 1996) findings offer almost no support for the signalling 
hypothesis and, when taken together with the findings of prior studies, raise serious doubts 
about the general empirical importance of dividend signalling. However, DeAngelo et 
al. 's (1996) conclusions are close to Watts (1973) who examined a random sample of 
dividend changes and concludes that, at best, dividends have trivial infon-nation content 
about future earnings. A number of studies do find evidence supportive of signalling, but 
they either focus on dividend decisions in unusual contexts or, consistent with Watt 
(1973), suggest that the magnitude of any signalling effect is trivial. 
Eades (1982), Rozeff (1982), and Kale and Noe (1990) mentioned that dividends 
might also signal the riskiness of the firm's cash flow. However, Kale and Noe (1990) 
developed a two-period model for this type of signalling and demonstrate that firms with 
less volatile future cash flows pay higher dividends. Moreover, Alli et al. (1993) tested the 
relationship between volatility of cash flows and payment of dividend and view that if all 
other dimensions are taken into account dividends may not be very effective in signalling 
the volatility of cash flows. 
5.1.1. v. Conclusion: 
In spite of the considerable controversy about what dividends actually signal, several 
empirical studies support the signalling argument of dividend that dividends always signal 
about the future earnings of the firm (John and Williams, 1985; and Kane et al. 1984) and 
more obviously Bhattacharya's (1979) and Miller and Rock's (1985) explanation of 
dividend signalling that optimum dividend payment signals future profitability. 
Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock's (1985) signalling 
models predict that announcements convey information about future and/or current cash 
flow. Moreover, this prediction is not supported by the empirical studies of Watts (1973) 
and Gonedes (1978), who are unable to find a significant relationship between dividends 
and subsequent earnings. Further, they find that current and past dividends forecast future 
earnings no more accurately than do current and past earnings. A more recent study by 
Ofer and Siegel (1987), in contrast, find that knowledge of dividend announcements does 
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improve the accuracy of the average analyst's pre-announcement forecasts of future 
eamings. 
5.1.2. Tax Clientele: 
5.1.2. i. Introduction: 
Brennan (1970) first introduced taxes into Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and developed the after tax pricing equation. In a later and often cited paper, Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979) generalised Brennan's model. Both models represent single 
period mean-variance pricing equations with adjustments for differential taxation between 
dividend and capital gains. 
However, the school of thought which favours lower dividends, Brennan (1970), 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980), bases its case on the view that dividends are less 
desirable than capital gains because they are more heavily taxed. 
5.1.2. ii. Main Argument: 
The tax clientele argument postulates that investors in low tax brackets prefer high 
dividend paying stocks when compared to investors in high tax brackets (Brennan, 1970; 
Elton and Gruber, 1970; Long, 1978; Litzenberger and Ramaswarny, 1979; and DeAnglo 
and Masulls, 1980). 
As the individual's personal tax rate on dividend is higher than capital gain tax rate, 
clientele investors may prefer capital gain to dividend. If the tax rate induce investors to 
favour capital gains over dividends, then the investors should pressure the management to 
reinvest rather than pay-out earnings. 
5.1.2. iii. Empirical Evidence: 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) tested their model on monthly US data from 
1931-1977 and their results support the theory that there is a differential tax impact on 
dividends over capital gains. However, Alli et al. 's (1993) findings also support tax 
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clientele argument of dividend that if the dividend is taxed in a higher rate than capital 
gains, the investors who are in higher tax brackets prefer low yield stocks and vice-versa. 
Moreover, Blume et al. (1974) showed that taxes affect the portfolio mix of 
investors. In contrast, Black and Scholes (1974) were unable to show whether investors 
who prefer dividends or those who prefer retained earnings had a strong effect on setting 
stock prices. But Farrar and Selwyn (1967) showed that with ordinary and capital gain 
taxes the policy of paying zero dividends maximises share value. 
Black and Scholes (1974), however, concluded that it is not possible to demonstrate 
that the expected returns of high yield stocks differ from the expected returns on low yield 
stocks either before or after taxes. In spite of the ambiguous implication for the after tax 
CAPM, Black and Scholes (1974) have frequently been cited as providing evidence 
against the existence of tax effects. Masulis and Trueman (1988) explore implications of 
differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The 
personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater 
investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthen-nore, 
dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in 
different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies 
under internal financing. The profitability of internally financed security investment is 
shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, 
externally financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint. 
The preferential treatment of capital gain and dividend in taxation obviously shows 
the investors' preference for capital gain instead of cash dividend. Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) and Miller and Scholes (1982) found that the investors in the higher 
tax bracket prefer low yield stocks. 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980) derived a model of asset prices in the presence 
of short selling restrictions together with a much simplified taxation scheme with 
individuals in diverse but constant marginal tax brackets. The implication of the model is 
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that the differences in tax brackets in the presence of short selling restrictions would 
induce dividend clienteles, with the tendency of low (high) tax bracket individuals to hold 
high (low) dividend yield stocks: covariances among individual securities as well as the 
levels of yields determine the clientele that holds a given security. Thus the existence of 
short selling restrictions leads to mitigate the tax effects of dividend changes since a 
corporation that attempts a sizeable dividend cut would affect the clientele that holds the 
stock, and the associated coefficients on dividend yield would increase. 
One of the central questions in corporate finance is whether investors prefer to 
receive their pay-outs from corporations in the form of cash dividends or as capital gains. 
The conventional wisdom is that investors dislike cash dividends because of the tax 
disadvantages associated with them. On the other hand, it has been argued that cash 
dividend have positive benefits that offset their tax disadvantage. 
Long (1978) was the first to exploit this opportunity, providing evidence that 
investors prefer cash dividends over stock dividends of equal value. His evidence 
contradicts the conventional wisdom that investors prefer capital gains to dividend income 
because the different tax treatment of income. However, Poterba (1986) suggests that 
investors are indifferent between cash dividend and stock dividend of equal amounts. On 
the other hand, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and Statman (1984) said that 
investors prefer cash dividend because of self-control reasons. 
5.1.2. iv. Opponent View: 
Venthienen and Vermaelen (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1984) view that taxes 
seem to be an important determinant of security market equilibrium. However, Friend 
(1986) states that while the results found by Venthienen and Vermaelen (1985) do not 
come as a surprise and he accepts the results of Venthienen and Vermaelen that persons 
with controlling interests in the firm were the investors who were willing to pay a large 
premium to avoid dividend taxes. Friend argued that while some investors would have 
high enough incomes that want to avoid additional tax, it is irrelevant whether these 
investors have controlling interest. 
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Masulis and Trueman (1988) specify conditions under which the controlling 
shareholders will prefer greater dividends than other shareholders in the same tax bracket. 
However, Friend (1986) shows no relationships when other variables affecting paý-out are 
included in the analysis. Friend also suggest that Venthienen and Vermaelen are 
misinforined when they suggest that it is easy to launder out taxes on investment income 
in the US as they cited examples of given by Miller and Scholes (1978). However, direct 
evidence on the limited use of tax avoidance devices is provided by Feenberg (1981) and 
by Peterson and Ang (1985). 
More recent studies have documented that clienteles may not depend on taxes alone. 
While Chaplinsky and Seyhun (1990) find that tax deferred and tax exempt dividend 
recipients accounted for half of all dividends in 1979, significant dividends were still 
subject to taxes. However, Sterk and Vandenbery (1990) find a preference for cash 
dividends despite the elimination of different tax rates between capital gains and dividend 
income in 1986. DeAnglo (1991) argues that an equilibrium consistent with dividend pay- 
out may exist even in the presence of a tax system that favours capital gains. Brennan and 
Thakor (1990) also present an equilibrium model where dividends exist for small 
distributions despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains. 
However, the empirical evidence has failed to convincingly support the existence of 
a tax-induced preference for lower dividends (Miller and Scholes, 1982). In addition, 
Gerber (1988), and Partington's (1989) findings also disagree with tax clientele argument. 
However, Blume (1980) finds a positive and significant coefficient on dividend 
yield, but he argues that tax effects alone could not explain his results. Instead, he suggests 
that the market failed to anticipate the greater relative growth of dividends for high 
yielding stocks as compared to lower yield stocks. 
Furthen-nore, Hess's (1981) empirical results indicate that the relationship betvveen 
dividend yields and stock returns are not significant and more importantly, constant across 
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securities which conflicts with some of the evidence provided by the tax effect models of 
Brennan (1970); Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979); and similar model by Blume 
(1980). 
Gordon and Bradford's (1980) findings are consistent with the maximising 
behaviour of the finn but not with maximising behaviour of investors. Although the result 
that payment of dividends in a world of differential taxation is the outcome of ratioiial 
firm maximisation behaviour is encouraging from the financial theory viewpoint. 
Finally, early investigators of the tax clientele effect were indirect tests of tax 
clientele argument and have been criticised by Miller and Scholes (1982) because of their 
extreme sensitivity to the definition to the dividends. 
5.1.2. v. Conclusion: 
Despite the strong argument against tax clientele theory from different studies, 
several studies conducted on tax clientele theory support the argument that investors ill 
low tax brackets prefer high dividend paying stocks when compared to investors in high 
tax brackets (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970, Long, 1978; Litzenberger and 
Ramaswarny, 1979; and DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980). And more importantly, the 
empirical evidences support the argument that if dividend is taxed in a higher rate than 
capital gains, the investors who are in the higher tax brackets prefer low yield stocks. 
5.1.3. Agency Cost: 
5.1.3. i. Introduction: 
Agency cost is the cost that arises for the conflict between shareholder-manager. 
The payments of dividend reduce the agency problem between manager and shareholder 
because dividend payments reduce discretionary funds available to managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et 
al. 1992; Alli et al. 1993; Saxena, 1999; and Mollah et al. 2000). However, Jensen's 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis views that agency cost also arises for free cash flow 
because free cash flow motivates the managers to take negative net present value projects. 
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Besides, agency cost also arises for the conflict between shareholder-bondholder because 
shareholders can expropriate wealth from bondholders by paying themselves dividends. 
5.1.3. ii. Shareholder-Manager Conflict and Agency Cost: 
5.1.3. ii. a. Main Argument: 
Dividend can be used in reducing the agency problem between managers and 
stockholders. The payment of dividends reduces the discretionary funds available to 
managers for perquisite consumption and helps address the manager- stockholder conflict 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984; and Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). 
5.1.3. ii. b. Empirical Evidence: 
Easterbrook (1984) views that firm pay-out dividends in order to reduce agency 
costs because payment of dividends reduces the discretionary funds available to managers. 
However, Rozeff (1982) was among the first to explicitly recognise the role of insiders as 
one of monitoring the managers. Firms establish higher dividend pay-outs when insiders 
hold a lower fraction of the equity and / or greater number of stockholders own the outside 
equity. This evidence supports the view that dividend payments are part of the finn's 
optimum monitoring / bonding package and serve to reduce agency costs. 
Alli et al. (1993), however, explained that as the number of stockholders increases, 
the agency problem becomes more severe, the need for monitoring managerial actions also 
increases and managers need to pay more dividends to reduce agency problem. However, 
higher insider ownership leads to lower agency problems, hence, low dividend pay-out. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) examine the relationship between ownership, dividend 
policy, and leverage and conclude that managers make financial policy trade-off to control 
agency costs in an efficient manner. However, Jensen et al. (1992) linked the interaction 
bem,, een financial policies (dividend and leverage) and insider ownership to informational 
asymmetries between insiders and external investors. They found that corporate financial 
decisions and insider ownership are interdependent. 
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Furthermore, there is a relation between firm's transaction cost and agency cost. If 
the firm pays higher amount of dividend that reduces firm's agency cost as well as finn's 
needs to raise external funds for investment, which rises firm's transaction costs. Rozeff 
(1982) attempts to trade-off between transaction costs and firms agency costs. Rozeff 
hypothesise that as outside equity holders own a larger share of the equity, they NNill 
demand a higher dividend as part of the optimum monitoring package and if insiders own 
the major portion of equity then they will have more power and in that case the company 
usually pay less dividends. Rozeff (1982), finally, concluded that higher dividend 
payments reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
However, Jensen et al. (1992) investigated the detenninants of dividend policy 
within a common empirical framework and identified insider ownership is one of the most 
influential detenninants of dividend policy. They hypothesise that if the insider owners 
hold the major share of the company then management naturally prefers not to declare 
more dividends but increases directors fees and so on. On the other hand, Miller and Rock 
(1985) argue that insider ownership is relevant to assessment of dividend signals. 
Saxena (1999) investigated the determinants of dividend policy of NYSE listed 235 
unregulated and 98 regulated firms and he found a strong influence of agency costs on 
dividend policy. In addition, Holder et al. (1998) investigated the relationship between 
dividend policy decisions and investment decisions of the firms of 477 NYSE listed 
companies and he also found a very strong influence of agency costs on dividend policy 
decision of the firm. Both Saxena (1999) and Holder et al. 's (1998) results are very much 
consistent with Rozeff s (1982) empirical evidences. 
Eastembrook (1984), on the other hand, observed whether dividend reduces 
agency costs of management but his findings are to some extent different from others. He 
found that dividend may keep firms in the capital market, where monitoring of managers 
is available at lower cost, and may be useful in adjusting the level of risk taken by 
managers and the different classes of investors. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
investigated whether the theory of agency, the theory of property rights, and the theory of 
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finance help to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the finn. They pointed out 
that agency costs are as real as any other costs and there were strong incentives for 
individuals to minimise agency costs. 
5.1.3. iii. Free Cash Flow and Agency Cost: 
5.1.3. iii. a. Main Argument: 
Jensen (1986) views that if firm has free cash flow, it is better off sharing them with 
shareholders as dividend pay-out or retire the firm's debt in order to reduce the possibility 
of these funds being wasted on unprofitable (negative net present value) projects. 
5.1.3. iii. b. Empirical Evidence: 
Dividend initiation can reduce agency costs because they reduce free cash flow 
available to managers. The potential for reduced agency costs should be greater for those 
firins that tend to use funds inefficiently. Given the previous performance serves as proxy 
for efficiency in allocating funds, the relatively poor performance have more potential to 
reduce agency costs following dividend initiations. On the other hand, dividend omissions 
can increase agency costs because they enlarge the free cash flow available to managers. 
However, the financial condition of firms at the time of a dividend omission may limit the 
degree to which agency costs can rise. Since many firms only omit dividends after 
experiencing financial problems, the funds retained rather than distributed, as dividends 
should be closely monitored. Agency costs are more likely to increase following a 
dividend omission if the firm's previous performance has not triggered closer monitoring 
of managers. That is, relatively poor performance prior to the dividend omission should 
automatically heighten monitoring of the firm's managers, while relatively strong 
performance prior to the dividend omission enlarges free cash flow without necessary 
triggering closer monitoring of the firm's managers (Akhigbe and Madura, 1996). 
Jensen's (1986) "free cash flow" hypothesis indicates that when a firm has cash in 
excess of what is required to finance positive-net present value (NPV) investment projects, 
it is better for managers to return the excess cash to shareholders as dividends in order to 
maximise shareholders wealth. Otherwise, he argues, the existence of free cash flow may 
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lead management to undertake sub-optimal investment projects. Moreover, Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) called the extended fonn of the free cash flow hypothesis 'the 
overinvestment hypothesis. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) investigated the infon-national content of dividends in 
the framework of the principal-agent conflict model developed by Berle and Means (1932) 
and extended by Jensen (1986). Lang and Litzenberger (1989), however, re-examines the 
dividend announcements to determine whether the free cash flow has explanatory power 
and they conclude that free cash flow has explanatory power. 
At the heart of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory lies the agency problem of 
managers and shareholders over the distribution of free cash flows generated by the firm. 
Howe et al. (1992), on the other hand, attempt to provide an extension of Lang and 
Litzenberger's (1989) dividend results to a broader set of cash transactions in which the 
cash distribution is not expected to be repeated. The transactions chosen are tender offer 
share repurchases and specially designed dividends (SDDs). Howe et al. (1992) analyses 
the effect of infrequent or one-time cash distributions to determine whether Jensen's free- 
cash flow hypothesis explains the market's reaction to an expanded set of transactions. 
Their result indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in two-day 
abnon-nal returns between high-Q and low-Q firms announcing tender offer repurchases or 
SDDs. Their interest in this result stems from its contrast with the findings of Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989), which generally support Jensen's free cash-flow theory. In Lang and 
Litzenberger's study, high-Q and low-Q firms exhibit markedly different responses to 
announcements of dividend changes. Dividend increases by low-Q firm's result in a more 
positive market reaction because these firms, which tend to overinvest, would 
subsequently have less cash flow to waste. 
5.1.3. iv. Sha reh older-Bondh older Conflict and Agency Cost: 
5.1.3. iv. a. Main Argument: 
Similar type of conflict like shareholder-manager also exists between shareholder 
and bondholder. Shareholders may expropriate wealth from bondholders by paying 
Chapter Five 88 Dividend Theories: Review 
themselves dividends; so, bondholders try to contain this problem through restrictions on 
dividend payments in the bond indenture (Kalay, 1982a; and Smith and Warner, 1979). 
5.1.3. iv. b. Empirical Evidence: 
Titman and Wassels (1988) argue that firms that hold more collateralizable assets 
have fewer agency problems between their bondholders and stockholders because these 
assets may serve as a collateral against borrowing. Collateralizable asset is the secunty of 
the bondholders. As higher levels of collateralizable assets indicate higher levels of 
protection for bondholders, so, in that case firm's face lower levels debt indenture and 
consequently that also reduces the conflict between shareholder-bondholder. Therefore, 
firms with lower levels of conflict between shareholder-bondholder can pay more 
dividends. However, Alli et al. (1993) investigates the agency problem between 
shareholders and bondholders and they found strong evidence that the conflict between 
shareholder and bondholder causes agency cost and that affects the dividend policy of the 
firm. 
However, La Porta et al. (2000) view that agency cost arises for the lack of 
protection of the outside investors because controlling shareholders or managers 
expropriate funds by maximising their own benefits. Expropriation can take a variety of 
forms. In some instances, the insiders simply steal the profits. In other instances, the 
insiders sell the output, the assets, or the additional securities in the firm they control to 
another firm they own at below market prices. Such transfer pricing, asset stripping, and 
investor dilution, though often legal, largely has the same effect as theft. In still other 
instances, expropriation takes the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the 
firm, installing possibly unqualified family members in managerial positions or 
overpaying executives, and undertaking wasteful projects (Mollah et al. 2000). In general, 
expropriation is related to the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
who focus on the consumption of "perquisites" by managers and other types of empire 
building. It means that the insiders use the profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather 
than return the money to the outsider investors. La Porta et al. (2000), therefore, suggested 
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that the corporate governance is, to the large extent, a set of mechanism through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. 
5.1.3. v. Conclusion: 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the previous empirical evidences support that 
agency cost arises for the conflict between shareholder-manager and shareholder- 
bondholder, i. e., basically for the lack of protection of outsiders, and for free cash flow. 
However, the previous studies suggest that payment of dividend reduces the agency costs 
arises for the conflict between manager and shareholder, shareholder and bondholder, and 
for free cash flow. 
5.1.4. Transaction Cost, Residual Theory, and Pecking Order Theory: 
5.1.4. i. Introduction: 
Transaction cost is the cost of external financing. As external financing costly, the 
firms with higher amount of external financing face heavy burden of transaction costs. 
However, higher burden of transaction cost reduces the capability of paying dividends. 
Higher growth rates of the firm create higher levels of investment demand and in that case 
firm should manage appropriate funding to maximise shareholders wealth. Moreover, as 
we have been mentioned earlier that external financing is costly and on the other hand, 
internal financing is very cheap and easily accessible, so, firms prefer to use their 
internally generated funds and the remainders they use for paying dividends. Therefore, 
higher investment reduces the capability of paying dividends. 
5.1.4. ii. Main Argument: 
5.1.4. ii. a. Transaction Cost: 
If issuance costs are significant the firms are likely to finance investments through 
extension of earnings rather than from external sources to the extent that dividends 
complete with investments for internally generated funds. Increased dividends raise the 
transaction cost of external financing. These costs are likely to affect dividend policy 
(Fai-na, 1974; and Higgins, 1972). 
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Residual theory postulates that a firm will pay dividends only when its internally 
generated funds are not completely used up for investment purpose. According to the 
cresidual dividend theory', a firm will pay dividends only if it does not have profitable 
investment opportunities, i. e., positive net present value projects (Saxena, 1999). 
5.1.4. ii. e. Pecking Order Theory: 
Pecking order argument of Myers and Majluf (1984) views that firms experiencing 
high growth rates generally have large investment requirements and these firms should be 
characterised by low pay-out ratios. Donaldson (1961) first introduced pecking order 
theory as a theory to explain observed financial behaviour of firm. Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed a modified version of the theory. These results revised 
the theory and suggested those informational asymmetries and bankruptcy costs also 
influence the firm's capital structure choice. 
5.1.4. iii. Empirical Evidence: 
Highly levered firms are more profitable for the residual owners than firms with low 
leverage (Gillespie, 1971). Higgin (1972) also mention the influence of debt financing. 
However, McCabe (1979) reported that new long-term debt has a negative influence on 
the amount of dividends paid. Fund requirements for investment purposes influence 
dividend pay-out ratio (Higgins, 1972). Investment influence dividend policy is not 
universal, Fama (1974) being a conspicuous exception. 
Finns establish lower dividends when they are experiencing or anticipate 
experiencing higher revenue growth, presumably because this growth entails higher 
investment expectations. The investment influencing dividend policy because external 
finance is costly. Firms establish lower dividends when they posses higher beta 
coefficients, presumably because higher betas are a reflection of the presence of higher 
operating and financial leverage. Higher level of operating and financial leverage demands 
higher fixed charges, which leads to lower the dividend payments to avoid the costs of 
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external financing. Beta reflects the level of operating and financial leverage (LeN., 1974; 
and Hamada, 197 1). 
Variables such as rate of asset expansion, and the attractiveness of new investment 
opportunities have the potential to influence the level of dividends. Dhrymes and Kurz 
(1964) concluded that dividend payments are affected by factors such as firm's investment 
programme its state of indebtedness, and its size. However, financing variables such as 
level of leverage, the level of financing required, and the cost of finance (Pouge, 1971) 
may affect a firm's capacity to pay dividends. 
Moreover, it is hypothesised that if a firrn has higher levels of operating and 
financial leverage, other things being equal, the finn will choose a lower dividend pay-out 
to lower its costs of external financing. A natural surrogate for operating and financial 
leverage is the firm's beta coefficient. The role of beta is reflecting operating and 
financial leverage is well known (Lev 1974, and Hamada 1971). Beta is higher insofar as a 
firm has higher operating and financial leverage (Rozeff, 1982). 
Investment opportunity or growth of the firm is the major determinant of dividend 
policy. If the firm has available investment opportunities then the company will prefer to 
reinvest the funds rather than paying dividends to shareholders. 
Investment and growth opportunity faced by a firm should also affect dividend 
policy. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that profitable firms with good investment 
opportunities may be forced to choose between dividend payments and capital 
expenditures when capital market frictions are important. Frictions in the capital market 
leads to a sort of competition between dividends and investment projects as potential use 
profits. This competition can explain why high growth firms with strong investment 
opportunities often pay low dividends. 
Higgins (1972) point out that firm's requirement of funds for investment purposes is 
an influential factor to determine dividend. This agreement that investment influences 
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dividend policy is not universal, Fama (1974) being a conspicuous exception. Rozeff 
(1982) defined the variable investment as the realised growth rate of firm's sales revenue 
and the Value Line's forecast of growth of firm's sales revenue and hypothesised that 
dividend pay-out is negatively related to both past growth of revenues and predicted future 
growth of revenues of the firm. Value Line's forecast of growth is a measure of the 
management's expectations of growth. Rozeff (1982), however, found that dividend paý'- 
out has a significantly negative function with the firm's past and expected future growth 
rate of sales. 
One question often raised is whether investment policy influences dividend policy. 
The answer reported here is "yes", in the sense that holding other factors constant, firms 
with greater investment, as measured by greater current and prospective growth rates of 
revenues, have lower dividend payoffs. Jensen et al. (1992) has also got significantly 
negative relation between firm's investment and dividend policy. Miller and Modigliani 
(196 1), Modigliani and Miller (1959), and Lintner (1956) state that future prospects of the 
company are the influential determinant of dividend policy. But Watts (1973) finds very 
lower levels of positive relation between expected earnings and dividend changes. A 
comprehensive theory might also have implications for relationships recognised in the past 
literature, e. g., the purported negative correlation between dividends and both investment 
opportunities and risks (Joy 1980). Smith and Watts (1992) find that measures of the 
firm's investment opportunity set (such as the availability of growth options and firm size) 
are related to its financing, dividend, and executive-compensation policies. In particular, 
they document that firms with more growth options (i. e., greater access to positive net 
present value projects) have lower leverage, lower dividend yields, higher compensation, 
and greater use of stock -option plans. 
Fin-n's debt financing is also an important factor to detennine dividend policy 
(Higgins 1972). McCabe (1979) also reported that new long-term debt has a negative 
influence on dividend policy. Abeyratna et al. (1996) identified that a levered firm should 
have to bear the burden of long term debt as well as the firrn should have to pay a large 
amount of interest for the long-term debt. Abeyratna et al. (1996) also viewed that the 
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more levered firm should have to pay a large amount of interest each and every year, 
which reduces the distributable profits. They stated a negative relation between levera2e 
and dividend policy. On the other hand, there are some opposite views that the earnings 
per share of a levered firm and an unlevered firm varies to a large extent because the 
levered firrn enjoys the facility of tax shield if the firm has made profit in that year. The 
amount of additional earnings due to tax shield in a levered firrn is higher than that of an 
unlevered firm. As it is considered that the rate of return on capital employed is greater 
than rate of interest charged on debt, consequently, the earnings per share of the levered 
firrn will increase as compared to that of unlevered firm. This enable levered firm to pay 
more dividends, ceteris paribus. Smith and Watts (1992), however, find that regulated 
firms have higher leverage, higher dividend yields. In contrast, Jensen et al. (1992) also 
shows the negative relation between long-term debt and dividend. Wansley and Lane 
(1987) view that there is a negative relation between long-ten-n debt and interest expense 
and dividend. On the other hand, DeAnglo and DeAnglo (1990), Chowdhury and Miles 
(1987), Lonie et al. (1992) state a positive relation between high interest expense and 
dividend cut. 
Typically, with debt instruments, the debt indenture refers to debt covenants which 
imply certain restrictions on the management's freedom of action with regard to some 
aspect of the firm's behaviour, viz., restriction on the magnitude of dividend payments, 
restriction on the cash dividend payment without the payment of interest. A levered fin-n 
having a debt indenture faces more constraints in paying dividends as compared to a 
levered firm without any debt indenture. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
demonstrate, stockholders can choose to finance dividend payments by rejecting 
investment projects with positive net present value (NPV). These potential costs 
associated with the conflict can be reduced (or avoided) by stockholders' precommitment 
to limit the level of future dividend payments. The above rationale for the existence of 
dividend constraints is suggested in the financial literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979; and Kalay, 1979a and 1979b), although the exact 
form of the constraint, the detail of its properties , its vari'ations across 
fin-ns and the extent 
to which it is likely to be binding, are yet to be documented. As Kalay (1982) reports, 
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dividend constraints usually define an inventory of funds available for dividends 
(inventory of payable funds or IPF or unrestricted retained earnings) over the life of the 
debt. The sample of bond indentures studied by Kalay (1982) reveals that diý-idend 
payments are constrained directly as well as indirectly. 
Long et al. (1994), on the other hand; empirically examine the underinvestment 
problem and the use of dividends to expropriate lenders' wealth. Rather than analysing the 
market's reaction to potential wealth expropriating events, a different aspects of potential 
conflicts of interest is addressed: do managers who control dividends act in a manner 
consistent with wealth expropriation? If so, then debt issues should be followed by 
increase dividends. Long et al. (1994) has used two samples of firms: those issuing 
straight debt and those issuing convertible debt. They find no evidence that firms 
manipulate dividend policy to transfer wealth from the bondholders to shareholders. 
Underinvestment, identified by Myers (1977), occurs when owners fail to accept 
investments with a positive net present value (NPV) because some of that value will 
accrue to the holders of risky debt. Bondholders are assumed to anticipate 
underinvestment and price the debt accordingly so those shareholders bear the resulting 
loss in firm value. The limitation of distributions to shareholders (dividend constraint) is 
regarded as a means of controlling underinvestment. 
5.1.4. iv. Opponent View: 
Pouge (1971) concluded that the effect of financing variables was very small in 
comparison to the effect of profitability. However, Huberman (1990) argues that even in 
the presence of transaction costs, dividend policy may be irrelevant. 
However, Dhrymes and Kurtz (1967) concluded that there is interdependence 
between dividend and investment but Fama (1974) conclude that there is no evidence of 
interdependence. On the other hand, they (Dhrymes and Kurtz, 1967) concluded that there 
was a financing effect, but their methodology was strongly criticised by Fama (1974). 
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5.1.4. v. Conclusion: 
In spite of the opponent views against transaction cost, residual theory, and peckmo -D 
order theory, several previous empirical studies strongly support the arguments of these 
theories that if issuance costs are significant the firms are likely to finance investmems 
through extension of earnings rather than from external sources and firms will pay 
dividends only when its internally generated funds are not completely used up foi- 
investment purpose. Therefore, growth firms generally have large investment 
requirements and these firms should be characterised by low pay-out ratios. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests a strong influence of transaction cost, residual, and pecking 
order theory on dividend policy (Alli et al. 1993). 
5.2. Conclusion: 
Several theories have appeared in the literature after Miller and Modigliani's (1961) 
dividend irrelevance and most of the studies are concentrated on the main dividend 
theories (signalling information content of dividend, tax clientele of dividend, agency cost 
explanation of dividend, and transaction cost, residual theory, and pecking order theory of 
dividend). While the few researchers provide evidence against the dividend theories, 
several studies document very strong findings in favour of the dividend theories including: 
(a) dividends always signal about the future earnings of the firm, (b) investors in low tax 
brackets prefer high dividend paying stocks when compared to investors in high tax 
brackets, (c) the payment of dividends reduces the discretionary funds available to 
managers for perquisite consumption and helps address the manager- stockholder conflict, 
and (d) if issuance costs are significant the firms are likely to finance investments through 
extension of earnings rather than from external sources to the extent that dividends 
complete with investments for internally generated funds. 
The major research questions anse through the review of the dividend theories are: 
(1) is there any applicability of dividend theories in the emerging markets, and 
(2) if so, then what are applicability of dividend theories in emerging markets? 
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Chapter Six: Determinants of Dividend Policy in an Emerging Market: Evidence 
from the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
6.0. Introduction 
Since Miller and Modigliani (1961) established the irrelevance of dividends in 
perfect capital markets, several theories have appeared in the literature that explain tile 
payment of dividends and variations in dividend pay-out policy by focusing on market 
imperfections (Alli et al. 1993). All of those studies are concentrated on the followillo 
categories: (a) signalling information content of dividend, (b) tax clientele of dividend, (c) 
agency cost explanation of dividend, and (d) transaction cost, residual theory, and pecking 
order theory of dividend. 
This chapter investigates the dividend policy of companies listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange to identify the determinants of dividend pay-out ratio in an emerging 
market. Ordinary Least Square models are tested by taking all of the dividend theories 
(dividend signalling, tax clientele, agency cost, transaction cost, residual, and pecking 
order theory) into account on the Dhaka Stock Exchange data over the period of 1988- 
1997 for this study- on which no other study has been conducted yet. The empirical results 
strongly support the agency cost theory and transaction cost theory of dividend. However, 
the empirical results identified insider ownership, collateralizable assets, leverage, and 
size as the major determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. The review of dividend 
theories along with major empirical evidence for identifying the determinants of dividend 
pay-out ratio, a brief summary of the remarkable previous empirical studies on 
determinants of dividend policy including the methodology, data used and the notable 
findings, and an explanation how the analysis will distinguish between the dividend 
theories are included in section 6.1. Section 6.2 contains the description of data and 
sample, selection of variables, and the methodology of the empirical analysis. The 
empirical results are reported in section 6.3. Finally, the summary and the concluding 
remarks are incorporated in section 6.4. 
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This part of the chapter contains a brief review of dividend theories along with the 
major empirical evidence for and against the dividend theories, identificatioi-i of the 
determinants of dividend pay-out ratio in connection with each and every theory of 
dividend, a brief summary of the major studies on determinants of diNidend policy 
including the methodology, data used and the notable findings (Table 6.1), and an 
explanation how the analysis will distinguish between the dividend theories. 
6.1. A. Dividend Signalling 
One of the most recent and faddish explanations of dividend pay-out is the 
dividend signalling. Dividend signalling was born out of the theory that dividends convey 
information (Pettit, 1972; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; and Bar- 
Yasef and Huffman, 1986). In fact, Miller and Modigliani (1961) were the first to 
introduce the hypothesis of the "Information content of dividend. " 
In spite of the considerable controversy about what dividend actually signal, 
Bhattacharya (1979), Kane et al. (1984), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock 
(1985) view that dividend can convey information about current and future level of 
eamings. 
However, the empirical results of Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978), and Penman 
(1983) document that dividends are not good predictors of a firm's future earnings. In 
addition to these studies, Friend (1986) points to strong empirical evidence against the 
signalling of dividend pay-out policy. 
6.1. B. Tax Clientele of Dividend 
The tax clientele argument views that investors in low tax brackets prefer high 
dividend paying stocks when compared to investors in high tax brackets (Brennan, 1970; 
Elton and Gruber, 1970, Long, 1978; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; and DeAnglo 
and Masulls, 1980). 
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The early investigations of the tax clientele effect were the indirect tests of the tax 
clientele argument, which was criticised by Miller and Scholes (1982) because of their 
extreme sensitivity to the definition of dividends. Miller and Scholes (1982), hoNN-eN, cr, 
view that the early empirical evidence had failed to convincingly support the existence of 
a tax-induced preference for lower dividends. In addition, the recent studies documented 
that clientele may not depend on taxes alone (Brennan and Thakor, 1990; Chaplinsky and 
Seyhun, 1990; Sterk and Vandenbery, 1990; and DeAnglo, 1991). 
6.1. C. Agency Cost Explanation of Dividend 
Agency cost is the cost that usually arises for the conflict between manager and 
shareholder. The payment of dividend reduces the agency problem between manager and 
shareholder by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et 
al. 1992; Alli et al. 1993; Saxena, 1999; and Mollah et al. 2000). However, Jensen (1986) 
documents that if firms have free cash flows then the firms pay dividends or retire their 
debts to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. Moreover, this argument of free cash 
flow was strongly supported by Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. (1992), Smith and Watts 
(1992), and Holder et al. (1998). In addition, a similar type of conflict exists like 
shareholder-manager between shareholder and bondholder because shareholders can 
expropriate wealth from bondholders by paying themselves dividends, therefore, 
bondholders try to contain this problem through restrictions on dividend payments in the 
bond indenture (Smith and Warner, 1979; and Kalay, 1982a). 
However, La Porta et al. (2000) argues that agency cost anses for the lack of 
protection of the outside investors (shareholders and bondholders) because controlling 
shareholders or managers (insiders) expropriate funds by maximising their own benefits. 
Mollah et al. (2000) also views the same argument. Expropriation can take a ý'ariety of 
forms. In some instances, the insiders simply steal the profits. In other instances, the 
insiders sell the output, the assets, or the additional securities in the firm they control to 
another firn-i they own at below market prices. Such transfer pricing, asset stripping. and 
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investor dilution, though often legal, largely has the same effect as theft. In still other 
instances, expropriation takes the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the 
firm, installing possibly unqualified family members in managerial positions or 
overpaying executives, and undertaking wasteftil projects. In general, expropriation is 
related to the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who focus on the 
consumption of "perquisites" by managers and other types of empire building. It means 
that the insiders use the profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather than return tile 
money to the outsider investors. La Porta et aL (2000), therefore, suggested that the 
corporate governance is, to the large extent, a set of mechanism through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. 
6.1. D. Transaction Cost, Residual Theory and Pecking Order Theory of Dividend 
Transaction cost is the cost of external financing. The finns with higher levels of 
financial leverage face a higher levels of fixed charges, which leads those finns to pay 
lower levels of dividends because of the cost of external financing (Higgins, 1972; and 
Fama, 1974). On the other hand, Huberman (1990) documents an opposite argument that 
even in the presence of transaction costs, dividend policy may be irrelevant. 
Residual theory of dividend postulates that a firin will pay dividends only when its 
internally generated funds are not completely used up for investment purpose. However, 
pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) views that fin-ns experiencing high 
growth rates generally have large investment requirements and these firins should be 
characterised by low pay-out ratio. 
The summary of the major empirical studies on determinants of dividend policy 
along with the data sets they used, the methodologies and the remarkable findings are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
While a great many of the studies conducted on dividend policy but a very few 
studies conducted on deten-ninants of dividend policy. However, all of the studies 
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Furthermore, we know that the empirical studies of dividend policy always lagged behind 
the theoretical studies and the results of the empirical studies are controversial. Therefore, 
we don't see that the researchers made any real attempt to minimise the gap between 
theoretical and empirical studies. Further, most of the studies were conducted on the US 
markets and the researchers used a variety of statistical techniques including OLS, factor 
analysis, and discriminant analysis. While the previous studies are indirect tests on the 
dividend theories, the empirical results support the dividend theories. 
Usually, the researchers estimate a regression equation using the proxies of 
dividend policy and independent variables. This study attempts to take the dividend 
theories (signalling, tax clientele, agency cost, transaction cost, residual theory and 
pecking order theory) into account to identify the determinants of dividend pay-out ratio 
in an emerging market. This study primarily sheds light on the dividend theories and then 
focuses on the explanation of each and every dividend theory to identify the influence and 
impact of dividend theories on dividend policy. Variables are then selected for the 
empirical analysis by considering the explanation of the theories and also by considering 
previous empirical evidences on dividend theories. However, the selected variables are 
considered as the representatives of the dividend theories. 
This study attempts to investigate the determinants of dividend policy by testing 
the alternative dividend theories simultaneously. Four simultaneous regression equations 
run at the same time for alternative dividend theories (signalling, tax clientele, agency 
cost, transaction cost, residual theory and pecking order theory) by incorporating the 
appropriate variables. For analysing alternative theories, the variables of every theory are 
focused on separately and the variables of other theories are then considered as control 
variables. However, this analysis will also capture the joint impact of the theories by 
taking all of the alternative theories into account together. 
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This study considers all the non-financial companies listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange over the period of 1988-1997 as the sample. The financial sector is eXCILided 
from the sample because of their different types of record keeping system. 
It is worth mentioning that some of the companies are excluded from the sample 
because of data problem (unavailability of either company data or market data). As a 
result, the sample size became smaller than the actual companies listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. The final sample consists of 153 companies. 
All the company data is collected from the annual reports of the listed non-financial 
sector companies of the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period of 1988-1997. A part of the 
market data (1988-1991) is collected from the Dhaka Stock Exchange price quotations, 
published records of the Dhaka Stock Exchange, and the Dhaka Stock Exchange computer 
database. The rest of the market data (1992-1997) is collected from the data channel 
(Datastream). However, the macro-economic data is collected from the published reports 
of National Board of Revenue of Bangladesh. 
6.2. B. Selection of Variables 
6.2. B. 1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is the dividend pay-out ratio (DPR). Dividend 
pay-out ratio is the proportion of profit paid as dividend. If finns pay relatively low levels 
of dividend this may show higher dividend pay-out ratio if the profits are very low. And 
on the other hand, if a firm maintains the absolute amount of dividend, - that could show 
increased dividend pay-out ratio, if the firm does this in case of falling profits. Usually, 
dividend pay-out ratio is defined as dividend divided by net profit after taxes but this 
could create problems sometimes because many companies pay dividends in excess of net 
profit after taxes and some companies also pay dividends when net profit after taxes are 
negative. So, the payment of dividend from negative profit creates a discontinuity in the 
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variable with negative values being rather meaningless. As dividend pay-out ratio (the 
extent of profit paid as dividends) is a better proxy for dividend payments thall others 
(e. g., dividend yield or ratio of dividend to sales) are, so, it is considered dividend pay-out 
ratio as the proxy of the dependent variable. Dividend pay-out ratio is calculated as 
dividend divided by operating profits where dividend is the annual equity dividend and 
operating income is the income from operation (gross profit - operating expenses). Jensen 
et al. (1992), Short (1996), and Mollah et al. (2000) also used the same proxy for dividend 
payments in their empirical investigations. 
6.2. B. 11. Independent Variables 
6.2. B. 11. A. Dividend Signalling 
6.2. B. 11. A. i. Business Risk 
Dividend signalling theory postulates that dividends convey infortnation about 
current and future levels of earnings to the market. However, business risk is the 
uncertainty about current and future profitability. Greater business risk makes the 
expected direct relationship between current and expected future profitability less certain. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that greater business risk will be associated with lower 
dividend payments. Business Risk is considered as the proxy of uncertainty about current 
and future earnings for testing dividend signalling theory for this study. Gerber (1988), 
Jensen et al. (1992), and Mollah et al. (2000) also used business risk as the proxy of 
uncertainty of profitability in their empirical studies. 
6.2. B. 11. B. Tax Clientele of Dividend 
6.2. B. 11. B. i. Institutional Shareholders 
As the tax clientele argument views that investors in low tax brackets prefer high 
dividend paying stocks when compared to investors in high tax brackets. The tax status of 
the institutional shareholders is considered as the proxy for marginal tax payers to test the 
clientele effect of dividend in this study because the institutional shareholders are in low 
tax brackets in Bangladesh. The tax rate on dividend income is only 15% for the 
institutional shareholders of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies. If tax clientele 
argumcnt is valid, the marginal tax payers prefer high yield stocks, therefore, it is 
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hypothesised a positive relationship between the institutional shareholders and the 
dividend pay-out ratio. Gerber (1988), Partington (1989), and Alli et al. (1993) also used 
institutional shareholders as the proxy for marginal tax payers in their empirical studies. 
6.2. B. 11. C. Agency Cost explanation of Dividend 
6.2. B. 11. C. i. Insider Ownership 
Agency theory argues that firms pay higher amount of dividends as moiutoring and 
bonding package when insiders hold a lower percentage of common stock and / or greater 
number of common stocks held by outsiders to reduce agency cost. If more percentage of 
common stocks is held by insiders then that leads to less protection of outsiders and in that 
case management usually expropriate funds by maximising their own benefits rather than 
return the money (dividend) to the outsiders (La Porta et al. 2000), therefore, it is 
hypothesised a negative relationship between insider ownership and dividend pay-out 
ratio. The proportion of stock held by insiders is considered as the proxy of insider 
ownership for this study. Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. (1992), Alli et al. (1993), Holder cl 
al. (1998), Saxena (1999), and Mollah et al. (2000) used percentage of insider ownership 
as a proxy of insider ownership in their studies. 
6.2. B. 11. C. ii. Dispersion of Ownership 
As agency theory suggests, widely spread ownership has more bargaining power 
which also ensures more protection of outsiders and in this case corporate governance 
works well. Therefore, management pays more dividends to control the influence of 
widespread ownership. As the number of common stockholders increases, the agency 
problems become more severe, the need for monitoring actions also increases; hence, 
dividend can alleviate this problem, so it is hypothesised a positive relationship between 
number of common stockholders and dividend pay-out ratio. The number of common 
stockholders is considered as the proxy of dispersion ownership for this study. Rozeff 
(1982), Jensen et al. (1992), Alli et al. (1993), Holder et al. (1998), Saxena (1999), and 
Mollah et al. (2000) also used the same proxy for dispersion of ownership in their studies. 
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Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis suggests that the firms with more free 
cash flow need to pay more dividends or to retire their bonds to reduce the agency cost 
because free cash flow encourage the insiders to take negative net present value (NP%') 
projects. However, La Porta et al. (2000) views that even if the invcstors' protection 
improves but the firm has free cash flow then the insiders must engage in more distorted 
and wasteful diversionary practices such as setting up intennediary companies into which 
they channel profits, and take wasteftil projects very often. Moreover, returning the money 
to the outsiders, i. e., payment of dividend to outside shareholders and retiring the long- 
term debt reduces the agency cost of free cash flow. As payment of dividends reduces the 
agency cost of free cash flow, therefore, it is hypothesised a positive relationship between 
free cash flow and dividend pay-out ratio. Free cash flow is considered as the proxy of 
free cash flow variable in this study. Holder et al. (1998), and Mollah et al. (2000) also 
used the same proxy of free cash flow in their studies. 
6.2. B. 11. C. iv. Collateralizable Assets 
Collaterizable asset is the security of the long-term debt because higher amounts of 
collaterizable assets indicate the higher extent of security of the bondholders. As higher 
amount of collaterizable assets is the indication of higher level of protection for 
bondholders, so, higher amount of collaterizable assets also reduces the agency cost 
arising for the conflict between shareholder and bondholder. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
a positive relationship between collateralizable assets and dividend pay-out ratio because a 
firm with more co I lateral izable assets has fewer agency problems between shareholder 
and bondholder and that also leads to the higher level of dividend payments because in 
that case firms face fewer debt indenture (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Collateralizable 
assets are considered as the proxy of bondholders' security for this study. Alli et al. 
(1993), and Mollah et al. (2000) also considered the same proxy for the bondholders' 
protection in their studies. 
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6.2. B. 11. D. Transaction Cost, Residual Theory, and Pecking Order Theory, of 
Dividend 
6.2. B. 11. D. i. Financial Leverage 
Higher level of financial leverage indicates the higher leý, el of dcbt burden of tile 
firin and this also increases the burden of fixed charges, i. e., transaction costs. Debt-equity 
ratio is considered as the level of debt for this study. As higher burden of transaction cost 
reduces the capability of paying dividends, therefore, it is hypothesised a negýitiý'c Zý 
relationship between the level of debt and dividend pay-out ratio. Gerber (1988). 
Partington (1989), and Jensen et al. (1992) also considered debt-equity ratio as the proxy 
of debt burden in their empirical investigations. 
6.2. B. 11. D. ii. Size 
We know that bigger firms face less issuance cost for external financing, so, bigger 
firms have the advantageous positions in the capital market to raise external funds at 
lower costs. As bigger firms enjoy advantages in the capital market for external financing, 
so, the dividend paying ability of the bigger size finns increases. And indeed the bigger 
fin-ns pay more dividends compare to the smaller finns. Therefore, it is hypothesised a 
positive relationship between firm size and dividend pay-out ratio. Alli et al. (1993) and 
Holder et al. (1998) also considered firin size as the proxy for the issuance cost of external 
financing in their studies. 
6.2. B. 11. D. iii. Investment Opportunity 
The firms expenencing high growth rates generally have large investment 
requirements and normally the investment opportunities reduces the capability of payilig 
dividends of those finns because financial managers usually take all the positive net 
present value projects to maximise shareholders wealth. Therefore, it is hypothesised a 
negative relationship between investment opportunity of the firm and dividend pay-out 
ratio because as residual theory and pecking order theory concern, finns with large 
investment opportunities generally use internally generated funds for investment and 
consequently pays lov, 'er dividends. Growth of net assets is the better predictor for 
investment opportunities than others (e. g., sales growth) because growth of net assets 
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provides the evidence whether the firm has taken positive net present value projects. And 
if they do then the finn is supposed to grow up in real terms. Therefore, growth of net 
assets is considered as the proxy of investment opportunities for this study. Partiiigton 
(1989), Jensen et al. (1992), and Alli et al. (1993) also used the similar proxy for 
investment opportunities in their studies. 
The independent variables, their proxies, and the calculations are shown in Table 6.22. 
Table 6.2: A Brief Description of the Independent Variables 
Dividend Name of the Variables Proxies Calculations 
Theories 
Signalling Business Risk Uncertainty of Standard Deviation of I" Difference 
Current and Future of Operating Income Divided by 
Profitability Total Assets 
Tax Clientele Tax Status of Institutional Proportion of Stock held by 
institutional Shareholders Institutional Shareholders 
Shareholders 
Agency Cost (1) Insider Ownership (1) Stock held by (1) Proportion of Stock held by 
(2) Dispersion of Insiders Insiders 
Ownership (2) Number of (2) Natural Log of Number of 
(3) Free Cash Flow Common Common Stockholders 
(4) Collateralizable Stockholders (3) (Net Profit After Tax - Dividend 
Assets (3) Free Cash Flow + Depreciation) / Total Assets 
(4) Collateralizable (4) Ratio of Net Fixed Assets to 
Assets Total Assets 
Transaction (1) Financial (1) Financial (1) Ratio of Long Tenn Debt to 
Cost, Leverage Leverage Book Value of Total Assets 
Residual, and (2) Size (2) Size (2) Natural Log of Market 
Pecking Order (3) Investment (3) Growth in Net Capitalisation 
Theory Opportunity Assets (3) (Net Fixed Assetst - Net Fixed 
Assetst- 1) / Net Fixed Assetst- I 
6.2. C. Methodology 
6.2. C. 1. Hypothesis: 
Ho: There is no significant influence of Business Risk Institutional Shareholders, 
Insider Ownership, Dispersion of Ownership, Free Cash Flow, Collateralizable Assets, 
Financial Leverage, Size, and Investment Opportunity on dividendpay-out ratio. 
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6.2. C. 11. Proposed Model 
Both pooled and cross-sectional OLS models run over the period of 1988-97 to 
identify the deten-ninants of dividend pay-out ratio. 
OLS Regression Model: 
Dividend Pay-out Ratio (DPR) =a+ filBusiness Risk (BR) +, fl2histitutional 
Shareholders (INST) + 83 Insider Ownership (INSIDE) + 84Dispersion of Oivnership 
(DOWNER) + P5Free Cash Flow (FCF) + 86Collateralizable Assets (COLLASS) +8 
7Leverage (LEVER) + 88Size (SIZE) + 891hvestment opportunity (INVEST) 
6.3. Empirical Evidences 
The average dividend pay-out ratio in the Dhaka Stock Exchange over the period 
of 1988-97 is 24.93%. While the dividend pay-out ratio is low but it is quite acceptable for 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange as an emerging market where the developed markets pay 
almost the same amount of dividends. However, this type of dividend payment 
presumably has higher level of investment opportunities but the asset growth rate is only 
11.78%, so, there is lot of scope of suspicion about profit transfer and profit channelling. 
Besides, it is presumable that the market has lower levels of outsiders' protection. 
Furthen-nore, if we look at the ownership structure of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 
companies then we could get some idea about the outsider protection in the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. Usually, the institutional shareholders are the major shareholders of the firms 
but we see that institutional shareholders are holding only 10.99% of the shares in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange which is one quarter of the developed markets (e. g., US markets). 
In contrast, the insiders are holding 29.92% of the shares. So, these are the clear indication 
of the facts. The institutional shareholdings figure indicate that the tax clientele theory is 
presumably not working well in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. However, the higher leNe] of 
insider ownership indicates the closely held nature of the firms and suggests less 
protection of outsiders in the markets. So , it 
is also presumable that expropriation is 
working perfectly and efficiently in the market. Moreover, the insider ownership is three 
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times as high as the developed markets (e. g., US markets); therefore, this is the indication 
of higher level of influence of agency cost theory in the market (Table 6-3). 
The Pearson's correlation matrix shows the expected relationship of all the 
independent variables with dividend pay-out ratio except dividend signalling variable. 
However, the correlation matrix also shows the correlation between the independent 
variables are either low degree or moderate degree, which suggests the absence of 
multico linearity between independent variables. As suggested by Bryman and Cramer 
(1997), the Pearson's r between each pair of independent variables should not exceed 
0.80; otherwise independent variables with a coefficient in excess of 0.80 may be 
suspected of exhibiting multicolinearity. Multicolinearity is usually regarded, as a 
problem because it means those regression coefficients may be unstable (Bryman and 
Cramer, 1997). Several scholars including Mendenhall and Sincich (1989), Hair et al. 
(1995), and Freund and Wilson (1998), state that multicolinearity can be quite difficult to 
detect where there are more than two independent variables. Moreover, the colinearity 
diagnostics provided by SPSS including colinearity statistics (Tolerance and Variance 
Inflated Factor 'VIF'), condition index, and variance proportion support the Pearson's 
correlation coefficients and document no proof of multicolinearity problem in the 
regression models (Table 6.4). 
There are two types of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models run to 
identify the determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market: one, ten yearly 
average cross-section regression model, and two, pooled regression model. In the pooled 
regression model, nine (10-1) year dummies are considered for 10 years (1988-97). 
However, the coefficient of none of the years is significant, which indicates no impact of 
time on the model. As time does not have any impact on the model, so, incorporation of 
year dummy has rather worsen the overall significance of the regression model. 
The overall = 8.466 and 5.125 for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
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adjusted R2 is 0.155 and 0.152 respectively for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models. 
Ramsey's RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) and White test (White, 1980) are employed 
for checking hetero skedasti city problem of the models but both the tests are unable to 
reject the hypothesis of homoskedasticity, i. e., the residuals are homoskedastic. Hoývever, 
Durbin-Watson is close to 2 in both the regression models, which indicates no 
autocorrelation problem of the regression models. 
While the coefficients of tax clientele, agency cost, transaction cost, residual, and 
pecking order theory variables are in the predicted direction in both the regression models 
but the coefficients are not strongly significant except a very few. In contrast, the 
signalling variable provides different story. The signalling variable shows a significant (p 
. 025) positive relationship with dividend pay-out ratio in cross-sectional model but an 
insignificant (p = . 969) negative relationship with dividend pay-out ratio in pooled 
regression model. 
6.3. A. Dividend Signalling 
The standardised beta coefficients of business risk are . 110 and -. 003 
respectively in cross-sectional and pooled regression models but only the beta coefficient 
of cross-sectional model is significant (p = . 025). These results 
document a Positive 
relationship between dividend pay-out ratio and business risk. These results suggest that in 
spite of more uncertainty about future profitability, the firins are paying more dividends in 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange. However, these results indicate that dividends neither signal 
about future profitability nor convey right information to the market because if dividends 
do convey information to the market then dividend should behave in the rational way, i. e., 
more uncertainty is supposed to lead to fewer dividend payments and vice versa. These 
results indicate that managers do not convey right infonnation to the market. Usually, the 
companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange follow stable dividend policy; so, they 
have a little scope to adjust the profitability to the payments of dividend. Therefore, 
dividend contains less infori-nation and dividend becomes less informative to signal the 
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profitability (see Chapter 8 for detail). These results reject the information content 
hypothesis of Miller and Modigliani (1961) and strongly disagree with the previous 
empincal evidence of dividend signalling. 
6.3. B. Tax Clientele of Dividend 
The standardised beta coefficients of the institutional shareholdings variable are 
. 
077 and . 068 and the significant levels are . 140 and . 181 respectively for cross-sectional 
and pooled regression models. These results indicate a positive but not highly significant 
relationship between dividend pay-out ratio and institutional shareholders. As the 
empirical results document a positive relationship between institutional shareholders and 
dividend pay-out ratio, so, it is assumed that the marginal tax payers influence the 
companies to pay more dividends. But in fact, the empirical results do not indicate the 
significant influence of the institutional shareholders on the dividend pay-out ratio. The 
main reason behind this problem is that the institutional shareholders are not the major 
shareholders but they are holding only 10.99% shares of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 
companies. However, these results are consistent with Brennan (1970), Elton and Gruber 
(1970), Long (1978), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), and DeAnglo and Masulis 
(1980) supported tax clientele argument. As we have been mentioned earlier that 
institutional shareholders are not the major shareholders of the listed companies in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, that is why, even though the empirical results support tax 
clientele theory but this theory is not supposed to work perfectly in the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange and therefore, institutional shareholders has become comparatively weak 
predictor of the tax clientele theory. 
6.3. C. Agency Cost Explanation of Dividend 
The standardised beta coefficients of insider ownership are -. 113 and -. 082 and the 
significant levels are . 024 and . 125 respectively 
for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models. However, the standardised beta coefficients of the natural log of common 
stockholders are . 034 and . 041 and the significant levels are . 573 and . 505 respectively 
for 
cross-sectional and pooled regression models. These results indicate that finns pay higher 
amount of dividends as monitoring and bonding package when insiders hold a loxý'er 
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percentage of common stock and / or greater number of common stocks held by outsiders 
to reduce agency cost. These results, however, support the empirical findings of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984), Crutchley and Hansen (1989), 
Jensen et al. (1992), Alli et al. (1993), Saxena (1999), and Mollah et al. (2000). 
The standardised beta coefficients of free cash flow are . 024 and . 015 and the 
significant levels are . 643 and . 284 respectively for the cross-sectional and the pooled 
regression models. These results, however, support Jensen's (1986) free cash flo%N7 
hypothesis that if firms have free cash flow then the fin-ns either pay dividends or retire 
their debts to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. These results also support the 
empirical evidence of Holder et aL (1998), and Mollah et al. (2000). 
In addition, the standardised coefficients of collateralizable assets are . 086 and 
. 104 and the significant levels are . 101 and . 052 respectively for the cross-sectional and 
pooled regression models. These results view that the finns with more collateralizable 
assets have fewer conflicts between shareholders-bondholders and consequently pay more 
dividends. Moreover, these results support the empirical evidences of Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Alli et al. (1993), and Mollah et al. (2000). 
While the higher level of collateralizable assets and the regression coefficients of 
collateralizable assets indicate the better protection of the bondholders in the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange, the insider ownership and the dispersion ownership and their regression 
coefficients provide clear evidence that the outside shareholders are completely 
unprotected in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. However, employment of unqualified family 
members in the top management and overpaid positions is a common practice in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. In addition, there are eight leading groups of companies of 
Bangladesh which exist in the Dhaka Stock Exchange and each of them has 8-10 
companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. However, they (the group of companies) 
have a great influence on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, so, all of these are the indications of 
higher level of agency cost and more obviously very low level of outsider protection in the 
market. Besides, as a number of listed companies are the members of the leading group of 
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companies with higher levels of insider ownership and lower levels of law enf k orcement in 
the market presumes that the insiders are e joying every facility for stealing profits. II nj IIIý 
transferring pricing, and channelling profits in the emerging markets (Mollah et al. 2000). 
6.3. D. Transaction Cost, Residual Theory, and Pecking Order Theory of Dividend 
The standardised beta coefficients of debt equity ratio are -. 274 and -. 278 
respectively for cross-sectional and pooled regression models and both the coefficients are 
highly significant (p<. 000). These results support the hypothesis that highly levered firms 
bear the huge burden of transaction cost and consequently pay lower amount of diN'idends 
to avoid the costs of external financing. However, these results are consistent with the 
empirical evidences of Higgins (1972) and Fama (1974). 
However, the standardised beta coefficients of natural log of market capitalisation 
are . 133 and . 146 and the significance levels are . 032 and . 022 respectively for cross- 
sectional and pooled regression models. These results document the hypothesis that larger 
fin-ns face lower issuance cost and they are able to pay more dividends. These results, 
however, support the empirical work of Alli et al. (1993). 
Moreover, the standardised beta coefficients of investment opportunity are -. 058 
and -. 045 and the significance levels are . 251 and . 373 respectively 
for cross-sectional and 
pooled regression models. These results indicate that higher growth generally has large 
investment opportunity and firms use internally generated funds for investment and 
consequently pay lower dividends. These results are consistent with the previous 
empirical works. These results, however, support the residual theory of dividend and 
Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order theory of dividend. Even though the empirical 
results agree with the argument of residual and pecking order theory and support previous 
studies but as the coefficients are not highly significant, so, the investment opportunity 
v'ariable has become a very weak predictor of residual and pecking order theory. 
So, these empirical results indicate a strong influence of transaction cost in the 
market, i. e., firms have higher level of debt, which force them to pay less dividends. 
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However,, a higher level of debt burden (27.07%) indicates that the finns either have 
higher amounts of investment demand or pay higher amounts of monitoring package but 
the reality is quite different. As we have already been mentioned earlier in this chapter 
that fin-ns have only 11.78% growth opportunities and firms pay only 24.93% dividend, 
these figures give us the clear support as we suspected earlier that may be the insiders are 
stealing profits efficiently in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Finally, the empirical results document clear evidence that there is a stron- 
influence of agency cost and transaction cost on dividend policy of the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange listed companies. However, the results also document a very strong 
disagreement with the signalling effect of dividend in the market. Moreover, the results 
also evidence the tax clientele effect on dividend policy but these results are not 
significant at a very high level which means the tax clientele effect is not so strong in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. In addition, the empirical results also document a very weak 
support of residual and pecking order theory in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (Table 6.5). 
6.4. Conclusion 
A vast majority of the studies conducted to date focused on dividend policy but 
some important issues still remaining unresolved. However, there is no such recognised 
study conducted on the determinants of dividend pay-out policy of the companies listed on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange yet. The major objective of this study is to identify the 
detenninants of dividend pay-out ratio in an emerging market. Since Miller and 
Modigliam (1961) established the irrelevance of dividends in perfect capital markets, 
several theories have appeared in the literature that explain the payment of dividends and 
variations in dividend pay-out policy by focusing on market imperfections and all of those 
studies are concentrated on signalling information content of dividend, tax clientele of 
dividend, agency cost explanation of dividend, transaction cost, residual theory, and 
pecking order theory of dividend. These theories are tested by using the OLS models on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange data over the period of 1988-1997 to identify the determinants 
of dividend pay-out ratio for this study. The Pearson's correlation matfix shows the 
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dividend signalling variable. However, the regression coefficients of all the N'ariables are 
in the predicted direction except business risk, which also support the correlation results. 
The coefficients of business risk are positively related to dividend pay-out ratio, 
which indicates that dividends do not convey any information to the market. Usually, the 
companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange follow a stable dividend policy; therefore, 
they do not partially adjust the profitability to the payments of dividend. Therefore, 
dividend contains less information and dividend becomes less informative to signal the 
profitability. This result is completely contradictory with the dividend signalling 
hypothesis because more uncertainty about current and future profitability leads the firms 
not to pay more dividends but to pay fewer dividends. These results are also inconsistent 
with the previous empirical studies and reject the theory of dividend signalling. 
The coefficients of the ratio of stock held by institutional shareholders are 
positively related to dividend pay-out ratio, which indicate that the marginal tax payers 
influence the firms to pay more dividends. This findings support the tax clientele 
argument of dividend but the coefficients are not strongly significant, so, institutional 
shareholdings has become a very weak predictor of tax clientele theory because the 
marginal tax payers (the institutional shareholders) are not the major shareholders of the 
companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
The coefficients of insider ownership are negative and the number of common 
stockholders are positively related to dividend pay-out ratio, which indicate that firms pay 
higher amount of dividends as monitoring and bonding packages when insiders hold a 
lower percentage of common stock and / or greater number of conunon stocks held by 
outsiders to reduce agency cost. However, free cash flow coefficients are positively 
related to dividend pay-out ratio, which indicate that if firms have free cash flow then they 
either pay dividends or retire their debts to reduce the agency cost of free cash floNý,,. In 
addition, the coefficients of collateralizable assets are positively related to dividend pay- 
out ratio, which indicate the influence of agency cost arises for the conflict between 
shareho Ider-bondho I der on diNidend pay-out ratio. These results are consistent with the 
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previous empirical studies and support the influence of agency cost oil dividend pay-out 
ratio. 
While the empirical results evidence the better protection of the bondholders in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, the higher amount of insider ownership, small size and less 
dispersed (ownership) firms are the clear indication of extreme influence of insiders in the 
Dhaka Stock exchange listed companies. However, the results also evidence that the 
outside shareholders are completely unprotected in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Furthermore, in practice the insiders are all the wrong-doers in the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
and the group of companies are the major source of these activities. So, all of these 
evidence the higher level of influence of agency cost theory in the market and more 
obviously the very low level of outsider protection. Besides, a lower level of law 
enforcement is helping the agents (managers) to do whatever they like, i. e., stealing 
profits, transferring pricing, channelling profits, etc. 
The coefficients of debt-equity ratio negatively and firm size positively related to 
dividend pay-out ratio, which indicates that firms with higher level of leverage pay lower 
amount of dividend because of higher burden of transaction cost and large firms pay 
higher dividend because these firms face lower issuance cost. These results are consistent 
with previous empirical studies and support a significant influence of transaction costs on 
dividend pay-out ratio. 
The coefficients of investment opportunity variable are negatively related to 
dividend pay-out ratio, which indicates that the firms with higher growth generally pay 
lower dividends. These results are consistent with the previous empirical works. However, 
these results support residual theory of dividend and Myers and Maj luf s (1984) pecking 
order theory of dividend. 
The average growth rate of the listed companies is 11.78% but the free cash flow 
is only 3.6%. This is very minimum to fulfil the fund requirement for the investment 
demand. However, as the insiders are the major shareholders of the Dhaka Stock 
Chapter Six 120 Determinants of Dividend Poliqv: Empirical 
Exchange listed companies and presumably the insiders are misusing the company profits 
perfectly and efficiently, which also causes higher amount of external financing (debt- 
equity ration is 27.07%). Moreover, as we know that most of the companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange are small in size, so, the companies face more issuance cost for 
external financing and higher amount of debt burden increases the total transaction cost. 
Therefore, a higher amount of transaction costs and higher amount of insider ownership 
reduce the capacity of the listed companies to pay dividends. 
The empirical results document clear evidence that there is a strong influence of 
agency cost and transaction cost theories on dividend policy of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
listed companies. The coefficient of the signalling theory variable is positively significant 
(at 5% level), which is completely opposite to the hypothetical relationship. This result 
clearly disagree with the existing literature and empirical evidence. So, it is quite 
reasonable to conclude that the empirical evidence disagrees with signalling effect of 
dividend in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (see Table 6.5). However, the results also evidence 
the tax clientele effect on dividend policy but these results are not significant at very high 
level which means the tax clientele effect is not so strong as other theories in the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange. In addition, the empirical results also document weak support for 
residual and pecking order theory in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Finally, the empirical 
study identified leverage, firin size, insider ownership, and collateralizable assets as the 
major determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market. 
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Chapter Seven: Dividend Policy and Dividend Behaviour: Prior Empirical Evidence 
7.0. Introduction: 
This chapter of the thesis will incorporate the review of the major previous 
empirical studies on dividend policy and behaviour. The objectives of this chapter are 
threefold: one, to have a better understanding about dividend policy and behavior, two, to 
identify the dividend policy and behavior of financial markets, and three, to develop the 
research questions for the empirical investigation on dividend policy and behavior in an 
emerging market. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. The review of major empirical 
studies on dividend policy and behaviour along with critical evaluation is included in 
section 7.1. Section 7.2 contains a brief summary and concluding remarks. 
7.1. Review of Major Empirical Studies: 
7.1.1. Dobrovolsky (1951): Corporate Income Retention: 
Dobrovolsky (195 1) was the earliest to conduct a full scale empirical study on 
dividend behaviour, although his main concern was corporate retention rather than 
dividends. He studied the behaviour of manufacturing concerns over different business 
cycles to establish the main elements which determined the level of earnings retention. He 
observed that retention and dividends are the normal proportion of the earnings. When the 
non-nal retention is not sufficient enough for the higher rate of expansion of assets then the 
corportion usually depends on external fund and on the other hand, when asset expansion 
is unusually low then retention is used to retire the borrowings of the company. 
Dobrovolsky summanses his findings as: 
"In the language of economic theory, it can be said that the average 
corporatc propensity to save has varied ivith the level of net income, but 
that the marginal corporate propensity to save has remained the same at 
different levels of net income. " (p. 2). 
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In one theory of consumer behaviour, the current saving of consumers is related to 
their current income in a manner similar to that, which Dobrovolsky (195 1) ascribes to 
corporate earnings retention. In this theory consumer preferences for savings and 
consumption are stable over time and determined mainly by the level of current income 
(Atkinson 1956). Current savings increases more than proportionally as the level of 
current income increases (Milton Friedman 1957). 
The critics (Michaelsen, 1961) of Dobrovolsky's work mentioned his findings are 
quite unconvincing as an explanation of corporate dividend behaviour. The determinants 
of consumer saving are not relevant to the analysis of corporate dividend behaviour 
because corporations do not save; rather they invest. Corporate retention and dividend 
behaviour is more properly related to a theory of investment of the firm. Thus, investors 
own the wealth which firms manage in the interest of their owners. The fin-n serves this 
interest by maximising the present value of the income which this wealth is expected to 
yield. Investors may save or consume this income as it is realised either as cash dividends 
or by realising a portion of the appreciation in the price of the stock which results from 
retention. The firm neither saves nor consumes its current earnings. It may invest a portion 
of these when doing so does not lessen the opportunities of its owners to save or consume. 
Such investment is, at the same time, saving on behalf of the investors and is so 
recognized by them. Dobrovolsky (1958) and Kaldor (1957) do not consider corporate 
investment of retentions as savings on behalf of investors. They believe that a complete 
distribution of all corporate earnings would result in a quite different level of saving in the 
economy from the current one because they believe that investors save much less than 
corporations do. 
As approprIate investment of extentions is made stock price should increase by a 
corresponding amount. Abstracting from taxes and transaction costs , investors include this 
price appreciation in their current income together with cash receipts. They may save or 
consume whatever proportion of this total income they wish by selling, if necessary, an 
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appropriate portion of their portfolio. Thus the investment of a particular firm can be quite 
independent of the saving of a particular investor. Investors' propensity to save as 
consumers may affect the level of investment in the economy as a whole indirectly 
through its effects on the level of interest rates, but this relationship will not affect the 
independence of investment of individual firms and the savings of particular investors. 
Michaelsen (1961) found Dobrovolsky's notion of corporate propensity to save 
both methodologically and theoretically difficult. Dobrovolsky derived a corporate 
propensity to save schedule from the aggregate time-series data that he used to describe 
both the behaviour of the manufacturing sector of the economy and the behaviour of the 
individual firms composing that sector. Proper inference from aggregate to Individual 
dividend and retention behaviour requires (a) that all important variables affecting the 
dividend behaviour of individual firms be included in the aggregate analysis; (b) that the 
regression equation used closely approximates the actual relationship between these 
variables; and (c) that the relationship between these variables within individual firrns not 
be distorted or concealed by the process of aggregation. If the first two of these conditions 
are not clearly established, then regression coefficients such as Dobrovolsky obtained have 
no particular meaning, except as historical description of the manufacturing sector. 
Michaelsen (1961) also found Dobrovolsky's work inappropriate on theoretical 
grounds. He mentioned: 
11 
..... this study shows clearly that there are 
important differences in pay-out 
ratios and in the variability of cash dividend flows among firms and that 
these differences are related to variables, other than current earnings 
variables, which were hidden by the use of aggregate data. " 
fI with aggregate data no investigation of the possible causes of these 
differences can be undertaken. " 
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Dobrovolsky did not determine whether the corporate propensity to save schedule 
concealed such interfirm differences, but rather assumed implicitly that aggregation 
presented no special problems. 
7.1.2. Lintner (1956): Distribution of Income: 
In a pioneering study in 1956, professor John Lintner investigated dividend 
behaviour over a extended period of time. He studied two distinct aspect of dividend. In 
the first aspect Lintner inter-viewed the managements of twenty eight firms to determine 
the factors they considered important in setting the firm's dividend payments. The major 
findings of that study were: (a) management sought to avoid increases in dividend 
payments, on a per share basis, that might have to be reversed at a subsequent time, and 
(b) earnings are the major determinants of dividend policy. In presenting these results 
Lintner leaves the reader with the following caveat: 
.......... the companies were not selected as a sample from which to draw 
statistical conclusions; rather they were deliberately selected to encompass 
a wide variety of situations and to build in opportunities for significant 
suggestive contrasts between the policies of companies similar in several 
respects but differing in other important characteristics. " (p. 98). 
In the second aspect Lintner developed an econometric model to explain dividend 
action. The equation was fitted to aggregate economic data taken from the national income 
accounts for the period 1918 to 1941 and was tested on similar data from the period 1918 
to 195 1. Lintner also tested the model on each of the twenty eight companies which were 
polled in the earlier part of the study. While the model was aggregative it nevertheless 
proved quite accurate in explaining the dividend action of the twenty eight companies 
from Lintner's sample universe. 
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Lintner's work suggests that most dividend decisions can be explained by the 
following equation: 
Dit = ai + ci (D*it - Di (t-l) )+ ýtit 
Where, 
D*it = rIPit, 
ri = Target pay-out ratio, 
Pit Current year's profit after taxes, 
Dit Change in dividend payments, 
a, = Contant term (usually positive), 
ci = Speed of adjustment coefficient, and 
ýtit = Error tenn. 
Subscript T= individual company, and 
Subscript T= time. 
................. 
This model states that the change in current year's dividend is equal to a constant 
plus an ad . ustment factor times (the current year's indicated earnings payable if a strict j 
pay-out ratio is adhered to, minus lagged dividends), plus an error terin which represents 
the discrepancy between the observed change ADit and the change expected on the basis 
of the other terms in the equation. 
Equation (7.1) can be converted to the following equation where b= cr and d= 
without changing the error term: 
DIt = alt + bP, t + dDi(t-1) + ýtit .............................. 
(7.2) 
Chapter Seven 126 Dividend Policy and Behaviour: Review 
Lintner fitted national income data for the period of 1918-1951 to equation (7.2) aiid 
found ....... excellent correlations, random residuals, and highly significant regression 
coefficients.... " (p. 109). 
Lintner belived this finding to be consistent with the following statement: 
" Current dividend distributions are primarily determined by last Year's 
dividends and current profits. The net effect of otherfactors, insofar as not 
systematically reflected by current profits and lagged dividends, is small 
and random. " (Lintner 1963, p. 252). 
However, external funds did not have, in Lintner's work, even the minor 
supplementary role they had in Dobrovolsky's. And Lintner's work is theoretically more 
satisfactory than Dobrovolsky's work because that was based explicitly on a mechanism of 
corporate behaviour. 
Despite the major contributions of Lintner's research, the study fails to fully 
inform the reader of all the factors which were investigated or to divulge the relatiVe 
importance of the factors in the determination of dividend policy. However, critics of 
Lintner's work have pointed out that ability of the model to explain dividends over a very 
long time during which everything else in the economy changed is grounds for suspicion 
of the results rather than satisfaction (Brittain, 1964). Specifically, the major weakness is 
attributed to reliance on aggregate data taken from national income accounts relating 
dividends directly to profits after tax. This may be appropriate for selected time periods to 
which the model is applied; however, since the beginning of the World War 11, liberallsed 
amortisation provisions have largely obsured the meaning of tax return data. For example, 
since the World War 11, the dividend net profit ratio has doubled while the ratio of 
dividends to cash flow has remained remarkably stable at about 30% (Brittain, 1964). 
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Even if Lintner's findings are accurate for the time period he covered, the model 
and his empirical results may be incorrect when considered in a contemporary context. 
Since the study appeared in 1956 there have been profound changes in the financial 
management of large American corporations. The normative theory which was in its 
infancy in the early 1950's has become an integral part of business school and advanced 
management cirricula. In addition, the increased acceptance of debt as an appropriate 
source of funds, and the growth in the ability of corporations to raise large sums of money 
in the capital markets has probably had a significant impact on management's willingness 
to shift financing requirements from internal to external sources with an attendant increase 
in dividend flexibility (Gillespie, 1971). 
Lintenr's interpretation of his findings depends critically on this assumption and it 
therefore deserve comment (Michaelsen, 1961). If external funds have no important role in 
financial decisions, as Lintner implied by his omission of them from his hypothesis, then 
investment must be financed almost entirely through retentions. If the firm maintains, on 
an average, a stable dividend pay-out ratio, these retention and hence, the investment 
which they finance, will be a stable proportion of current earnings. If, in addition, the 
average rate of return on new investment is the same as that on existing investment, and if 
both of these rates of return are stable over time, the annual increment in earnings due to 
retention will also be a stable proportion of current earnings. Therefore, the earnings 
stream will grow at a constant rate. Reinvestment of a constant proportion of this stream 
requires an increasing amount of investment opportunities. The capital budget, the 
optimum package of investment opportunities financed by these retentions, will also grow 
at the same constant rate as the earnings stream and will therefore be a constant proportion 
of current earnings in every period. 
Lintner's model of dividend detennination, in which the target pay-out ratio is the 
main parameter , is thus unsatisfactory on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds. His vvork 
also entailed methodological difficulties (Michaelsen, 1961). Like Dobrovolsky, Lintner 
used aggregate time-series data as the main object of his analysis. Lintner made no 
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rigorous attempt to show that earnings and dividends for the corporate sector as a whole 
might be treated as observation of a single firm and that such observations for several 
consecutive years might be treated as independent observations for similar firms. Rather, 
Lintner implicitly assumed that the regression coefficients derived from these aggregate 
data described the determination of dividends within individual firrns. HoNvever, here, as 
in Dobrovolsky's work, important interfirm differences were concealed by aggregation and 
the coefficients so obtained serve mainly as historical descriptions of the corporate sector 
of the economy. 
7.1.3. Paul Darling (1957): Extension of Lintner's Work: 
Paul Darling proposes 'a theory to explain how dividend decisions are madc' 
(Darling 1957, p. 214). He argued that a target pay-out ratio and speed-of-adjustment 
factor could not give proper weight to all the factors which might be expected to affect 
dividend decision. He proposed more elaborate hypothesis to explain dividend behaviour 
but did not alter Lintner's primary emphasis on pay-out ratio as the central element in 
dividend policy. He desired to reveal the influence of other factors besides last year's 
dividends and this year's profits on the pay-out ratio. 
In the study which followed Lintner's effort Paul Darling modified Lintner's basic 
formulation to include expectations and liquidity in the determination of dividend policy. 
Darling bases his work on the presumption that the ultimate goal of the management group 
is to maintain and if possible enlarge its control over corporate affairs. He further theorises 
that this goal depends on (a) growth of the firin relative to the rest of the industry, (b) the 
degree of liquidity maintained by the firm, and (c) the extent of dispersion of stock 
ownership. Darling in essence proposed a more complete explanation of diN, 'idend 
behaviour without changing Lintner's principal emphasis. 
Darling mainly focused on managerial expectations and attitude towards liquidity; 
but he hoped to gain an understanding of these "by studyingfluctuations in the dividetid 
flow. " (Darling 1957, p. 209). 
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Darling hypothesise that dividends are a function of current investment and current 
use of external funds as well as past dividends and current earnings. The functional 
relationship may be expressed in the forrn of Lintner's model as follows: 
AD =a+ c(rP - D-1) - dl + eB + ýt ................ (7.3) 
Where, AD, a, c, r, P, D- 1, and ýt are same as in equation (7.1) and I is current net 
investment and B is current net flow of external funds. 
In Lintner's fonnulation AD is not affected by investment and external funds but 
only by current profits and past dividends. On the other hand, in Darling's work AD is 
affected by current profits and past dividends and as well as current investment and 
current use of external funds. The variables in equation (7.3) bear the following 
relationship to each other by accounting identity: 
AD= P-D-1 +(B-1) ............................. (7.4) 
The relationship between earnings, investment and external funds are implied by 
the assumption of the proportionality of the capital budget is: 
(B -1)=kP, wherek= I -rand I >k>O. 
That is, both investment and external funds bear a constant proportional 
relationship to earnings deten-nined by the pay-out ratio. 
Darling's first step in the revision of Lintner's work is the Introduction of a budget 
constraint which takes the following form: 
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(P +A+ B) - (D +I+ AW) =AC ................... (7.5) 
Where, 
P= Net income after taxes, 
A= Depreciation, 
B= Net current borrowing, 
D= Dividends, 
I= Gross investment, 
AW = Change in working capital requirements, and 
AC = Change in holdings of precautionary assets. 
Management's goal of maintaining financial maneuverability involves planning for 
an adequate level of future liquid balances thus placing the dividend decision within the 
constraint of this budget equation. In addition, if the firm's liquidity position is defined by 
the sequence of estimated future values cl, C2, C3 . ........ etc. 
departure ftom these levels 
can be deten-nined by management. A liquidity index, L, to be used in the dividend 
equation is then defined as an index of the degree of departure of the currently expected 
future cash position from desired levels. 
Incorporating these modifications into Lintner's basic forinulation produces the 
following equation can be tested using aggregate data and multiple regression analysis: 






AS = Change in sales, 
L= Index of liquidity, and 
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ýt = Error tenn. 
Darling incorporated lagged profits in equation (7.6) instead of lagged dividends 
because of his feeling that profit is a better explanatory variable than dividends. In 
addition, he suggests that because of the high degree of multicolinearity between lagged 
dividends (D-1) and lagged profits (P-1) Lintner's correlation findings may actually reflect 
the importance of profits, not dividends. 
In developing his tests for determining the impact of liquidity and expectations 
Darling theorises that after management has decided upon a future cash position, cl, c2, 
c3, ....... a revision of expectations about future profits or changes in the degree of 
certainty of future profits will cause a divergence between the desired and expected levels 
of the future cash position. As a consequence management will act immediately by 
adjusting the current dividend and instituting a revised financial program to eliminate this 
gap. When the liquidity index (L) is omitted from the regression equation the residual 
from the equation should reflect changes in business anticipations. By showing that the 
residuals are positive during periods when profit outlook is optimistic and negative during 
periods of passimism, Darling concludes that expectations play an important role in 
dividend policy. His formal hypothesis is: "Dividends will tend to vary directly with 
current profits, with past profits, with the rate of amortisation recoveries and with shifts in 
anticipations offuture earnings and will tend to vary inversely with persistent changes in 
the level of sales" (Darling, 1957, p. 214). The independent variables in this hypothesis 
with the exception of amortisation and change in sales need little elaboration. The 
inclusion of amortisation is based on Darling's feeling that rising and predictable 
depreciation changes diminish uncertainty with respect to maintaining dividends out of a 
given level of profits. He includes the change in sales as a proxy for anticipated increases 
in working capital requirements. Such an increase in working capital would, of course, 
constrain the firm's liquidity position with the ultimate effect of reducing the firrn's ability 
to pay cash dividends. Darling submits that the results of tests using his dividend equation 
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provide support for this hypothesis, while admitting that substantial additional research is 
necessary. 
Darling might have given a more satisfactory account of the relationship between 
the variables in equation (7.4) than Lintner did as a result of his explicit treatment of each 
of them. In particular, he might have related investment to expectations and the cost of 
capital. He might have related external funds to the relative cost of different sources of 
funds and to the capital structure of the firm. Darling neither improve Lintner's basic 
model nor did he give a more satisfactory account of the determination of the pay-out ratio 
than Lintner did (Michaelsen, 196 1). 
Darling implicitly assumed a relationship of constant proportionality between 
earnings and investment in his main argument (Darling 1957, p. 213). He was more 
explicit in an earlier discussion of corporate liquidity and dividend policy: 
"Anticipated growth requirements ...... 
lead to the development of a policy 
to withhold a portion of earnings. It is belived that such policies, for most 
large corporations are extremely 'stable'.... so that thisfactor may be taken 
as a constant overfairly long time intervals" (Darling 1955, p. 445). 
Darling did not include investment in his empirical analysis because "it does not 
appear that the claim of plant and equipment disbursement, I, against the net inflow of 
funds is prior to the claim of dividends" (Darling 1957, p. 215). Darling cited Lintner's 
work as evidence for this view, but had criticised Lintner's exclusion of variables such as 
investment as an oversimplification (Darling 1957, p. 211). 
Darling's treatment of external funds in the theoretical development of his 
hypothesis and in his empirical analysis is some what more complicates than his treatment 
of investment. Even if investment were a constant proportion of earnings, there is no 
special reason N-vhy external funds should be. Darling recognised that net sales of securities 
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provided funds which might be expected to influence dividend payments. However, he 
argued later in the course of his analysis that new debt and equity issues were not feasible 
sources of funds for expansion or other purposes because ...... debtfinancing is eventual4v 
limited by the lender's preferences concerning the ratio of debt to ownership equlýl` and 
because stock sales " .... would run the risk of diluting the equity of present oivners " 
(Darling 1957, p. 213). Darling altered this position in his empirical analysis by 
mentioning, "the main theoretical variable omittedfrom this functional representation is 
the external financing variable, B. Some tests were run with an interest rate variable 
included, but the results were inconclusive" (Darling 195 7, p. 215). 
In all his tests Darling used aggregate time series data as did both Lintner and 
Dobrovolsky. He assumed the aggregate time series data, which he used for each of his 
variables, could be treated as a collection of observations on individual firms. To be 
consistent he should have used an aggregate time series data for external funds and as well 
as an 'interest rate variable'. It can not be assumed that in each year the individual firms in 
Darling's aggregate data absorbed the same proportion of external funds; or, what is more 
relevant, that none of these firms absorbed any external funds as is implied by his 
omission of them (Michaelsen, 1961). 
The aggregate time-series data which Darling used simply do not bear on his 
hypothesis of "how dividend decision be made" within the individual firm. The criticism 
made of this methodological procedure in the work of Dobrovolsky and Lintner apply 
with equal force here. Thus, despite Darling's effort, we are no nearer a satisfactory 
explanation of dividend behaviour than we were as a consequence of Lintner's work 
(Michaelsen, 1961). 
Darling offers no evidence to support his contention that dividend policy affects 
stock price through its influence on expectations (Michaelsen, 1961). The view that 
dividend policy has an independent effect on stock price is not new. However, there has 
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been little systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between dividend policy and 
stock price. 
7.1.4. Brittain (1966): Corporate Dividend Policy: 
The effort by John Brittain for the Brooking Institution, to date, seems to be the 
most far reaching of the macro time-series studies of dividend behaviour. Brittain NN'as 
prticularly concerned with explaining the fact that between 1946 and 1962 dividends rose 
at a 6% annual rate while profits only increased at a 2% rate. His analysis was based on a 
statistical model designed to explain changes in corporate dividend payments with primary 
attention given to the detenninants that are subject to public policy control notably 
individual tax rates and tax provisions concerning depreciation. Brittain proposes three 
general hypotheses to be tested in the study. The hypotheses are: (a) Net earnings is a poor 
measure of the ability to pay dividends. This is accompanied by the corollary that cash 
flow would be a better basis for the explaination of dividends. (b) The primary hypothesis 
about the pay-out ratio was that it would tend to vary inversely with the differential 
between the higher tax rates on ordinary income and the rates on capital gains. (c) Higher 
interest rates may also encourage a higher rate of retention to avoid the high costs of 
external finance or rationing or restrictions imposed by lenders at given interest rates 
(Brittain, 1966). 
Although Brittain extended his research to encompass both industry and firin data, 
the primary portion of the study was concerned with aggregative time-series analysis of 
the relationship between changes in dividends and movements in presumably related 
variables. The analytical approach involved fitting regression models to annual data in an 
effort to isolate the impact of the various factors. The models were primarily developed to 
analyze long run relationships rather than short run adjustments (Gillespie, 1971). 
The results of Brittain's aggregative time-series analysis are: (a) because of the 
exaggeration of the squeeze on net earnings by liberalisation of depreciation allowances 
tile measurement of income by 'cash flow' gives a better explaination of dividends since 
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the beginning of World War 11; (b) allowing for long-run vanations in the ratio of 
dividends to net profits in response to individual tax rates and depreciation liberality gi%, Cs 
a satisfactory explaination of dividends in the entire 1920-1960 interval; (c) these two tax 
factors appear sufficient to account for the sharp drop in the pay-out ratio between the late 
1920's and the early postwar period and its subsequent recovery; (d) the rate of corporate 
taxation was found to influence aggregate dividends, but not the pay-out ratio; (e) three 
other factors, rising interest rates, rapid sales increases, and diminishing corporate 
liquidity, were all found to depress the fraction of income paid out in dividends, although 
their influence was far less significant (Brittain, 1966). The pay-out ratio Brittain refers to 
in item four is the rate of dividends to after tax eamings. Thus while increases in taxation 
were found to reduce aggregate dividends. The pay-out ratio remained constant since after 
tax eamings was reduced by a commensurate amount. 
The second aspect of Brittain's study was a less detailed time series analysis of the 
dividend policy of industries and firms. The results verified the depreciation and tax rate 
hypothesis, and showed interest rates to be influential in a majority of cases. The same 
models fitted to a sample of forty large firms suggested that depreciation and individual 
tax rates were each influential in the case of about one-third of the firms. 
In the final aspect of Brittain's pooled (cross-section and time-series) data for forty 
large firms and simultaneously analysed the variation among firms and over time. The 
results reaffirmed strongly the influence of depreciation and individual tax rates on a 
fin-n's propensity to distribute earnings. When dealing with individual firms, however, the 
tax rate influenced the target pay-out. From the viewpoint of this study Brittain's most 
interesting findings were that liquidity stimulated dividends while high investment 
demand produces the opposite effect (Brittain, 1966). The inclusion of investment demand 
variable improved the model's coefficient of determination substantially. Additionally 
since the N, ariable entered the model with the expected negative sign it supported the 
propositioii that high investment demand tends to control dividend policy in the long run. 
The addition of the liquidity N,, ariable in conjunction with the investment variable produced 
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a modest increase in the R2 thus supporting the contention that liquidity is important in 
the dividend decision. 
7.1.5. Fama and Babiak (1968): Dividend Policy: 
Fama and Babiak (1968) started their work on the partial adjusted model of Lintner 
(1956 and 1963) and the extended work by Brittain (1964 and 1966). They examines the 
dividend policy of 392 industrial firms over the period of 19 years (1946-64). Lintner and 
Briattain's developed behavioural model imply that the current dividend is a function of 
current and past earnings. They (Fama and Babiak) also tested the distributed lag effect. 
Fama and Babiak tested behavioural models on firm data, do the simulations, and 
predict the best-fit behavioural model. The empirical results provide consistent evidence 
on dividend models for individual firms. The two variable Lintner model including a 
constant term, D, -,, and 
E, perfori-ris well relative to other models; in general, however, 
deleting the constant and adding the lagged profits variable E,, leads to a slight 
improvement in the predictive power of the model. In applying dividend models to the 
data of most firms, net income seems to provide a better measure of profits than either 
cash flow or net income and depreciation included as separate variables in the model. 
Finally, in the models tested by Fama and Babiak, serial dependence in the disturbances 
does not seem to be a senous problem. 
7.1.6. Djarrya and Lee (1981): An Integration Model: 
Djarrya and Lee (1981) followed the conceptual development of Waud (1966), in 
embodying the conceptual ingredients of both dividend-behaviour rationales, and 
constructed a more general specification of dividend determination. In a long-run 
framework it is expected that the desired level of dividend can be expressed as a 
percentage of expected earnings, neither variable being observable for practical purposes. 
Including the major arguments of the part i al-adj ustment and information-content theories, 
they considered the following three equations: 
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D*t = rE*t ....... (7.7) 
Dt - Dt-I =a+ bl(D*t - Dt-I )+ ut ........... (7.8) 
E*t -E*t- I= b2(Et - E*t- I) .................. (7.9) 
which, when combined and simplified, were shown to yield: 
Dt - Dt-I = ab2 + (I - bl - b2)Dt-I - (I - b2)(I - bl)Dt-2 + rblb2Et - (I - b2)ut-I + ut 
In performing empirical tests, many varied conclusions can be reached depending on 
the relevant outcomes. Those most important for the analysis here include: 
(i) If the b2 coefficient of expectations is equal to one, then the generalised model reduces 
to the simpler partial-adjustment model; 
(ii) If the speed-of-adjustment coefficient, bl, equals one and the intercept 'a' equals zero, 
the model reduces to the alternative simplified model, an adaptive-expectations model 
of eamings; 
(111) If the intercept terin equals zero and the two 'b' coefficients equal one, then dividend 
policy is actually a residual decision, much as Higgins (1972) suggested it should be; 
and 
(iv) If all coefficients are significantly different from zero and/or one, then the two 
previously discussed simplified models are insufficient to describe corporate dividend 
policy, and the generalised model offers a much needed explanation. 
As for the empirical tests Djarraya (1980) has shown that the ordinary least- 
squares regression technique does not allow for the distinction between the bl and b2 
coefficients, and Doran and Griffiths (1978) have shown that the OLS estimates of bI and 
K? are inconsistent. Therefore, the maximum-likelihood estimator techniques required to 
perfon-n the empirical tests were used in conjunction NN,, ith Marquardt's (1963) nonlinear 
least-squares regression technique. 
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Djarrya and Lee (1981) criticised the partial-adjustment and adaptive expectation 
models and mentioned that neither the partial-adjustment model of dividend behaý'iour nor 
the adaptive-expectations model adequately explains the dividend behaviour of firms. The 
results of Djarrya and Lee (1981) reveal the partial-adjustment and expectations 
coefficients are significantly smaller than one and greater than zero. However, they 
suggested a more generalizable model of dividend behaviour on the part of firms is 
necessary, in order to understand the true nature of the dividend decision. 
7.1.7. Gordon (1959): Dividend Policy and Stock Price: 
M. J. Gordon (1959) established a definite realtionship between dividend policy 
and stock price. Gordon undertook a systematical, theoretical and empirical analysis to 
develop criteria by which an optimum dividend policy could be determined. He attempted 
to discover the optimum pay-out ratio which could be the basis for decision rules to guide 
dividend policy. Gordon sought a firm grounding for these rules in economic theory. The 
critics of Gordon's work cited very strong word for his theoretical analysis: 
his theoretical analysis is not convincing .............. His 
data do not bear 
on his hypothesis and did not provide a test for it. (Michaelsen 1961, p. 
23). 
However, Gordon's empirical analysis is quite similar to the kind of analysis that 
has a view that dividends have an independent affect on stock price. 
Gordon used several empirical models to test his hypothesis. The following 
equation is one of his simplest models: 
P= ao + alD + a-) (Y - D) ...................... 
(7.11) 
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Where, 
P= Price of a share of common stock, 
D= Year's dividend, 
Y= Year's eamings, and 
Y-D= Year's retention. 
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Gordon (1959) found in each of his samples that the coefficients of dividends, al, 
was significantly larger than the coefficient of retention, a2. 
Gordon interpreted this as support for his hypothesis that dividends have an 
independent effect on stock price quite apart from the effect of earnings. Graham and 
Dodd (195 1) presented a model of stock price formulation which has similar implications. 
Their evidence was based on data from a small number of firms specially selected to 
demonstrate the relevance of this model. The theoretical justification which they offered as 
the basis for the effect of dividends on stock price was considerably less rigorous than 
Gordon's (Michaelsen, 1961). 
Michaelsen (1961) cited Gordon's interpretation as both statistically and 
methodologically difficult. It has been shown that random variations in earnings, from 
whatever source, will cause the estimate of the population coefficient of dividends, al, to 
be larger than the corresponding estimate of coefficient of retentions, a2, even when these 
two population parameters are equal (Modigliam and Miller, 1959; and Benishay, 1961). 
This can readily been seen in equation (7.11) by noting that dividends can be 
measured exactly but that earnings and therefore retentions are subject to considerable 
measurement error. Gordon also used averages of earnings over a period of years to 
correct this measurement error. Marshall Kolin (1961), on the other hand, used a 
distributed lag procedure to estimate earnings, rather than simple averages, in his study of 
the effect of dividends on stock price but he did not find a larger coefficient for dividends 
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than for retentions which strongly suggests that dividend has no independent effect on 
stock price. 
Even if Gordon's coefficients were not subject to the statistical bias just described, 
his interpretations of these coefficients as evidence that dividends affect stock price would 
be suspect on methodological grounds. 
However, Michaelsen (1961) cited in his concluding word: 
"... Gordon's work provides no evidence for the relationship between stock 
price and dividendpolicy. " (Michaelsen 1961, p. 26). 
7.1.8. Michaelsen (1961): Determinants of Dividend Policies: 
Two studies by Michaelsen provide useful preliminary work in the area of 
dividend policy. The original study, completed in 1961 as a doctoral dissertation at the 
University of Chicago, tried to determine if dividends are the primary active variable or if 
dividends are simply the passive residual in investment and financial decisions. 
Michaelsen asserts that the standard explanations of dividend policy, typified by Lintner's 
work which gives dividends a primary position in financial decisions, are inadequate both 
of theoretical and methodological reasons. He summarises his criticism of theoretical 
inadequacy on the grounds that the earlier works are inconsistent with observed behaviour 
in these important respects. These are: "(1) The assumed proportional relationship 
between investment and earnings is not consistent with recently gathered evidence on the 
investment behaviour of corporations, (2) The explicit exclusion, or at best, tacit omission 
of external funds from the process of dividend determination is contrary to casual 
observation of the capital markets, and (3) The assumed relation between dividend policl, 
and stock price is not supported by available evidence. " (Michaelsen 1961, p. 2 7). 
Michaelsen feels that the studies of both Lintner and Darling are methodologically 
weak because the aggregate data used in their studies concealed interfirm differences. In 
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view of these shortcomings Michaelsen concludes that the ý)riman, atid actA,, e' 
explaination of dividend behaviour of these authors is unconvincing both 
methodologically and theoretically. 
As an alternative to the primary and active theory of dividends Michaelsen submits 
that dividends are the passive element in financial decisions. He supports this contention 
by hypothesising that corporate investment is a function of expectations of future earnings 
and that such expectations are uncertain. As a result investment will vary considerably 
from year to year. If external funds are excluded from the financing mix dividends should 
be irregular since investment must be financed out of current earnings. Under these 
circumstances dividends are the residual funds after all profitable investments have been 
undertaken. With respect to the more realistic situation where outside financing is 
included Michaelsen states, 
".... if external funds are an important and continuing element in the 
financial decisions of corporations, the link between investment and 
dividends is broken. Dividnendpolicy may then be only indirectly related to 
current investment and current earnings. In a word, dividends may then be 
a ýpassive'element in financial decisions. " (Michaelsen 1961, p. 29). 
Michaelsen proposed two hypotheses to explain corporate dividend policy. The 
differential growth hypothesis states that, 'firms that have the greatest growth potential 
retain a large proportion of earnings and, conversely, firms that have only meager growth 
potential retain a small proportion of earnings. " (Michaelsen 1961, p. 54). He further 
theorised that firms with a low pay-out ratio will also pay irregular amounts since 
investment opportunities are irregular. If this hypothesis is correct dividend stability and 
growth potential should be correlated in this manner. Michaelsen's test of this hypothesis 
using several different measures for growth potential and dividend stability failed to 
substantiate growth as a meaningful explanation for dividend policy. 
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As an alternative to the differential growth hypothesis Michaelsen proposed the 
diverse policies hypothesis, which holds that, "there are two general kinds of dividend 
policy which are associated with firm size: in large firms, dividends are used to 
communicate managerial expectations offuture prospects; in smallfirms dividends conv(v 
no such information but are liquid assets which can not be profitably invested within the 
firm. The use of dividends as a means of communication by large firms is due to (a) the 
greater reliability of the information about future prospects available to these firms, and 
(b) to the relatively lower cost of using dividends in this manner of these 
firms. "(Michaelsen 1961, p. 61). To test this hypothesis Michaelsen measured the 
correlation between firm size and dividend stability, and the correlations between firm size 
and the use of external funds. He justifies testing the latter relationship on the grounds that 
given the sporadic occurrence of investment projects outside funds must be used if 
dividend stability is to be maintained. Michaelsen found some correlation to support the 
diverse policies hypothesis. However, he points out that the sample was not originally 
intended to test this hypothesis and consequently the results may be of questionable value. 
In a subsequent paper Michaelsen tried to demonstrate that the hypothesis relating 
dividend policy to the concept of a target pay-out ratio is invalid both pragmatically and 
theoretically. He shows that the target pay-out hypothesis fails to account for "(a) the 
record of per share dividend declaration, including extras and split ups, and its 
relationship to the behaviour of assets, earnings, and market value over time; and (b) the 
rcsponse of share price to announcements of changes in dividends " (Michaelsen, 1965). In 
addition he contends that the target pay-out hypothesis is theoretically weak since it is 
inconsistent with the tenents of share price maximisation. Elaborating on this point he 
says, "if cxternalfunds are used to stabilise dividends, the target pay-out ratio can not be 
held to have direct link to the maximisation process unless it can be shown that dividends 
enter as an independent argument in the demandjunction for shares - that is independent 
of the capital budget and otherfinancial variable. " (Michaelsen, 1965). Michaelsen feels 
that a test of the target pay-out hypothesis using the standard methodologies is extremely 
difficult. 
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As an alternative explanation of corporate dividend behaviour he proposed the 
inertia hypothesis which holds, "in the absence of a compelling reason to do othenvise, 
management shouldpay the same regular quarterly dividendper share as the last quarter. 
Put differently the dividend behaviour offirms is largely a matter of inertia" (Afichaelsen, 
1965). Supporting the inertia hypothesis is the relative stability of aggregate dividends as 
compared with aggregate earnings in the national income accounts. Michaelsen holds that 
Lintner's findings may reflect no more than these factors and the strong upward growth 
trend in dividends and earnings over the period he studied. He supports this with the 
following argument: 
"The 'excellent correlations .... and 
highly significant regression 
coefficients' he found are to be expected when a strong trend exists in both 
the dependent and independent variables. The fact that the regression 
coefficientfor current earnings is less than thatfOr lagged dividends could 
result from the uncontrolled or random component in reported earnings 
which is not present in dividends" (Michaelsen, 1965). 
Two indirect tests were perforined on the inertia hypothesis. The first test involved 
an examination of the dividend behaviour of individual firms. The second test involved an 
investigation of the response of share prices to announcements of changes in dividends. In 
examining the behaviour of 107 sample firms Michaelsen points to the passing of regular 
cash dividends by thirty five firms although reported earnings increased in 56 percent of 
the periods in which dividends were omitted as prima facie evidence of non-target 
dividend policies (Michaelsen, 1965). 
In testing the response of share price to changes in dividends Michaelsen used 
Modigliani and Miller's infon-nation content theory as a starting point. This theory holds 
that where a fim-i has followed a policy of dividend stabilisation with a long established 
target pay-out ratio investors are likely to interpret a change in the dividend as a change in 
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management's view of future profits for the firm. Michaelsen feels that if his conclusions 
regarding dividend omission and the target pay-out ratio are correct and if Modigliani and 
Miller's informational content theory is correct there should be no association between 
changes in share prices over short periods following dividend announcement dates alld 
changes in dividends of the firms which periodically omit dividends. Michaelsen's test of 
this proposition produces a positive association between these variables suggesting that 
the infori-national content of dividend announcements is imparted by a mechanism 
different from that posited by Modigliani and Miller (Michaelsen, 1965). 
Michaelsen's early hypotheses of the determinants of dividend policy provide little 
insight into the question of how dividend policy is set. His inertia hypothesis however has 
interesting connotations for this study. It suggests that attempts to define dividend policy 
through target pay-out rules will probably be unsuccessful. However, the unsettling results 
of his investigation strongly assert that it is changes in dividend rather than their 
continuation at previous levels which needs explanation. 
7.1.9. Thompson and Walsh (1963): Survey of 195 Industrial Firms: 
Probably the most broadly based non-statistical investigation of dividend policy G. 
Clark Thompson and Francis J. Walsh, Jr., conducted an extensive poll of decision makers 
at 195 large industrial firms. The study done for the National Industrial Conference Board 
and provides additional insight into dividend policy and substantiates many of Lintner's 
conclusions and much of Darling's extension of Lintner's work. The major findings of 
Thompson and Walsh was that continuity of dividend payments is a matter of paramount 
importance in shaping dividend policy for most of the firms contacted. This finding is 
consistent with the intertia hypothesis developed by Michaelsen which holds that in the 
absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise the same quarterly dividend per share as 
the previous quarter should be paid. 
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ings are perhaps best illuminated by the' 9 
Their find' I ir statement that 
"Executives frequently comment that they prefer a conservative dividend 
rate that can be maintained at the same level through bad times as well as 
good. They say that when earnings justify it, an extra dividend i's 
distributed at the end of the fiscal year. And they state Jurther that they 
oppose any attempt to raise the regular dividend rate unless there is a 
reasonable assurance that it can be maintained in thefuture, because thcýl, 
would be extremely reluctant to reduce a rate once it became established" 
(Thompson and Walsh, 1963). 
Thompson and Walsh also polled the executives of the firins to determine what 
factors were considered in forinulating dividend policy. The five principal decisioll 
variables seem to be: (1) present cash level, (2) anticipated need for funds, (3) past and 
prospective earnings, (4) interest of shareholders, and (5) taxes. The stress on liquidity and 
expectatons which is evidenced in this list provides empirical support for Darling's 
hypothesis that dividends are a function of liquidity and expectations, as well as profits. 
Thompson and Walsh's study also substantiates the generalisations about dividend 
policy which have been presented in most introductory finance texts. However, the 
determinants of dividend policy disclosed by Thompson and Walsh's opinion survey and 
the determinants presented in the basic finance texts are more extensive than the 
influencing variables substantiated by the empirical efforts of Lintner, Darling, Brittain 
etc. 
7.1.10. Pogue (1968 and 1971): Dividend and Investment: 
In the research effort probably most closely related to this study Pogue tested the 
hypothesis that "corporate dividends are determined, at least in part, by the demandfor 
ini, cstment fiinds and the availabiliti, or cost offunds ftom other sources than retained 
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earnings" (1971, p. 182). Pogue developed a theory of corporate dividends which places 
the operations of the finn subject to a cash flow constraint. The constraint is presented as: 
T=K+W=(l -d)P+B+E ................... (7.12) 
Where, 
K= The flow of net investment in fixed capital; gross capital expenditures 
minus depreciation charges, 
W= The flow of net investment in working capital where working capital is 
defined as current assets minus current liabilities. Current liabilities include debt 
with a maturity of less than one year, 
K+W; the time rate of change of the stock of fixed and working capital 
(T), 
P= Net income after taxes and preferred dividends; income available for 
distribution to common stockholders, 
d= The proportion of income paid out in dividends; (I - d) is the proportion of 
income retained, 
E= Net cash proceeds from new equity issue (both common and preferred 
stock), and 
B= Net cash proceeds from long-terin borrowing; long-term debt is defined as 
debt with a maturity greater than one year (Pogue, 197 1). 
This equation shows that borrowing, new equity issues, and earnings retention are 
potential substitutes for financing a given amount of new investments. Pogue based his 
study on the assumption that only if dividends are given complete priority over investment 
spending and utilization of external financing would the dividend decision be independent 
of these considerations. 
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"... in general, one would expect dividends to be influenced by investment 
spending and managerial willingness tofinance investment with external 
funds (debt and equity issue) rather than retained earnings. " (1971, p. 
185). 
To develop a testable model Pogue (1971) states: 
"The firm's flow of retained earni . ngs and net cash proceeds from 
borrowing and new equity issues are assumed to be determined by the 
requirement that the market and imputed costs of investment financing be 
minimized subject to the cash flow constraint. Investment spending (T) by 
the firm is assumed to be exogenously determined independent of the cost 
or supply of investmentfunds. "(p. 208). 
Using least square regression analysis Pogue attempted to determine the 
importance of a number of statistical variables in the corporate dividend decision. The 
specific variables he tested were: (a) Income, (b) Indebtedness, (c) Income variability, (d) 
Industry dividends, (e) Industry debt, (f) Investment spending, and (g) Sales change. 
Pogue's findings support the widely verified conclusion that corporate income is the most 
important determinant of dividends. In addition, he found that: 
...... dividend payments, given income, are (1) inversely related to the 
demand for investment funds and the market and imputed costs of 
borrowingfunds, and (2) directli, related to the imputed cost of retained 
earnings. " (Pogue 1968, p. 63). 
This later conclusion seems inconsistent with intuitive beliefs until it is pointed out 
that the imputed cost of retained earnings by Pogue's definition is the return that the 
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shareholder could have earned had the earnings been paid out. The problems in trying to 
measure this imputed cost are extensive, and consequently Pogue's results MUst be viewed 
with some scepticism. Pogue hastens to point out that while the investment and cost of 
retained earnings variables have some impact on the dividend decision their influence is 
still relatively insignificant compared with corporate income. 
Detracting from Pogue's conclusions is the heterogeneity of the regression 
coefficients over time. He found that the hypothesis of coefficient homogeneity could be 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Pogue, however, contends that the heterogeneity 
of the coefficients may be due to an overstatement of the degree of freedom in calculating 
F-statistic. The tests of regression coefficient homogeneity assume that the error terms for 
each firm are independent. However, because of firm effects there may be an 
autocorrelation of the error terms for each firm. An autocorrelation of the error terms 
would cause the degree of freedom to be overstated unless an appropriate adjustment was 
made. When the F-statistics are adjusted for the possible overstatement in degrees of 
freedom the hypothesis of inter-temporal coefficient homogeneity can not be rejected at 
the 10% significance level for any of the equations (Pogue, 1968). 
7.2. Conclusion: 
This chapter reviewed all the major studies conducted on dividend policy and 
behaviour since 1950s. While these studies have provided an increased understanding of 
corporate dividend policy, there has not been a common theoretical foundation for all of 
the investigations. However, the findings of the empirical studies vary a large extent 
among the researchers but there is an unanimity among the researchers that the issue of 
dividend policy and behavior is important. 
This chapter is basically a chronological review of the major studies on dividend 
policy and behaviour, which begins with Dobrovolsky's (1951) Corporate Income 
Retention. All of these reviews can be divided into three basic categories: firstly, the 
studies on dividend policy and behaviour; secoiidly, the studies on the impact of dividend 
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policy on stock prices; and thirdly, the imact of dividend policy on other aspects of the 
corporations, e. g., investment and financing decisions. The first part of the review 
basically concentrates on the dividend policy and behaviour where the main theme of 
analysis is whether dividend policy primarily governed by current profitability and and 
dividends paid in the previous years or by any the factors. The second part of the review 
concentrates whether there is any impact of dividend policy on stock price or not. The 
final part of the review concentrates whether there is any impact of dividend policy on the 
other corporate decisions (e. g., investment and financing) or not. Through these reviews 
one thing has become more clear that the basic element of the dividend policy is the 
current profitability and lagged dividends, i. e., the dividend behavioural models are quite 
right in their directions. However, the reviews of the second and third part also make it 
clear that dividend policy has an impact on share prices and as well as on the investment 
and financing decisions of the corporations. 
Despite some disagreement, these reviews clearly show the unanonimous decisions 
among the researchers about the dividend policy and behaviour and there is a big 
unanimity among the dividend behavioural models that dividend policy is basically 
depend on the profitability and lagged dividends. However, there are two major problems 
about the support of the dividend behavioural models: firstly, all of these models are 
developed in the developed markets; and secondly, there are only two empirical studies 
(Garg et al. 1996, and Mishra and Narendar, 1996) on these models but both of them are 
on the emerging markets. However, both Garg et al. (1996) and Mishra and Narendar 
(1996) identified the determinants of dividend policy and they mainly used behavioural 
models in their empirical study, so, their studies do not quite test the validity of the 
behavioural models in the emerging economies. These reviews and the empirical studies 
of the behaviour models left behind some basic research questions, e. g., whether the 
behavioural models, which have developed in the developed economies practically work 
either in developed or in emerging markets or not; whether the dividend behaviour is the 
same in both developed and emerging markets or not. Therefore, this study will basically 
deal with the following two research questions: 
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(1) Whether the behavioural models, which have developed in the emerging 
markets work in the emerging markets, and 
(2) Whether the dividend policy in the emerging markets follow the basic 
principles of the behavioural models? 
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Chapter Eight: Dividend Policy and Behaviour in an Emerging , Nlarket: An 
Empirical Investigation on the Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Models 
8.0. Introduction 
Dividend behaviour of the emerging financial markets is assumed to be quite 
different because emerging markets are quite dissimilar to the developed markets. Scveral 
studies have been published on dividend policy and behaviour of developed markets but 
very few studies published have examined dividend policy and behaviour of ei-nerging 
markets and none of the studies have yet been published on dividend policy and behaN, Iour 
of the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The major objective of this study is to identify the dividend 
policy and behaviour of an emerging market. Partial adjustment dividend behaviour 
models are tested on the Dhaka Stock Exchange data over the period of 1988-1997 to 
identify the dividend policy and behaviour of an emerging market. 
The empirical results suggest that Brittain's (1966) dividend behaviour model 
offers satisfactory explanation of dividend behaviour of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 
companies. However, the empirical results suggest that dividend decision is primarily 
governed by current profitability for measuring the capacity of the companies to pay 
dividends and dividends paid in the previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. Moreover, the 
empirical results identified cash flow as the better measure of the company's ability to pay 
dividends. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. A brief review of the partial 
adjustment dividend behaviour models for identifying the dividend policy and behaviour 
of an emerging market and selection of variables for the partial adjusted models are 
included in section 8.1. Section 8.2 contains the description of data and sample of the 
empirical analysis. The empirical results are reported in section 8.3. A brief summary and 
the concluding remarks are incorporated in section 8.4. 
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This part of the chapter contains a brief review of the partial adjustment diN, idend 
behaviour models along with the selection of variables to Identif I y the dividend policY and 
behaviour of an emerging financial market and to identify the best-fit partial adjustment 
dividend behaviour model of an emerging market. 
8.1. A. Lintner's (1956) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Model 
In the pioneering study in 1956, Professor John Lintner investigated dividend 
behaviour over an extended period of time. He viewed that dividend pay-out is a function 
of net current earnings after tax and dividend pay-out in the previous years (lagged 
dividends). 
Changes in dividend pay-out ratio JADPR = (Dividend / Sales), - (Dividend / 
Sales), j is considered as the dependent variable of the model. Current profitability (Net 
Profit After Tax / Sales), and lag of dividend pay-out ratio are considered as the 
independent variables of the model. ' 
8.1. B. Darling's (1957) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Model 
In the study, which followed Lintner's effort Paul Darling modified Lintner's 
formulation to include expectations and liquidity in the deten-nination of dividend policy. 
Darling in essence proposed a more complete explanation of dividend behaviour without 
Lintner's principal emphasis. Darling hypothesised that dividends are a function of current 
investment and current use of external funds as well as past dividends and current 
earnings. However, he concludes that lagged profit would offer a better explanation to the 
current levels of dividends. In addition, he added depreciation and amortisation recoveries 
as a source of funds, and changes in sales as a working capital requirement. 
' All the considered variables have been scaled (deflated) by common size (sales) to remove 
heteroskedasticity and outlier problems. 
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Changes in dividend pay-out ratio fADPR = (Dividend / Sales), - (Diý, -idend / 
Sales), j is considered as the dependent variable of the model. Current profitability (Net 
Profit After Tax / Sales), lag of profitability, amort'sation (Depreciation and Amortisation 
Sales), and growth (changes in sales) are considered as the independent variables of the 
model. 
8.1. C. Brittain's (1966) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Model 
The effort by John Brittain for the Brooking Institution, to date, seems to be the 
most far reaching of the macro time-series studies of dividend behaviour. Brittain's model 
suggested that cash flow is the better measure of the company's ability to pay dividends. 
Changes in dividend pay-out ratio (ADPR = (Dividend / Sales), - (Dividend / 
Sales), j is considered as the dependent variable. Cash flow (Net Profit After Tax 
Depreciation / Sales), and lag of dividend pay-out ratio are considered as the independent 
variables of Brittain's model. 
8.1. D. Fama and Babiak's (1968) Partial Adjustment Model 
Fama and Babiak (1968) started their work on the partial adjusted model of Lintner 
(1956 and 1963) and the extended work by Brittain (1964 and 1966). They examined the 
dividend policy of 392 industrial firms over the period of 19 years (1946-64). 
Farna and Babiak tested behavioural models on firm data, did the simulations, and 
predicted the best-fit behavioural model. The empirical results provide consistent evidence 
on dividend models for individual firms. They find the two variable Lintner models 
including a constant term, Current earnings 'E, ', and lag dividend 'D, -, 
', perform well 
relative to other models. However, they also observed that net income seems to proý'ide a 
better measure of profits than either cash flow or net income or depreciation included as 
separate variables in the model. 
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The dependent and the independent variables are considered the same as Lintner's 
model. However, as Fama and Babiak tested their models on the individual firm data, so, 
Fama and Babiak's supported partial adjustment dividend behaviour model is tested on the 
individual firm data rather than aggregate data in this study. 
Lintner (1956) was the first who introduced a partial adjustment dividend 
behavioural model and his empirical work is the best and the most recognised empirical 
investigation on dividend behaviour to date. Moreover, Darling (1957) extended and 
Brittain (1966) modified Lintner's basic behavioural model by altering and adding 
different parameters. In addition, Fama and Babiak (1968) tested Lintner and Brittain's 
developed partial adjusted dividend behaviour models on the individual firm's data rather 
than aggregate data and identified Lintner's model as the best partial adjustment dividend 
behaviour model. 
There are only two empirical investigations (Garg et al. 1996 and Mishra and 
Narender, 1996) of partial adjustment models on Indian data. However, both of the studies 
found Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment dividend behaviour model as the best-fit model 
and concluded that dividend policy is primarily determined by the current profit after tax 
and dividends paid in the previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. The summary of Garg et 
aL 'S (1996) and Mishra and Narender's (1996) studies on partial adjustment dividend 
behaviour models are presented in Table 8.1. 
The empirical part of this chapter tested all the partial adjustment dividend 
behavioural models on the Dhaka Stock Exchange data to investigate the dividend policy 
and behaviour in an emerging market. This study also tries to identify the best-fit dividend 
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8.2. Data and Methodology 
8.2. A. Data 
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The Dhaka Stock Exchange listed all non-financial sector companies is primarily 
considered as the sample of the study. " Companies are then selected" for this study by 
considering the regularity of paying dividends and non-negative profits (net profit after 
tax). The Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 83 non-financial sector companies are then taken 
into account after screened out the irregular dividend payers and the companies with 
negative profits for this study. Companies are then filtered by considering the dividend 
payments at least five years among the sample period (1988-97) and also by considering 
different other characteristics, e. g., selected sample should represent all the sectors 
(incorporation of companies from all non-financial sectors), different sizes (large, 
medium, and small), product diversity (single product and multiple products), activity 
(active and inactive), frequency of dividend payments (companies pay dividends always 
and companies pay dividends sometimes), and the pay-out (high, medium and low pay- 
out) for selecting the final sample. The final sample then reduced to 51 Dhaka Stock 
Exchange listed non-financial sector companies. 
However, 51 carefully selected companies represented all the non-financial sectors 
(12 are from Engineering, 7 are from Food and Allied, 8 are from Jute and Textile, 10 are 
from Pharmaceuticals, and 14 are from Miscellaneous Sector). The sample consists of 8 
high pay-out companies (payment of dividend 50% and more), 9 low pay-out companies 
(payment of dividend 5% or less) and 34 medium pay-out companies (payment of 
dividend is between 5% and 50%). However, the sample represents 14 large companies 
(market capitalisation is 1000 million Taka and more), 7 small companies (market 
capitalisation is 5 million Taka or less), and 30 medium companies (market capitalisation 
is between 110-150 million Taka). Moreover, the sample consists of 41 actively traded 
" Financial sector companies are excluded from the study because accounting system of financial sector 
companies are quite different from non-financial sector companies. 
" It is worth mentioning that researchers always take different company and market characteristics into 
consideration in selecting sample for testing behavioural models. 
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companies and 10 inactively traded companies of the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The sample 
also comprises 40 single product and II diversified products companies. In addition, the 
sample also represents 15 companies that paid dividends all 10 years and 36 companies 
that paid dividends 5-9 years. 
All the required data for empirical investigation on the partial adjustment dividend 
behavioural models are collected from the published annual reports of the selected 
companies. 
8.2. B. Models 
8.2. B. 1. Lintner's (1956) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behavioural Model 
Hypothesis: 
HO: Changes in dividend pay-out ratio (ADPR) is not a function of net current earnings 
after tax (PROFIT) and dividendpaid in previous years (lagged dividends) (LDPR). 
Model: 
ADPRt = oc +pI PROFITt + P2DPRt- 1 (LDPR) + Et 
Where, 
ADPRt and DPRt_ I= Changes in dividend pay-out ratio and lagged dividend pay-out ratio 
respectively, 
PROFITt = The ratio of net profit after tax to sales in period T, 
cc = Constant term, 
PI= ciri (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' and ri is the firm's 'target ratio' 
of dividends to profits), 
P2 : -- - ci (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' for lagged dividend), and 
Et = Error tenn. 
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8.2. B. 11. Darling's (1957) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behavioural Model 
Hypothesis: 
HO: Changes in dividend pay-out ratio (ADPR) is not a function of net current earnings 
after tax (PROFIT), lagprofits (LPROF[T), amortisation (AMORTISE), and sales growth 
(GROWTH). 
Model: 
ADPRt = cc + PIPROFITt + P2PROFITt-I (LPROFIT) + P3AMORTISEt + P4GROWTHt 
Et 
Where, 
ADPRt = Changes in dividend pay-out ratio, 
PROFITt and PROFIT, -, = 
The current profitability and lagged profitability respectively, 
AMORTISEt = The ratio of depreciation and amortisation to sales, 
GROWTHt = The sales growth ((Salest - Salestj / Salestj, 
oc = Constant tenn, 
PI= ciri (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' and ri is the firm's 'target ratio' 
of dividends to profits), 
02:: ":: - ci (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' for lagged profits), 
P3, and N= The coefficients of amortisation and sales growth respectively, and 
F, t = Error tenn. 
8.2. B. 111. Brittain's (1966) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behavioural Model 
Hypothesis: 
HO: Changes in dividend pay-out ratio (ADPR) is not a function of cash flow (CFLOW) 
and dividendpaid in previous years (lagged dividends) (LDPR). 
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Model: 
ADPRt =- oc +01 CFLOWt +0 2DPRt- I (LDPR) + Et 
Where, 
ADPRt and DPRt_ I= The changes in dividend pay-out ratio and lagged dividend pay-out 
ratio respectively, 
CFLOWt = The ratio of cash flow (net profit after tax + depreciation) to sales in period Itl 
cc = Constant term, 
pI= ciri (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' and ri is the firm's 'target ratio' 
of dividends to cash flow), 
02 ý- ci (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' for lagged dividend), and 
Et = Error tenn. 
8.2. B. IV. Fama and Babiak's (1968) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Model" 
Hypothesis: 
HO: Changes in dividend pay-out ratio (ADPR) is not a function of net current earnings 
after tax (PROFIT) and dividendpaid in previous years (lagged dividends (LDPR). 
Model: 
ADPRt = cc +PI PROFITt + P2DPRt- I (LDPR) + E; t 
Where, 
ADPRt and DPRt_l = Changes in dividend pay-out ratio and lagged dividend pay-out ratio 
respectively, 
PROFITt = The ratio of net profit after tax to sales in period T, 
(x = Constant term, 
01= ciri (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' and ri is the finn's 'target ratio' 
of dividends to profits), 
P2 - ci (where ci is the 'speed-of-adjustment coefficient' for lagged dividend), and 
Fama and Babiak's (1968) model is tested on individual company data rather than aggregate data but the 
hypothesis, the model, and the variables are as same as Luitner's (1956) model. 
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Et = Error tenn. 
8.3. Empirical Results 
8.3. A. Descriptive Statistics 
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The changes in dividend pay-out ratio over the period of 1988-97 are . 
05 1 %. The 
profitability and lag of dividend pay-out ratio are 7.0% and 3.1% respectively. However, 
the growth rate of sales, and depreciation and amortisation recoveries are 11.56% and 4% 
respectively and the average cash flow is 9.1 %. These results indicate a very low level of 
changes in dividend pay-out ratio and higher level of working capital requirements of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies. However, the working capital requirements are 
far more than the available sources of funds, i. e., depreciation and amortisation recoveries. 
Moreover, even though the level of profitability and cash flow vary at a large extent but 
the figures indicate that cash flow is 2.1% more than the current earnings of the regular 
dividend paying companies of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (Table 8.2). 
8.3. B. Pearson's Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson's correlation matrix shows the expected relationship of all the 
independent variables with dependent variable except depreciation and amortisation 
recoveries. However, the correlation matrix shows the correlation between the independent 
variables are either low degree or moderate degree, which suggests the absence of 
multico linearity between independent variables. As suggested by Bryman and Cramer 
(1997), the Pearson's r between each pair of independent variables should not exceed 
0.80; otherwise independent variables with a coefficient in excess of 0.80 may be 
suspected of exhibiting multicolinearity. Multicolinearity is usually regarded, as a problem 
because it means those regression coefficients may be unstable (Bryman and Cramer, 
1997). Several scholars including Mendenhall and Sincich (1989), Hair et aL (1995), and 
Freund and Wilson (1998), state that multicolinearity can be quite difficult to detect where 
there are more than two independent variables. Moreover, the colinearity diagnostics 
provided by SPSS including colinearity statistics (Tolerance and VIF), condition index, 
C) C) r, 4 '"o 
ýc -9ýhl --4 w -11 (-A 
tp mmm UI)686 II 0 C7) 00 týj t-j týj " N) -4. 
"0 w Cý w C> ti 
t, i : ý, -4 00 w 00 ýr, t-i C: ) cý 4L tli 4iý 
SO mmmm 
rp 
ýo b ýD ýD (b CD 
tli w tli tli týJ 


















Chapter Eight 162 Partial Adjusted Models: Empirical 
and variance proportion support the Pearson's correlation coefficients and document no 
proof of multico linearity problem in the regression models (Table 8.3a, 8.3b, and 8.3c). 
8.3. C. Regression Results 
There are two types of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models run to 
identify the dividend policy and behavior in an emerging market: firstly, ten yearly 
average cross-section regression model, and secondly, pooled regression model. In the 
pooled regression model, nine (10-1) year dummies considered for 10 years (1988-97) 
period. However, the coefficient of none of the year dummies is significant, which 
indicates no impact of time on the model. As time does not have any impact on the model, 
so, incorporation of year dummies has rather worsen the overall significance of the 
regression models. 
Ramsey's RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) and White test (White, 1980) are employed 
for checking heteroskedasticy problem of the partial adjustment dividend behavioural 
models and both the tests are unable to reject the hypothesis of homo skedasti city for each 
and every model. So, the residuals of all the behavioural models are homoskedastic. The 
Durbin-Watson is close to 2 in all the regression models, which also indicates no sign of 
autocorrelation problem in the regression models. 
8.3. C. 1. Lintner's (1956) Dividend Behavioural Model 
The overall F,,,,,, = 57.267 and 10-649 for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models respectively and both the values are significant at 1% level (p<. 000). However, the 
adjusted R2 are 0.220 and 0.210 respectively for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models. 
The standardised beta coefficients of the profitability and lagged dividend (LDPR) 
variables are . 282 and . 
276, and -. 503 and -. 502 respectively for cross-section and pooled 
regression models. The coefficients of these variables are in the predicted direction and 
highly significant (p<. 000). However, the empirical results show the more influence of 
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Table 8.3a: Correlation Matrix: Pearson Indices 
Variables ADPR PROFIT LDPR 
ADPR 1.000 
PROFIT 
. 089 1.000 LDPR -. 399*** . 384*** 1.000 Note: ***Significant at 1% level 
"Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
Table 8.3b: Correlation Matrix: Pearson Indices 




. 089 1.000 LPROFIT 
. 018 . 786*** 1.000 AMORTIZE -. 107** . 157*** . 183*** 1.000 GROWTH -. 010 -. 070 -. 071 -. 069 1.000 
Note: ***Significant at I% level 
"Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
Table 8.3c: Correlation Matrix: Pearson Indices 
Variables ADPR CFLOW LDPR 
ADPR 1.000 
CFLOW 
. 115** 1.000 LDPR -. 399*** . 431 *** 1.000 Note: ***Significant at I% level 
"Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
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lagged dividend on dividend changes than profitability because the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
listed non-financial sector regular dividend paying companies basically follow stable 
dividend policy based on dividend per share (DPS). As the companies pay stable 
dividends, e. g., 15% (DPS) on the face value, the managers are reluctant to cut the 
dividend even though they make loss in certain year. But they change the pay-out policy 
every few years depending on the profitability, i. e.; if the companies make huge profit then 
they certainly change the dividend payment rate, e. g., 15% to 20% and keep going with 
that for a certain period. In contrast, the basic assumption of the partial adjustment 
dividend behaviour model is the target ratio of dividend to profits. The empirical findings 
are quite consistent with the practice of the companies under consideration, i. e., dividend 
change basically depend on the lagged profits but profitability encourage the firms to 
change dividend policy, i. e., speed of adjustment work to take increasing or decreasing 
decision of the stable dividend policy but dividends are perfectly adjusted with the levels 
of profitability. Therefore, the empirical results suggest that Lintner's dividend 
behavioural model is all right for the Dhaka Stock Exchange but not best-fit model 
because of their dividend policy (stable pay-out policy rather than partial adjustment) 
(Table 8.4). 
8.3. C. 11. Darling's (1957) Dividend Behavioural Model 
The overall Fc = 1.569 and 0.832 for cross-sectional and pooled regression '0" 
models respectively and but none of them is significant at higher level. However, the 
adjusted R' are 0.006 and -0.006 respectively for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models. 
The standardised beta coefficients of the profitability and lagged profitability 
(LPROFIT), amortisation, and growth variables are . 180 and . 165, -. 
103 and -. 086, -. 062 
and -. 061, and -. 028 and -. 046 respectively for cross-section and pooled regression 
models. The coefficients of these variables are in the predicted direction except 
depreciation and amortisation recoveries are not highly significant. WUle lag profitability 
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are quite consistent with Lintner's model. The main reason behind this is that the 
companies follow stable dividend policy based on dividend per share rather than target 
pay-out ratio (as we have been mentioned earlier). However, as depreciation and 
amortisation recovery is quite insufficient to fulfil the investment demand, so, 
amortisation variable does not influence the dividend policy effectively. In addition to 
these, as we have already been mentioned that companies are mostly determined not to 
change the dividend policy very often, so, investment opportunities are not also affecting 
too much to change dividend policy. Therefore, the empirical results suggest that 
Darling's model does not work at all in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (Table 8.5). 
8.3. C. 111. Brittain's (1966) Dividend Behavioural Model 
The overall Fcore= 77.424 and 14.282 for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models respectively and both the values are significant at 1% level (p<. 000). However, the 
adjusted R' are 0.257 and 0.248 respectively for cross-sectional and pooled regression 
models. 
The standardised beta coefficients of the cash flow and lagged dividend (LDPR) 
variables are . 352 and . 349, and -. 551 and -. 548 respectively 
for cross-section and pooled 
regression models. The coefficients of these variables are in the predicted direction and 
highly significant (p<. 000). However, as cash flow incorporates depreciation as the source 
of funds with the regular profits, so, cash flow encourage the companies to change their 
dividend policy at a point of time even though they are not highly motivated to change the 
pay-out policy so often. Therefore, cash flow provides a better explanation of the ability of 
the companies to pay dividends. Finally, the empirical results suggest Brittain's partial 
adjustment dividend behavioural model as the best-fit model in the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(Table 8.6). 
8.3. C. IV. Fama and Babiak's (1968) Partial Adjustment Dividend Behaviour Model 
The coefficients of the lagged profitability variable show the predicted signs in all 
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have got the expected sign in 41 cases but significant in 20 cases only. The adjusted R'ý is 
more than 50% in 31 companies and more than 80% in 17 companies, wlilch means the 
explanatory power of the independent variables are really very high. Moreover, F-statistics 
is significant in 36 cases that means that the partial adjustment model is statistically 
significant for most of the companies. The constant term is positive in 35 companies and 
among them 14 are statistically significant that implies that most of the companies are 
reluctant to cut dividends but rather they like to increase or maintain dividends (Tables 
8.7). 
The empirical result of the Fama and Babiak partial adjustment model is quite 
consistent among the companies. However, the coefficient of lag profitability is more 
significant than profitability. As we have mentioned earlier, the main reason is that the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange listed non-financial sector regular dividend paying companies 
basically follow stable dividend policy based on dividend per share (DPS) rather than 
target pay-out ratio. But current earnings encourage them to change the pay-out policy in 
every few years and they usually keep going with that for the next few years. So, the 
empirical findings clearly explain the practice of the companies under consideration, i. e., 
dividend change basically depend on the lagged dividends but profitability encourage the 
firms to change dividend policy, i. e., speed of adjustment work to take increasing or 
decreasing decision of the stable dividend policy but dividends are not perfectly adjusted 
with their levels of profitability. 
However, the average company size of this sample is 391 million Taka whereas the 
average company size of the non-financial sector companies is almost 70 million Taka. 
Moreover, the institutional shareholdings for this sample is 12.44%, which is bit higher 
than the average market institutional ownership. And the insider ownership for this sample 
is 23.3 1 %, which is bit lower than the average insider ownership of the non-financial 
sector companies but insiders are still the major shareholders of the regular dividend 
paying companies. So, presumably solely insider controlled firrns have lower levels of 
outsider protection, which is the same as the empirical phase one. However, as , k-e have 
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mentioned earlier that the regular dividend paying companies follow stable dividend 
policy based on the dividend per share, so, pay-out policy does not adjust properlý' with 
the level of profitability. Therefore, as regular dividend paying companies do not adjust 
payment policy with the level of earnings properly, so, the insiders have great opportunity 
to expropriate funds from insider controlled bigger sized firins efficiently and perfectly. 
Finally, empirical results support Lintner's (1956) view that dividend policy is 
primarily governed by current earnings and lagged dividends but find Brittain's (1966) 
dividend behavioural model as the best-fit partial adjustment dividend behaviour model in 
an emerging market. However, the empirical studies identify cash flow as the better 
measure of the company's ability to pay dividends because cash flow boost the companies 
to change their dividend policy at a point even though they are not highly motivated to 
change the pay-out policy so often. 
8.4. Conclusion 
Dividend behaviour of the emerging markets are quite different from developed 
markets because of its differential characteristics. Several studies have been published on 
dividend behaviour in developed markets but very few studies have published on dividend 
policy and behaviour of emerging markets and none of the studies has been published on 
dividend behaviour of the Dhaka Stock Exchange yet. The major objective of this study is 
to identify the dividend policy and behaviour of an emerging market. Partial adjustment 
dividend behaviour models are tested on the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed non-financial 
sector companies over the period of 1988-1997 for the above purpose. 
The empirical results support Lintner's (1956) view of partial adjustment model but 
find Brittain's (1966) dividend behavioural model as the best-fit partial adjustment 
dividend behaviour model in an emerging market. While the empirical results show a very 
high degree relationship between dividend change, current earnings, and lagged dividends, 
in practice dividend policy is primarily governed by lagged dividends because the regular 
dividend paying companies follow stable dividend policy and the pay-out policy does not 
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adjust perfectly with the level of current earnings. Moreover, as cash flow incorporates 
depreciation as the source of funds with the regular profits, so, cash flow boost the 
companies to change their dividend policy at a point in time even though they are not 
highly motivated to change the pay-out policy so often. However, the empirical studies 
also identify cash flow as the better measure of the company's ability to pay dividends. 
In addition, the empirical results indicate some connection with the empirical phase 
one including the firm size and the ownership structure, which are major influential factors 
in an emerging market. Even though, the empirical results indicate that the regular 
dividend paying firms are comparatively bigger size firms of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
but these firms are also solely controlled by insiders. So, solely insider controlled firms 
presumably have very lower level of outsider protection, which is the same as the 
empirical phase one. However, as we have mentioned earlier that the regular dividend 
paying companies follow stable dividend policy based on the dividend per share, so, the 
dividend policy does not reflect the level of earnings properly. Therefore, because of the 
company's choice of stable dividend policy, insiders enjoy a great many opportunities to 
expropriate funds in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
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Chapter Nine: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of Dividend: Prior 
Theoretical and Empirical Evidence 
9.0. Introduction: 
A vast majority of the studies conducted in different countries indicate that 
announcements of dividend changes do convey information to the market (Pettit, 1972; 
Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Woolridge, 1982; Asquith and Mullins9 
1983; Brickley, 1983; Divecha and Morse, 1983; Woolridge, 1983; Benesh et al. 1984; 
Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984; Eades et al. 1985; Wansley and Lane, 1987; 
Aharony et al. 1988; Bom, 1988; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988; Healey and Palepu, 
1988; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1991; John and Lang, 1991; Marsh, 1993; and Abeyratna 
et al. 1996). However, the question 'what information is contained in dividend 
announcements? ' has not been fully resolved. 
There are two schools of thought of dividend policy: one, dividend irrelevance 
and two, dividend relevance. Both of the thoughts have conflict with each other and 
none of them provides complete and satisfactory guidelines. However, both of the 
schools are trying to establish their thoughts, which led to dividend controversy. The 
major objectives of this chapter are twofold: one, to have a clear understanding about 
both of the schools of thought of dividend policy, and two, to develop research 
questions for an empirical investigation on security price reaction to the announcement 
of dividends in an emerging market. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 9.1 includes the 
prior theoretical and empirical evidences on dividend irrelevance. Prior theoretical and 
empirical evidence on dividend relevance and special reference to the security price 
reaction to the announcement of dividends are included in section 9.2. Finally, section 
9.3 incorporates the general summary and concluding remarks. 
9.1. Dividend Irrelevance: 
Miller and Modigliani's (196 1) seminal article on diNidend policy suggests that 
the dividend policy of the firm, per se, is irrelevant to its valuation. Miller and 
Miodigliani (1966) and more recently Higgins (1974) conducted empirical tests, using 
samples of regulated and electric utilities that support the irrelevancy argument of 
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dividend policy for share valuation. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) showed that in perfect capital markets with no information asymmetry 
the value of a firm is independent of financing decisions if the product, on-i nvestm ent 
decision is given. Thus, the payment of cash dividends to equity holders is of no 
consequence to stockholder wealth or firm value. 
Miller and Modigliam (M-M) (1961) provide the most comprehensive 
argument in support of the irrelevance of dividend. M-M maintained that dividend 
policy has no effect on the share prices of the firm is therefore, no consequences, i. e., 
whether dividend is paid or retained that does not make any difference. Under 
condition of perfect capital markets, rational investors, absence of tax discrimination 
between dividend income and capital gains, given the firm's investment policy, its 
dividend policy may have no influence on the market price of shares (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1966). 
Miller and Modigliam (1961) point out that if the corporation does not let its 
dividend policy affect its investment decisions, and if we ignore taxes and transaction 
costs, a corporation's dividend policy should not affect the value of its shares at all. 
Their approach suggests, however, that the existence of differential taxes on income 
and capital gains should make the shares of corporations that pay low dividends more 
desirable, and thus that a corporation can increase the value of its shares by reducing 
its pay-out ratio. 
There is an another argument, hinted by Miller and Modigliam, which suggests 
that dividend policy should not matter. They say (196 1, p. 43 1): 
'If, for example, the frequency distribution of corporate pay-out ratios 
happened to correspond exactly with the distribution of investor 
preferences for pay-out ratios, then the existence of these preferences 
would clearly lead ultimately to a situation whose implications were 
different in noJundamental respectfrom the perfect market case. Each 
corporation would tend to attract to itseýf a 'clientele' consisting of 
those preferring its particular pay-out ratio, but one clientele would be 
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entirely as good as another in terms of the valuation it would implyfor 
thefirm. ' 
In a perfect capital market context, dividend policy is irrelevant as 
i propositioned by Modigliani and Miller (1958). However, the conviction spread that 
real world tax laws cause the irrelevance proposition not to hold. Moreover, Miller 
(1977) suggests it may hold after all, tax or no tax. 
9.2. Dividend Relevance: 
The impact of dividend announcements on stock prices has received much 
attention in the finance literature. Most recently, Aharony and Swary (1980), KNNan 
(1981), Eades (1982), and Woolridge (1982), using dividend announcements made in 
isolation of other firm news reports, have found a significant positive association 
between dividend changes and announcement day stock returns. 
Gordon (1962 and 1963) and Walter (1963) support the dividend relevance 
doctrine. They suggest that dividend policy and investment policy is inter-linked. 
Investment policy can't be separated from dividend policy and the choice of an 
appropriate dividend policy affects the value of the finn. 
The leading proponents of the bird-in-the-hand theory (Gordon, 1962; and 
Lintner, 1962) view that stockholders value a dollar received in dividend more highly 
than dollar earnings retained. Therefore, dividend policy is relevant to the value of 
shares 
Watts (1973) in an early empirical study of the information content of 
dividends examines the relation between unexpected dividend changes and future 
earnings, and abnormal stock returns for firms that announce unexpected dividend 
changes. He finds unexpected dividend changes provide little infon-nation about future 
earnings and there are no abnormal returns in months surrounding the dividend 
announcements. However, Gonedes (1978) reported the similar results and supports 
Watts's (1973) findings. 
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Bhattacharya (1979), Kalay (1980), and Miller and Rock (1982), each 
assuming that information asymmetries exist between managers and investors, ha 
developed models of cash dividend signalling. In each model, security prices adjust to 
new equilibrium levels in response to the information managers convey to investors in 
their dividend decisions. 
Still dividend news could, as M-M argued earlier, convey information about a 
firm's prospects and cause its stock's price to change. Direct evidence about the 
information content of dividend announcements is scant. Pettit (1972) suggested the 
content was important. Watts (1973) presented some evidence that little, if any, 
information content beyond that already reflected in contemporaneous earnings is 
present in dividends. However, Laub (1976) and Pettit (1976) challenged Watts's 
findings. In addition, Woolridge (1982) views that his empirical evidences indicate 
that abnormal stock returns vary in sign with unexpected dividends. The results are 
also consistent with the hypothesis that dividend contain information. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) introduced the idea that dividends could convey 
information about future profitability and that this could affect share prices. The 
extensive investigation of the share price effects of dividend announcements suggests 
that dividend payments do indeed convey information, and that the adverse effect of a 
dividend cut is relatively larger than the positive effect of a dividend increase (Griffin, 
1976; Charest, 1978; and Aharony and Swary, 1980). Moreover, Partington (1989) 
hypothesised a cut in dividends would probably have an unfavourable effect on share 
price and the empirical results support his hypothesis. 
The two recent models, one by Miller and Rock (1985) and the other by John 
and Williams (1985) attempt to explain dividend pay-out as rational optimisation 
behaviour from the viewpoint of both management and shareholders. The main 
assumption of these models is that there is asymmetry in information between inside 
management and outside shareholders. Asymmetric information leads to dividend 
announcement effects wherein stock price increases result from investors' realisation 
that insiders have superior information on the firm. However, Gerber (1988) finds 
clear evidence from executive interview that management is aware of the asymmetric 
information. 
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There has been considerable controversy concerning the effect of dividend 
yields on common stock returns. The controversy centres on whether or not the 
positive association between common stock returns and dividend yields reported in a 
number of empirical studies can be attributed entirely to information effects. 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) show that there is a positive and non-linear 
relationship between common stock returns and expected dividend yield. The 
prediction rule for expected dividends is based solely on infon-nation that would have 
been available to the investor ex-ante. These results cannot, therefore, be attributed to 
the favourable or unfavourable information that would be present in a proxy for 
expected dividend yield that anticipates the occurrence of a dividend. Whether the 
effect of dividend yields on common stock returns can be attributed to information 
effects or is due to some omitted variables remains an open question. The conclusion is 
that these significant yield effects cannot be attributed to the information content in the 
prior knowledge that the firm will declare a dividend of unknown magnitude. 
Miller and Scholes (1981) have argued that the observed relationship between 
common stock returns and dividend yields as attributed to the favourable information 
contained in the knowledge that a firm will actually declare any dividend. Dhillon and 
Johnson (1994) examine the stock and bond price reactions to dividend changes. The 
positive stock market response to dividend increases has several potential 
explanations, two of the more commonly discussed being information content and 
wealth redistribution between stockholders and bondholders. The evidence presented 
by Dhillon and Johnson (1994) support the wealth redistribution hypothesis but does 
not rule out the information content hypothesis. Typically, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) 
find that the bond price reaction to announcements of large dividend changes is 
opposite to the stock price reaction. Their result differs from those of Handjinicolaou 
and Kalay (1984) who analyse bond returns around dividend changes, and report that 
the bond prices are not affected by dividend increases but that bond prices react 
negatively to dividend reductions. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) argue that their data 
supports the information content hypothesis. In contrast, Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) 
find insignificantly negative bond price reactions to dividend announcements. 
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Bar-yosef and Sarig (1992) propose and examine a new approach to identify 
and measure dividend surprises. They find that the proposed measure detects dividend 
surprises even when dividends remain constant. They further find that the measure is 
insensitive to the extent to which the options used to measure dividend surprises are in- 
or-out-of-the-money. They examine the reaction between the proposed measure and 
the market's reaction to dividend announcements. Their result indicates that 
unexpected dividend payments bring about a statistically significant market reaction. It 
shows that dividends have an information content even for closely monitored large 
corporations. When dividend surprises are measured according to alternative 
approaches, i. e., relative to the Naive, the Lintner, and the Box-Jenkins models, or the 
value-line dividend expectations, the mean two-day abnormal stock return following 
dividend announcements is less strongly correlated with the dividend surprises. They 
compare the five methods in terms of their ability to measure dividend surprises. They 
use the market's reaction to dividend announcements to gauge the extent to which each 
announcement is unexpected. The results indicate that the suggested model of 
measuring dividend surprises is more highly correlated with the true surprises than 
with dividend surprises as measured by either the Box-Jenkins method or by other 
models employed by past studies or in relation to Value-Line dividend expectations. 
Black and Scholes (1974) have found that a corporation that increases its 
dividend can expect that this will have no definite effect on its stock price. The price 
may change temporarily in response to a change in the dividend, because the market 
may believe that the change indicates something about the probable future course of 
earnings. If it becomes clear that the change was not made because of any change in 
estimated future earnings; this temporary effect should disappear. Thus a corporation 
may want to choose its dividend policy under the assumption that changes in dividend 
policy will have no permanent effect on its stock price. 
In a recent article extending the work of Berle and Means (1932) on the 
separation of ownership from control, Jensen (1986) argues that a finn with substantial 
free cash flows will have a tendency to overinvest by accepting marginal investment 
projects with negative net present values. If managers are overinvesting, increases in 
the dividend will, all else being equal, reduce the extent of overinvestment and 
increase the market value of the firm, and a decrease in the dividend will have the 
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opposite result. Jensen (1986) views that empirical evidence of a positive association 
between dividend-change announcements and stock price movements as supporting the 
free cash flow hypothesis. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) recognised that dividend announcements could 
contain information about a firm's future earnings and cause revaluation of its 
securities. Whether or not dividend announcements contain information is an open 
empirical question. Pettit (1972 and 1976), Griffin (1976), Laub (1976), and Aharony 
and Swary (1980) interpreted their findings as evidence of infon-nation in divideiids, 
while Watts (1973,1976a, 1976b), Ang (1975), and Gonedes (1978) found no such 
evidence. 
Denis (1990) examines the defensive payoffs announced in response to hostile 
corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive 
share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of 
the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of 
target firm shareholders. Regardless of pay-out type, those firms remaining 
independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest expenence an abnon-nal 
share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are 
substantial post contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and 
abnormally high rates of top management turnover. He investigated the use of 
defensive changes in corporate pay-out policy as a means of retaining the 
independence of a target firm during the course of a hostile control contest. The 
repurchases are often part of an overall defensive strategy undertaken by the target 
firm and are associated with a high rate of success in maintaining target firm 
independence. However, in the process of retaining this independence target firm 
shareholders suffer large abnormal losses. Furthermore, the result of many layout plans 
is the concentration of managerial control of voting rights without the simultaneous 
increase in managerial cash flow ownership. This evidence can be interpreted as 
consistent with managers using the defensive strategy for their own benefit at the 
expense of shareholders. 
An exception to this general interpretation appears to be the use of special 
dividend plans. While also associated with a high rate of success in maintaining target 
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firm independence, these payoffs are typically associated with abnormal wealth 
increases for target firm shareholders. Cumulative abnormal returns for the entire 
control contest indicate substantial wealth gains for target firm shareholders eNen when 
a transfer to control is not effected. Thus, although the announced payoffs typically 
decrease shareholder wealth relative to the expected payment ftom the hostile bidder, 
they increase shareholder wealth relative to its pre-contest value. A possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the market expects value increasing changes in 
the target firm to occur in the future. 
However, the empirical studies suggest that the current stock prices not only 
reflect historical information but also reflect all publicly available published 
information, e. g., annual reports, earnings announcements, company news, dividend 
announcements, equity issues, and merger and acquisition announcements (Fama et al. 
1969; Pettit, 1972; and Fama, 1991). 
Pettit (1972) views that in an efficient market current prices fully and without 
bias reflect all published, widely available information. This implies that the return 
expected from a security in one period is independent of all information available in the 
previous period since the security's price already reflects the effect of this information 
(see Samuelson, 1965; and Fama, 1970). Announcements of changes in dividends 
would be immediately and unbiasedly reflected in the security's price resulting in a one 
time actual return that exceeds (if a dividend increase) or falls short of (if a dividend 
decrease) the expected security return. In this kind of a market, no trader, relying on 
publicly available information, can consistently make a return that exceeds the 
equilibrium risk adjusted return. However, a market that is inefficient would be 
characterised by firms with abnormal returns that tend to exist over a period of time 
after the announcement; implying either that it takes considerable time for the 
information to be disseminated across the market, or that there is a tendency to either 
systemically understate or overstate the effects of such information on the price of the 
security. 
Abnormal security performance prior to an announcement may but does not 
necessarily imply that the market is inefficient. The market would be considered to be 
inefficient if this apparent anticipation effect was the result of purchases or sales by 
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investors who have access to relevant information that has, for some reason, been 
withheld from the rest of the market, or the unique ability of some investors to use 
publicly available information to predict more accurately announcements that are 
related to or correlated with the favourable or unfavourable news conveyed by a 
dividend announcement. 
9.2.1. Security Price Reaction to Dividend Initiation and Omission: 
Previous studies have shown that positive (negative) dividend change 
announcements produce positive (negative) common stock price changes. Michaely et 
al. (1995) investigate both the immediate reaction to initiation or omission of 
dividends and the long terin post announcement price performance and their findings 
are quite consistent with prior empirical evidence (e. g., Healey and Palepu, 1988 and 
Asquith and Mullins, 1983) that dividend omission leads to price drop and price 
increase as a result of dividend initiation. 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) re-examine the stock price reaction to dividend 
announcements, using daily stock price data to control for other contemporaneous 
information announcements. Their results show significant positive abnormal returns 
at dividend initiation announcements, other studies including Aharony and Swary 
(1980), Brickley (1983), Kalay and Lowenstein (1985), and Dielman and Oppenheimer 
(1984), also document abnormal returns at the announcement of unanticipated 
dividend increases and decreases. 
Healey and Palepu"s (1988) empirical result indicate that firms that initiate and 
omit dividends have significant increases and decreases in their annual earnings for at 
least one year before and year of dividend policy change. These findings are consistent 
with Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), and Watts (1973) and suggest that 
dividend initiation and omissions can, in part, be predicted by changes in past and 
current earnings. However, there is a significant market reaction to the announcement 
of these dividend policy changes, indicating that they can not be perfectly predicted 
and that they convey new inforination. 
In another study Aharony and Swary (1980) indicate that dividend increases 
lead to increases in stock prices. Lee (1995) investigates the response to stock prices to 
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dividend shocks in a bivariate model of stock prices and price-dividend spreads. ne 
dividend generating process is modelled as the sum of a permanent component and a 
temporary component. By using the stock price valuation (present value) model, the 
two components are related to stock prices. The stock market responds significantly 
not only to permanent shocks to dividends, but also to temporary shocks to dividends. 
Furthermore, initial responses of stock prices to the temporary shocks are as strong as 
those to the permanent shocks. As a result, substantial variation in stock prices is due 
to the temporary shocks. This finding provides empirical support for the imperfect 
information hypothesis that emphasises the failure of investors to clearly distinguish 
between the two components of dividends, and also suggests that the observed mean- 
reverting behaviour of stock returns should be explained by incorporating a significant 
temporary component into stock prices. The price-dividend spreads are primarily 
accounted for by the temporary shocks to dividends, and respond strongly to them, 
suggesting that, in response to the temporary shocks to dividends, stock prices respond 
excessively relating to dividends. 
Black and Scholes (1974) concluded that it is not possible to demonstrate that 
the expected returns of high yield stocks differ from the expected returns on low yield 
stocks either before or after taxes. In spite of the ambiguous implication for the after 
tax CAPM, Black and Scholes (1974) have frequently been cited as providing 
evidence against the existence of tax effects. 
Various authors' report that dividend reductions are associated with large share 
price declines (Charest, 1978; and Woolridge and Ghosh 1985). On the other hand, 
many studies document that dividend increases are associated with share prices 
increases (Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; and Lang and Litzenberger 
1989). 
Traditionally, it has been argued that a corporation can influence the price of its 
shares by changing its dividend policy. The most common argument is that the 
corporation can increase the value of its shares by increasing its pay-out ratio. The 
feeling is that investors prefer dividends to capital gains because 'a bird in the hand is 
worth inore than one in the bush'. Therefore, investors will bid up the prices of the 
common stock of companies that pay generous dividends, relative to similar 
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companies that pay smaller dividends. However, Graham and Dodd (1934) are perhaps 
the best known proponents of this point of view. 
Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) find insignificantly negative bond price reactions 
to dividend announcements. Michaely et al. (1995) investigates the immediate and 
long-terrn effects of dividend initiation and omission announcements. They find that 
the short-term price impact of dividend omissions is negative and dividend initiation is 
positive. Initiation reactions are about one-half the magnitude of the market reaction to 
omission announcements. The change in yield, however, is seven times higher for the 
omission announcements. They also show that the market reaction to a dividend 
omission announcement is not greater than to an initiation for a given change in yield. 
They find the significant long-term drift following announcements of initiations and 
especially omissions. These drifts are surprising for several reasons. First, from the 
efficient market perspective, predictable excess returns are always surprising. In the 
case of omissions, where the drifts is large and robust. They show that the combined 
initiating and omitting fin-ns' drifts result in abnormal profits. Second, firms that omit a 
dividend are prior losers, not unlike those studies by De Bondt and Thaler (1985 and 
1987) who find significantly positive excess returns. Third, while the negative drift 
resembles that found by Bernard and Thomas (1989 and 1990) and other who have 
investigated post earnings announcement dnft; this is not the same phenomenon. The 
drift here is more pronounced, lasts longer, and does not appear to occur primarily 
around subsequent earnings announcements. Fourth, they can find no evidence of 
important changes in volume or clientele, which mitigates price pressure as a potential 
explanation for the announcement drift. It is apparent that the immediate and the long- 
term reaction to omission announcements is greater (in absolute value) than to 
initiation announcements. But Michaely et al. (1995) is unable to explain (at least 
partially) the asymmetry in the short-term reaction by the difference in the magnitude 
of the yield changes between these two types of events. They can explain for the long- 
ten-n difference in price behaviour between initiations and omissions. Neither the 
intensity of news (i. e., the change in yield) nor the stock's liquidity can explain the 
larger dnft observed for omissions. Finally, they showed that those firms substituting 
stock dividends for cash dividends experience a worse than non- stock-dividend-p ayi ng 
firms in the long-run. 
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Signalling and agency cost theories of dividend policy predict the omissions 
will produce a large average decline in equity values than will reductions of less than 
100%. However, Christie and Nanda (1994) identify a U-shaped relation between 
announcement day risk adjusted excess returns and the percentage decline in 
dividends. The significantly smaller than expected price reaction to dividend omissions 
can't be traced to growth opportunities, nor to a tendency for firms to delay omission 
announcements. While omitting firms provide higher per share dividend action than do 
firms that severely reduce payments, further dividends are unrelated to the market 
response. 
Several studies have analysed the responses of share prices and bond prices to 
the announcements of specific modes of cash distribution by finns, and the following 
stylised facts have been noted: 
9 Both dividends and stock repurchases have significant announcement effect. When 
a firm announces a stock repurchase or a dividend increase, its stock price increases 
(Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Dann, 1981; 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984; Stewart, 1976; and Vermaelen 1981). More direct 
evidence - using a more discriminating empirical methodology - that changes in 
dividend policy convey information has recently been provided by Ofer and Siegel 
(1986). 
On average, a stock repurchase provokes a significantly higher stock price response 
than a dividend increase (Aharony and Swary, 1980; Dann, 1981; Jensen and Smith, 
1985; Masulis, 1980b; and Vermaelen, 1981). 
Finns that repurchase stock offer premia above the pre-repurchase market prices for 
their own stock (Vennaelen 1981 and 1984). 
In many cases, despite the increase in the price per share subsequent to the 
announcement of the repurchase, the stock price drops in the "aftermarket", i. e., 
after the execution of the repurchase (Vermaelen, 198 1). 
Despite the post-repurchase price decline, a price increase subsequent to the 
repurchase announcement is relatively permanent in the sense that the price in the 
"aftermarket" remains higher than the price prior to the repurchase announcement 
(Vermaelen, 1981). 
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There is, surely, much evidence that market treats changes in dividends as 
newsworthy. When dividends are increased or initiated, prices tend to go up, and when 
dividends are cut or omitted, prices fall. 
9.2.2. Security Price Reaction to the Contemporaneous and Joint Announcements 
A major difficulty in assessing dividend information content lies in the fact that 
dividend and earnings announcements often are closely synchronised. Thus, one has 
first to adequately identify information reflected in both earnings and dividends and 
then consider the reminder of the information conveyed by dividend announcements. 
Stock price reaction to joint announcements is significantly greater than the 
reaction to just one signal. Some evidence shows that the reaction to a joint 
announcement is approximately twice that to a contemporaneous announcement. 
Miller and Rock (1985) show theoretically that under certain conditions 
dividend and earnings announcements can serve as perfect substitutes for each other. 
Watts (1973) empirically argues that the information content of dividend beyond 
earnings is trivial. In contrast, studies such as Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary 
(1980), Kane et aL (1984), and Venkatesh and Chaing (1986) suggest that dividend 
and earnings announcements are not perfect substitutes. 
If announcements are not perfect substitutes, the stock price reaction to a joint 
announcement of two consistent news series should be greater, on average, than the 
stock price reaction to a single announcement. Alternatively, if announcements are 
perfect substitute, the stock price reactions should not differ between the two types of 
announcements. 
The positive association between announcements of dividend changes and 
stock price movements has been documented in several empirical studies. Fama et al. 
(1969) find that firms announcing stock splits accompanied by increases in cash 
dividends have a statistically significant, positive mean, risk adjusted stock return 
during the announcement months, and those accompanies by dividend decreases have 
a significant negative return. Studies by Pettit (1972) and others find that the mean risk 
adjusted return for firms announcing dividend increases is significantly positive over 
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the two days surrounding the announcement, and for those announcing dividend 
decreases the two-days return is significantly negative. More recently, Aharony and 
Swary (1980) report similar results after controlling for contemporaneous quarterly 
earnings reports. 
A major difficulty in assessing the information content of dividend 
announcements lies in the inability of researchers to isolate the possible dividend 
effects from the effects of other, often closely synchronised, announcements. 
The leading explanation for the positive announcement effects surrounding 
stock repurchase announcements is the information-signal ling hypothesis. Major 
studies, by Dann (1981), Masulis (1980b), Rosenfeld (1982), and Vermaelen (1981 
and 1984), find consistent evidence of positive market returns on announcement dates 
of stock repurchase tender offers. Because alternative explanations (i. e., tax savings, 
leverage, and expropriation hypotheses) were found to be only marginally important, 
the repurchase event is commonly viewed as a signal of favourable earnings prospects. 
Similarly, several studies document announcement effects accompanying large 
dividend changes. Based on a substantial body of evidence, the best explanation for the 
market's reaction to dividend announcements is also the information-signalling 
hypothesis, wherein the firm conveys favourable information on its prospects to the 
market via dividend increases. Conversely, announcements of equity issues appear to 
signal unfavourable information about the economic opportunities facing issuing firrns. 
The market's reaction to both primary and secondary distributions of shares is 
negative. These studies support the notion that firrns attempt to communicate their 
prospects to the market via corporate transactions involving cash inflows (equity 
issues) or cash outflows (dividends and repurchases). The signalling theory thus argues 
that management has private information, which is superior to that available to 
shareholders in the market. 
In the absence of information asymmetries between management and capital 
markets theory predicts that firms should not simultaneously pay dividends and issue 
new stock. If stock issues are costly the rational value maximising firms should avold 
incremental issue costs associated with financing dividends. HoNý, eý-er, there is 
I--- -- 
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evidence that dividend increases lead to stock price appreciation and dividend 
decreases to stock price decline (Charest, 1978; and Aharony and Swary, 1980). These 
provide managers with the opportunity to benefit their shareholders. Managers could 
time a stock offering after a stock price increasing dividend announcement. Some 
practitioners recommend, managers could deliberately increase dividends before initial 
public offerings (Miller 1987) and seasonal offerings. 
Loderer and Mauer (1992) examine whether managers do indeed rely on 
dividends to obtain higher prices in primary stock offerings and weather the market's 
reaction to dividend and stock offering announcements justifies such a policy. 
Korajczyk et al. (1989) attempt to assess the effect of regular infon-nation releases on 
the pricing and timing of equity issues. They suggest that firms time equity issues after 
regular information releases to reduce valuation uncertainty. This then leads to the 
prediction that the price decline on issue announcements is more severe the longer the 
time since the last information release. 
John and Williams (1985) formulated an empirical model for the relation 
between dividend and stock offering. They provide a rationale for why firms raise 
outside equity while paying dividends. Dividends are used to signal firm value, which 
results in shareholders obtaining a higher price when selling their shares. The analysis 
implies that issuing firms (except the lower value firms) declare dividends before the 
offering. They predict that the joint announcement effect of stock offering and 
immediately preceding dividend is positive if dividends are increased and negative if 
dividends are decreased. 
Stock offering announcements could depress stock prices simply because of 
finite price elasticity of demand for firm's securities (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; 
and Loderer et al. (1991). Alternatively, Healy and Palepu (1990) argue that dividends 
could signal expected earnings whereas stock issues could signal changes in risk. In 
either case, firms may not have much to gain from the timing of the announcement of 
stock issues immediately after dividend declarations. On the other hand, Jain (1989) 
suggests that changes in system risk be unrelated to offer announcement effects. 
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9.2-3. Size and Dividend Announcement: 
Eddy and Seifert (1988) find that the abnormal stock price reaction to a 
dividend increase is greater for small firms. Zeghal (1983) extends the work of Klein 
and Bawa (1977), pointing out that there should be a negative relationship between 
size and availability of information. Zeghal (1983) supports his basic premise with 
empirical work that shows that the information of financial statements is greater for 
small firms than for large firms. Similarly, the information content of a dividend 
change may be greater for small firms. 
In a well- functioning market, on average, there should be no surprise in 
dividend announcement. Absent microstructure effects, market efficiency dictates that 
the excess returns to all dividend announcements, taken, together be zero. However, 
Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) find that during a three-day period surrounding dividend 
announcements, the actual returns, on average, significantly exceed both the returns 
predicted by the markets model and the average daily returns realised over a recent 
period. They also find that the market reactions to dividend announcement is sluggish, 
i. e., the excess return persist for up to four trading days after the announcement date. In 
a subsequent study, Eades et al. (1985), find that for the sub-sample of dividend 
announcements that are separated sufficiently from ex-dividend dates, there is no 
evidence of sluggishness. They also confirm that the market reaction to dividend 
announcement is biased. Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find that the average excess return to all 
dividend announcements increases as the firm size and stock price decrease. On the 
basis of 67,592 dividend announcements including 336 dividend omission 
announcements of the NYSE-listed firms over the period of July 1962 to June 1987, 
they find a 0.21% average excess return over the three day announcement period. For 
the lowest decile of firm size (stock price), the average excess return is 0.67(0.16)% 
while the corresponding average for the highest decile of firm size (stock price) is 
0.07(0.05)%. 
Bajaj and Vijh's (1995) findings on the firm size and stock price effects suggest 
that the observed price reactions may be due to micro-structure based reasons. Market 
micro-structure can effect stock prices during dividend announcement periods for two 
reasons: - (a) spill-over of tax-related trading around ex-dividend days, and (b) trading 
behaviour related to the dissemination of dividend information. 
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9.3.3. A. Tax -related trading and market prices around dividend announcement: 
Using transaction data, they (BaJaj and Vijh, 1995) examine trade and quote 
prices to study microstructure effects during dividend announcements. Firstly, they 
investigate whether the observed returns are biased upward due to the bid-ask spread. 
Such a bias may arise if the closing price before an announcement is more likely to be a 
bid price or the closing price after an announcement is more likely to be an ask price. 
The results of them find no such evidence. Secondly, they look for evidence of price 
pressure due to concentration of buy orders after dividend announcements. Even 
though the total trading volume increase significantly, the relative numbers of buy and 
sell orders after an announcement are similar to those on an unaffected day. Their 
findings that there is increased trading volume but no "buying pressure" during a 
dividend announcement period suggests that the increased trading activity may be 
related to information production rather than tax arbitrage. 
9.3.3. B. Infonnation production and stock prices dunng dividend announcements: 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b, and 1992) provide theoretical analysis of 
private information production and trading behaviour around anticipated events. They 
suggest that anticipation of a public announcement stimulate private information 
production even if information production is costly. Traders acquire private information 
to gain comparative advantage in interpreting the subsequent public information. Upon 
the release of public information, there is increased trading volume as traders revise 
their private (prior) beliefs. Kim and Verrecchia's models predict an increase in both 
the trading volume and price volatility during the announcement period. They predict 
that the expected increase in trading volume and price volatility are increasing 
functions of the precision of the announced information and decreasing functions of the 
amount of pre- announcement public and private information. 
To examine whether the observed excess returns are related to information 
production they (Kim and Verrecchia) first examine the changes in price volatility 
during the announcement days. However, Bajaj and Vijh (1995) findings are consistent 
with the findings of Kalay and Loewenstein (1985). On average, the volatility is higher 
during announcement days. They also find that there is a significant increase in trading 
volume during announcement days. The evidence on excess volume accompanying 
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dividend announcement reinforces the impression of inform ation-rel ated trading. 
Trading volume due to liquidity, and tax-arbitrage, reasons should decrease during 
periods of greater volatility. 
The prediction rule for expected dividends is based solely on information that 
would have been available to the investor ex-ante. These results can not, therefore, be 
attributed to the favourable or unfavourable information that would be present in a 
proxy for expected dividend yield that anticipates the occurrence of a dividend. 
9.2.4. Ex-dividend Day Effect of Dividends: 
There are a large number of studies which have examined the security pricing 
behaviour on ex-dividend days, e. g., Campbell Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber 
(1970), Black and Scholes (1973), Kalay (1982b), Eades et al. (1984), Booth and 
Johnston (1984), Kaplains (1986), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983 and 1986), 
Grammatikos (1989), Koski (1990), Michaely (1991), Karpoff and Walkling (1988 
and 1990), Choe and Masulis (199 1), Robin (199 1), Stickel (199 1), Michaely and Vila 
(1995 and 1996), and Boyd and Jagannathan (1992), documented an ex-dividend day 
stock price drop which is less than the dividend per share and positively correlated 
with the corresponding dividend yield. However, past studies also indicate that ex- 
dividend day returns vary over time. The variability of price depends on dividend yield 
but they are unable to explain the variation with changes in the tax code but find the 
strong effect for the introduction of negotiated commissions. Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979 and 1980) and Eades et al. (1984) present results that suggest 
variation over time. Ex-dividend day returns of high yielding stocks are persistently 
positive for some period and negative for other periods. On the other hand, lox", 
yielding stocks are constantly positive and less variable. Eades et al. (1994) views 
those corporate dividend policies affect ex-dividend day returns and they confirm the 
findings of Gordon and Bradford (1980) that the price effect of dividends is counter- 
cyclical. The counter-cyclical nature of interest rates is implied by the results of Fama 
and Schwert (1977) and has also been documented by Litterman and 'Weiss (1985) and 
Lee (1992). However, Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the higher taxation of 
dividends relatiNe to corporate gains results in a price drop on ex-dividend days being 
smaller than the amount of dividends paid. 
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9.3. Conclusion: 
Several studies conducted on information signalling evidence that dividend 
convey information to the market and that reflect in the share price. Two schools of 
thought have established: one, dividend irrelevance, and two, dividend relevance, and 
both the schools are trying to establish their thoughts, which led to dividend 
controversy. Miller and Modigliani (1961) maintained that dividend policy has no 
effect on the share prices of the firm is therefore, no consequence, i. e., whether 
dividend is paid or retained that does not make any difference. However, the impact of 
dividend announcements on stock prices has received much attention in the finance 
literature. Gordon (1962 and 1963) and Walter (1963) support dividend relevance 
doctrine. They view regarding the dividend relevance doctrine that dividend policy is 
relevant to the value of the share. Moreover, 'do dividend convey any information to 
the market? ' is still remaining unresolved and left as the key research question for the 
further studies. 
The important research questions arise through the review of previous 
empirical studies on dividend relevance and irrelevance are: 
(1) does security price react to the announcement of dividends or not, and 
(2) if it does, then does the security price of the emerging markets react to the 
announcement of dividends the same way as the developed markets? 
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Chapter Ten: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of Dividends in an 
Emerging Market: An Empirical Investigation 
10.0. Introduction 
Numerous studies conducted in different countries have documented that 
announcement of changes in dividends and earnings conveys specific information to 
the market (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Woolridge, 1982 
and 1983; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Brickley, 1983; Divecha and Morse, 1983; 
Benesh et al. 1984; Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984; Eades et al. 1985; Wansley and 
Lane, 1987; Aharony et al. 1988; Born, 1988; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988; Healey and 
Palepu, 1988; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1991; John and Lang, 1991; Marsh, 1993; and 
Abeyratna et al. 1996). However, recent studies which have examined simultaneous 
announcements by firms have discovered that the signal of dividend and earnings may 
either corroborate or contradict the other or, in consequence, influence the level of any 
abnormal returns which are earned by investors (Kane et al. 1984; Easton, 1991; Eddy 
and Seifert, 1992). Moreover, previous empirical studies suggest that positive 
(negative) dividend change announcements produce positive (negative) common stock 
price (Asquith and Mullions, 1983; Healey and Palepu, 1988; and Michaely et al. 
1995). 
As a member of an emerging market the stock price reaction of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange listed companies to the announcement of dividends is likely to be 
different from developed markets because the characteristics of the emerging markets 
are quite different. That is why, we see that the security price behaviour of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange listed companies appear differently from developed markets what 
might be expected from reading the literatures derived from developed markets. 
This chapter investigates the security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies to identify whether security 
price reacts to the announcement of dividends or/and dividend announcement works as 
a signalling device in an emerging markets. Event study methodology is employed for 
this study and the results suggest that security prices decrease after the announcement 
of dividends in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. This behaviour of stock price is 
irrespective of the nature of announcements (i. e., good news, bad news, or no news). 
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However, it is also observed a negative relationship between the returns of obsen, ation 
and comparison period in all the cases. These results also support the same argument. 
In addition, t-statistics is not highly significant either of the case which indicate the 
ineffectiveness of dividend announcements to influence the security prices. These 
results, therefore, suggest that security price does not react to the announcement of 
dividends in an emerging market. Finally, the empirical results also suggest that 
emerging markets are inefficient. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. The reviews of all the 
major theoretical and empirical evidence along with critical evaluation for identifying 
the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends are included in section 
10.1. Section 10.2 contains the description of data and methodology of the empirical 
analysis. The empirical results are reported in section 10.3. Finally, the summary and 
the concluding remarks are incorporated in section 10.4. 
10.1. Theoretical Background 
The bird-in-the-hand fallacy claims that stockholders are indifferent to dividend 
payments and retention; therefore, dividend policy is relevant to the value of shares. 
The leading proponents of the bird-in-the-hand theory (Gordon, 1962; and Lintner, 
1962) view that stockholders value a dollar received in dividend more highly than a 
dollar earnings retained. Moreover, Gordon (1963) and Walter (1963) also support the 
dividend relevance doctrine. 
Miller and Modigliani (M-M) (1961) provide the most comprehensive 
argument in support of the irrelevance of dividend. M-M maintained that dividend 
policy has no effect on the share prices of the firm is therefore, no consequences, i. e., 
whether dividend is paid or retained that does not make any difference. Under 
condition of perfect capital markets, rational investors, absence of tax discrimination 
between dividend income and capital gains, given the firm's investment policy, its 
dividend policy may have no influence on the market price of shares (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1966). 
However, Michaely et al. (1995) investigate both the immediate reaction to 
initiation or omission of dividends and the long term post announcement price 
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performance and their findings are quite consistent with prior empirical evidence (e. g., 
Asquith and Mullins, 1983; and Healey and Palepu, 1988) that dividend omission leads 
to price drop and price increase as a result of dividend initiation. 
On average, in a well- functioning market, there should be no surprise in 
dividend announcement. Absent microstructure effects and market efficiency dictates 
that the excess returns to all dividend announcements taken together are zero. However, 
Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) find that during a three-day period surrounding dividend 
announcements, the actual returns, on average, significantly exceed both the returns 
predicted by the markets model and the average daily returns realised over a recent 
period. Moreover, they mention that the market reactions to dividend announcement is 
sluggish, i. e., the excess returns persist for up to four trading days after the 
announcement date. In a subsequent study, Eades et al. (1985), find that for the sub- 
sample of dividend announcements that are separated sufficiently from ex-dividend 
dates, there is no evidence of sluggishness. However, they confirm that the market 
reaction to dividend announcement is biased. 
Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find that the average excess return to all dividend 
announcements increases as the firm size and stock price decrease. Their findings on 
the firm size and stock price effects suggest that the observed price reactions may be 
due to microstructure based reasons. Market microstructure can effect stock prices 
during dividend announcement periods for two reasons: spill-over of tax-related trading 
around ex-dividend days and trading behaviour related to the dissemination of dividend 
information. 
The summary of the major empirical studies on the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends along with the data set they used, research methodology, 
and their remarkable findings are presented in the Table 10.1. 
While there are a number of studies conducted on security prices, a very few 
studies have been conducted on security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends. However, all of those studies are on US markets except one, which is on 
UK market. Although, all of those studies employed event study methodology, the 
researchers applied a variety of approaches and considered different event study 
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periods to analyse the data. The empirical results of all the studies support that positive 
dividend change announcements produce positive common stock prices and vice Nrersa. 
The empirical part of this chapter investigates the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends in an emerging market. The dividend announcements 
divides into three categories: good news (announcement of dividend increase), bad 
news (announcement of dividend decrease) and no news (dividend maintaining 
announcements). An event study methodology is used considering four event periods 
(60,30,20, and 10 days before and after the announcement of dividends) to compare 
the mean abnormal returns between observed period (before the announcement) and 
comparison period (after the announcement) and to examine whether the 
announcement of dividends make abnormal returns after the announcements of 
dividends or not. 
10.2. Data and Method 
This section of the chapter employs a conventional event study methodology to 
examine the stock price reaction to the announcement of dividends. It is defined the 
announcement day as the event day (Day = 0), which is the day before the day on 
which dividend announcement news are published in the daily newspapers or in the 
daily stock price quotation. It is considered -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days 
of the event day as the observation period and +60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 
days of the event day as the comparison period for the study. 
A part of the market data (1988-1991) is collected from the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange price quotations, published and unpublished records of the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange, and the Dhaka Stock Exchange computer database. The rest of the market 
data (1992-1997) is collected from the data channel (Datastream). However, the 
announcement dates are obtained from the Dhaka Stock Exchange daily price 
quotations for this study. 
Daily share price returns are estimated according to the following equation 13: 
Rit = (Pit - Pit-, )/ Pit-, .......... 
13 Dividends are not included to estimate the stock returns. 
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Where, 
Rit = Share price return on day 't' 
Pit = Share price on day T and 
Pit-, = Share price on day 't- V 
Abnon-nal returns are calculated according to the following equation: 
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) ................... (2) 
Where, 
ARit = Abnormal return on day T and 
E(Rit) = Expected return on day T 
The expected return is derived using the well-known market model and based on the 
previous 300 days of the event study period. 
The expected return is: 
E(Rij =a+, 8^, 2? .................................................................. 
Where, 
a and 8= Predicted values of cons tan t term and beta coefficient, and 
Rn, t = Market return on day T ff Price Indext - Price Indext-1) / Price Indext-I I 
As it is known that Index comprises both frequently and infrequently traded 
shares. However, it is also known that frequently traded shares cause upward bias and 
infrequently traded shares cause downward bias. Scholes and Williams (1977) and 
Dimson (1979) explained the problem of infrequent trading bias in the financial 
markets and also mentioned the problem of using OLS model. They suggested to 
consider lag and lead factor for adjusting upward and downward bias. On the other 
hand, Bartholdy and Allan (1994) considered Scholes and Williams (1977) and 
Dimson's (1979) suggested lag and lead factors alongside OLS model but they found I 
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more stability of the coefficients in case of using OLS model. Therefore, using market 
model for predicting constant term ((x hat) and beta coefficient (P hat) is quite justified 
for this study. 
All the cash dividend announcements of the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 153 
non-financial companies over the period of 01-01-1988 to 31-12-1997 are primarily 
considered as the sample of the study. There are 513 cash dividend announcements in 
the sample period but 93 of them are excluded because those announcements 
accompanied earnings and / or rights and / or stock dividend announcements. 
Moreover, 40 cash dividend announcements are excluded because earnings, rights, or 
stock dividend announcements are made in the event study period of these cash 
dividend announcements. So, the final sample consists 380 cash dividend 
announcements amongst 213 dividend increasing announcements, 84 dividend 
decreasing announcements, and 83 dividend maintaining announcements. 
It is worth mentioning that there was a massive fluctuation in the market 
between 27 th June 1996 and 28 th March 1997 (See Figure 10.7). So, the empirical part 
of this chapter also investigates the announcement effect of dividend by excluding the 
cash dividend announcements in the abnormal period (27 th June 1996 to 28 th March 
1997) as well. There are 28 cash dividend announcements made in the above 
mentioned abnormal period. Therefore, the excluded sample consists 352 cash 
dividend announcements amongst 198 dividend increasing announcements, 79 
dividend decreasing announcements, and 75 dividend maintaining announcements. 
Hypotheses of the study: 
HO: The mean abnormal returns of the observation period and comparison 
period are not significantly differentftom zero. 
The empirical part of this chapter investigates the security price reaction to the 
announcement of increasing dividends, decreasing dividends, and maintaining 
dividends. However, to investigate the security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends, the empirical part compares the abnormal returns of the observation and 
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comparison period for four event study periods (±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and 
± 10 days) simultaneously. 
10.3. Empirical Evidences 
10.3. A. Good News: 
10.3. A. 1. Statistics: 
The mean abnormal returns in the excluded sample are -. 0087%, -. 028%, - 
. 0062% and -. 010% 
in the observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 
days respectively but these returns decrease in the comparison periods +60 days, +30 
days, and +20 days, and +10 days (-. 12%, -. 16%, -. 15%, and -. 012). However, the 
mean abnormal returns in the included sample are . 0577%, . 074%, . 13% and . 17% 
in 
the observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days respectively but 
these returns also decrease in the comparison periods +30 days, +20 days, and +10 
days (-. 14%, -. 12% and . 042%) 
but the return increases a little bit in comparison 
period +60 days (. 058%). These results show that the abnormal returns decrease after 
the announcement of increasing dividend in all the study periods (±60 days, ±30 days, 
±20 days, and ±10 days) but the returns do not decrease significantly in terms of size 
after the announcement of dividend increase (Table 10.2). 
10.3. A. 11. Correlation: 
The correlation coefficients between abnomial returns of observation periods 
and comparison periods of the excluded sample are -. 232, -. 076, -. 243, and . 116 and 
the probability values are . 075, . 
690, . 301, and . 750 respectively 
for ±60 days, ±30 
days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the correlation coefficients between abnormal 
returns of observation periods and comparison periods of the included sample are . 026, 
-. 010, -. 035, and -. 322 and the probability values are . 844, . 958, . 882, and . 365 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. The correlation 
coefficients indicate a negative relationship between the abnon-nal returns of the 
observation periods and comparison periods for dividend increase announcements in 
all the study periods (±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days). However, these 
results do not explain a very high degree significant correlation between the abnon-nal 
returns of observation period and comparison period either of the case (Table 10.3). 
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10.3. A. 111. T-Test: 
The mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the 
comparison periods of excluded sample are 1.152E-03,1.303E-03,1.397E-03, and 
2.035E-05 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the 
mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the comparison 
periods of included sample are 2.3145E-06,2.187E-03,2.447E-03, and 1.278E-03 
respectively for ±60 days, ±3 0 days, ±20 days, and ± 10 days. 
The t-values and the probability values of excluded sample are 1.772,1.681, 
1.340, and . 016, and . 082, . 103, . 196, and . 987 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, 
±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the t-values and the probability values of included 
sample are -. 001,2.400,2.074 and . 654, and . 999, . 023, . 052 and . 529 respectively for 
±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. These results imply that the mean 
difference of the abnormal returns between observation and comparison periods is not 
significantly different from zero. 
So, these empirical results document that abnormal returns are decreasing but 
not significantly after the announcement of increasing dividends. Therefore, it is clear 
that the mean returns of the observation periods (-60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 
days) and comparison periods (+60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 days) for 
dividend increasing announcements are not significantly different from zero. The 
sequence charts of the abnormal returns for the event study periods (see Figures 10.1 a, 
10.1b, 10.1c, 10.1d, 10.2a, 10.2b, 10.2c, and 10.2d) also support the same argument as 
the empirical findings. However, these results are completely contradictory with the 
previous empirical studies (Table 10.4). 
10.3. B. Bad News: 
10. B. 1. Statistics: 
The mean abnormal returns in the excluded sample are . 75%, -. 76%, -. 77% and 
-. 81% in the observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days 
respectively but these returns decrease in the comparison periods +60 days, +30 days, 
and +20 days, and +10 days (-. 91%, -. 89%, -. 96%, and -1.03%). However, the mean 
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observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days respectively but these 
returns also decrease in the comparison periods +60 days, +30 da%, s, +20 days, and --r- 10 
days (-. 86%, -. 83%, -. 90% and -. 96%). These results indicate that the abnormal returns 
decrease after the announcement of dividend decrease but these returns do not decrease 
significantly in terms of size after the announcement of dividends (Table 10.5). 
10.3. B. 11. Correlation: 
The correlation coefficients between abnonnal returns of observation periods 
and comparison periods of the excluded sample are . 029, -. 330, -. 603, and -. 630 and 
the probability values are . 829, . 075, . 005, and . 051 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 
days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the correlation coefficients between abnormal 
returns of observation periods and comparison periods in the included sample are . 104, 
-. 328, -. 218, and -. 122 and the probability values are . 431, . 077, . 355, and . 738 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. The correlation 
coefficients indicate a negative relationship between the abnormal returns of the 
observation periods and the comparison periods for the dividend decreasing 
announcements in all the study periods (±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days). 
However, these results do not explain a very high degree significant correlation 
between the abnormal returns of observation periods and comparison periods either of 
the case (Table 10.6). 
10.3. B. 111. T-Test: 
The mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the 
comparison periods in the excluded sample are 1.661E-02,1.274E-03,1.898E-03, and 
2.178E-03 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the 
mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the comparison 
periods in the included sample are 1.599E-02,1.522E-03,2.227E-03, and 2.287E-03 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. 
The t-values and the probability values of the excluded sample are 1.243, 
1.559,1.683, and 1.261, and . 
219, . 130, . 109, and . 239 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 
days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the t-values and the probability values of the 
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respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. These results, however, 
imply that the mean difference of the abnormal returns between observation and 
comparison periods is not significantly different from zero. 
So, these empirical results also evidence that abnormal returns are decreasing but 
not significantly after the announcements of decreasing dividends. However, it is clear 
that the mean returns of the observation periods (-60 days, -3 0 days, -20 days, and -10 
days) and comparison periods (+60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 days) for 
dividend decreasing announcements are not significantly different from zero. The 
sequence charts of the abnormal returns for the event study periods (see Figures 10.3a, 
10.3b, 10.3c, 10.3d, 10.4a, 10.4b, 10.4c, and 10.4d) also support the empirical findings 
of this study. While the abnormal returns of the differential periods are not 
significantly different from zero, the empirical results support (narrowly) the previous 
studies that negative dividend change produce negative common stock prices (Asquith 
and Mullins, 1983; Healey and Palepu, 1988; and Michaely et al. 1995) (Table 10.7). 
10.3. C. No News: 
10.3. C. 1. Statistics: 
The mean abnormal returns in the excluded sample are . 038%, . 05%, . 057%, 
and . 10% in the observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days 
respectively but these returns decrease in the comparison periods +60 days, +30 days, 
and +20 days, and +10 days (-. 053%, -. 16%, -. 20% and -. 21%). However, the mean 
abnormal returns in the included sample are . 29%, . 57%, . 80%, and . 15% 
in the 
observation periods -60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 days respectively but these 
returns also decrease in the comparison periods +60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 
days (-. 077%, -. 018%, -. 021 %, and -. 020%). These results show that abnormal returns 
decrease after the announcement of dividends but the returns do not decrease 
significantly in terms of size after the announcements of maintaining dividends (Table 
10.8). 
10.3. C. 11. Correlation: 
The correlation coefficients between abnon-nal returns of observation periods 
and comparison penods of the excluded sample are . 039, -. 219, -. 037, and -. 407 and 
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222 Security Price ReactiOn. - Empirical 
days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the correlation coefficients bet", een abnonnal 
returns of observation periods and comparison periods of the included sample are - 
. 018, -. 127, . 023, and -. 427 and the probability values are . 892, . 504, . 925, and . 218 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. The correlation 
coefficients indicate a negative relationship between the abnormal returns of the 
observation periods and comparison periods for dividend maintaining announcements 
in all the study periods (±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days). However, these 
results do not explain a very high degree significant correlation between the abnormal 
returns of observation periods and comparison periods either of the case (Table 10-9). 
10.3. C. 111. T-Test: 
The mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the 
comparison periods of the excluded sample are 9.163E-04,2.103E-03,2.572E-03, and 
3.100E-03 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the 
mean difference between the abnormal returns of the observation and the comparison 
periods of the included sample are 3.714E-03,7.460E-03,1.008E-02, and 1.695E-02 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. 
The t-values and the probability values of the excluded sample are 1.491, 
2.005ý 1.974, and 1.207, and . 141, . 054, . 063, and . 258 respectively for ±60 days, ±30 
days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. However, the t-values and the probability values of the 
included sample are 1.413,1.440,1.319, and 1.069, and . 163, . 161, . 203, and . 313 
respectively for ±60 days, ±30 days, ±20 days, and ±10 days. These results imply that 
the mean difference of the abnormal returns between observation and comparison 
periods is not significantly different from zero. 
The empirical studies also document that abnormal returns are decreasing but not 
significantly after the announcement of maintaining dividends. However, it is clear that 
the mean returns of the observation periods (-60 days, -30 days, -20 days, and -10 
days) and comparison periods (+60 days, +30 days, +20 days, and +10 days) for 
dividend maintaining announcements are not significantly different from zero. The 
sequence charts of the abnormal returns for the event study periods (see Figures 10.5a, 
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226 Security Price Reaction: Empirical 
of this study. However, these results are contradictory with the previous empirical 
studies (Table 10.10). 
The empirical results accept the announcement effect hypothesis of dividend. It 
is observed from the empirical results that security return decreases after the 
announcement of either good, bad, or no news of dividends in the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. However, the negative correlation between the returns of observation and 
comparison period also supports the same argument. Although, the abnon-nal returns 
are decreasing after the announcement of increasing, decreasing, and maintaining 
dividends, the differential returns between observation periods and comparison periods 
are not significantly different from zero. However, even though the empirical results of 
the dividend-decreasing sub-sample narrowly support previous empirical studies, the 
empirical results of the dividend increasing and dividend maintaining announcement 
sub-samples completely disagree with the previous empirical studies. Moreover, this is 
the similarity among these sub-samples, i. e.; security price is decreasing after the 
announcement of good news (increasing dividends), bad news (decreasing dividends), 
and no news (maintaining dividends). So, this is the indication of the ineffectiveness of 
the announcements of dividends in emerging markets. 
The empirical results evidence that there is no significant impact of dividend 
announcement on the security prices of an emerging market because as insiders trade in 
the market, SO, the information used to be adjusted with the share prices before 
announcement and consequently announcement of dividends do not carry any new 
inforination to the market. However, these results also strongly reject signalling theory 
of dividend. Besides, one of the most important reasons for the ineffectiveness of the 
announcements of dividend in an emerging market is the insider's motivated trading 
before and after the announcement of dividends. As we have already been mentioned 
earlier that insiders are holding higher proportion of stocks of the DSE, so, usually 
insiders start to buy back the shares before the AGM for higher voting rights that 
causes higher demand of shares and consequently higher share returns. Moreover, 
insiders off load shares after AGM that also causes higher supply of shares and 
consequently returns fall. 
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228 Security Price Reacrion. - Empirical 
However, as we have already been mentioned in the empincal phase one of this 
study that the DSE listed companies follow stable diý'idend policy but they do not 
adjust profits to the payment of dividends perfectly, so, dividend does not contain 
accurate information and as a result security prices do not react properly for the 
announcement of dividends. 
Furthermore, insider trading causes asymmetric information iii the market and as 
insiders have private information, so, outsiders love to follow the insiders to buy or sell 
shares. Therefore, shareholders always misled because of asymmetric information and 
consequently positive information about dividend also became an ineffective device in 
the market. 
As the DSE is still in the speculation and manipulation stage, so, speculators play 
their role in the market for a short-term period. However, it is notable that insiders, 
brokers, and the exchange employees are the speculators of the market. And as these 
informed speculators play their role in the market for short-term gain that causes 
dividend information ineffective. 
However, ineffectiveness of dividend announcements also causes for many 
other reasons including companies announce dividends but they often do delay in 
paying dividends to shareholders, after the book closure sometimes the companies take 
a long time to transfer the ownership, etc. For these and many other reasons, the 
shareholders are always sceptical about the activities of the management and they do 
not trust management with full confidence. Moreover, the lower level of law 
enforcement in the market and ineffectiveness of the regulatory bodies also became a 
cause of distortion in the market. 
Finally, the empirical results clearly indicate that the DSE is an inefficient 
market because security prices do not reflect the publicly available information. 
However, as the informed insiders trade in the market, so, the securities gain excess 
returns before the announcements. This is another indication of market inefficiency 
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10.4. Conclusion 
A vast majority of the studies found dividend announcement as a strong 
signalling device, which influence the security prices but the issue of the effect of 
dividend announcements on security prices is still inconclusive. The major objective of 
this chapter is to identify whether dividend announcements convey information to the 
market or whether investors consider announcement of dividends as a signal of firm's 
future prospects, i. e., to see the security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends in an emerging market. Cash dividend announcements of the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange listed 153 non-financial companies over the period of 1988-1997 are 
considered for this study. The empirical section of this chapter employs a conventional 
event study methodology to examine the stock price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends. The mean abnon-nal returns of the observation periods and comparison 
periods are not significantly different from zero. These results document that there is 
no significant impact of dividend announcement on the security prices of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange listed companies. However, these result also reject the dividend 
signalling hypothesis that dividend announcement does not convey any information 
about the companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
The empirical results evidence that there is no significant impact of dividend 
announcement on the security prices of an emerging market because as insiders trade 
in the market, so, the information used to be adjusted with the share prices before 
announcement. Therefore, announcement of dividends do not carry any new 
information to the market. However, insider's motivated trading before and after the 
announcement of dividends is also an important reason for the ineffectiveness of the 
dividend announcements. Non-adjustment of profits to the payment of dividends is 
also one of the most important causes for this type of insensitive reaction of security 
returns to the announcement of dividends. However, asymmetric information as a 
result of insider trading is also a cause of this type of behaviour of security returns. 
Besides, as DSE is still in the speculation and manipulation stage, so, speculators play 
their role in the market for short-term gain. Apart from these, brokers' trading and 
exchange employees' trading cause dividend information ineffective because all these 
groups deal with short-ten-n gain. Ineffectiveness of dividend announcements also 
causes for many other reasons including companies announce dividends but they often 
do delay in paying dividends to shareholders, after the book closure sometimes the 
230 Security Price Reat- iion. - Empirical 
companies take a long time to transfer the ownership, etc. As this kind of situation is a 
common phenomenon in an inefficient market like the Dhaka Stock Exchan,, ge, so, 
positive information about dividend also becomes an ineffective device in such 
markets. For these and many other reasons, the shareholders are ahva)'s sceptical about 
the activities of the management and they do not trust management Nvith full 
confidence. Finally, the empirical results also clearly indicate that the enierging 
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232 Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter Eleven: Summary and Conclusion 
The objectives of this study are threefold: firstly, to identify the detenninants of 
dividend policy in an emerging market; secondly, to identify dividend behaviour of an 
emerging market and to identify the the best-fit partial adjusted dividend behaviour model 
in an emerging market; and thirdly, to identify the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends in an emerging market. 
The highlights of the major findings are presented in section 11.1. Section 11.2 
contains a comparison of the empirical findings of this study with developed markets and 
with other emerging markets. The contribution of this study to the finance theories and to 
the existing literature is presented in section 11.3. The implications of the research, 
limitations of the research, suggested further research and concluding remarks are 
presented in sections 11.4,11.5,11.6 and 11.7 respectively. 
11.1. Highlights of the Major Findings: 
11.1.1. Empirical Phase One: Determinants of Dividend Policy in an Emerging Market 
The empirical studies on dividend policy are always lagged behind the theoretical 
studies, therefore, this study attempts to take the dividend theories into account to identify 
the determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market and to minimise the gap 
between theoretical and empirical studies. The results of the empirical investigation 
strongly support agency cost theory and transaction cost theory but strongly reject 
signalling theory of dividend. However, the results also narrowly support tax clientele, 
residual, and pecking order theory of dividend. 
The regression results document a positive relationship between business risk 
(signalling theory variable) and dividend pay-out ratio. These results indicate that 
dividends do neither signal about future profitability nor convey any information to the 
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market. Usually, the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies follow stable dividend 
policy; so, they have a little scope to adjust the profitability to the payments of dividend. 
Therefore, dividend contains less information and dividend becomes less informative to 
signal the profitability (see Chapter 8 for detail). These results also reject the information 
content hypothesis of Miller and Modigliani (1961) and strongly disagree with the 
previous empirical evidence on dividend signalling (e. g., Pettit, 1972; Bhattacharya, 1979; 
Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Kane et al. 1984; John and 
Williams, 1985; and Miller and Rock, 1985). 
However, the regression results document a positive relationship between the 
institutional shareholdings and dividend pay-out ratio but the coefficients are not highly 
significant. These results indicate that marginal tax payers influence the companies to pay 
more dividends. While, these findings support the tax clientele theory of dividend and 
agree with previous empirical studies (e. g., Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Long, 
1978; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; and DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980), the 
coefficient of institutional shareholders has become very weak predictor of tax clientele 
theory because institutional shareholders are not the major shareholders of the companies. 
Moreover, the coefficients of insider ownership are negatively and number of 
common stockholders are positively related to dividend pay-out ratio. These results 
indicate that firms pay higher amount of dividends as monitoring and bonding package 
when insiders hold a lower percentage of common stock and / or greater number of 
common stocks held by outsiders to reduce agency cost. These results document a very 
high degree relationship between dividend pay-out ratio and agency cost (that arises for 
the conflict between stockholder and manager). These results, however, support previous 
empirical studies (e. g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; 
Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et al. 1992; Alli et al. 1993; and Saxena, 1999). 
Moreover, the empirical results document a positive relationship between free cash flow 
and dividend pay-out ratio but the coefficients are not highly significant. These results 
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indicate that if firms have free cash flow then the firms either pay dividends or retire their 
debts to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. These results, however, support Jensen's 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis and previous empirical evidence. In addition, the 
coefficients of collateralizable assets are positively related to dividend pay-out ratio. These 
results, however, indicate the influence of agency cost that arises for the conflict between 
shareholder-bondholder on dividend pay-out ratio. These results are also consistent with 
the previous empirical studies (e. g., Smith and Warner, 1979; and Kalay, 1982). 
Therefore, these empirical evidence strongly support the influence of agency cost theory 
on dividend pay-out ratio. While the higher levels of collateralizable assets and the 
regression coefficients of collateralizable assets indicate the better protection of the 
bondholders in the Dhaka Stock Exchange, the insider ownership and the dispersion 
ownership and their regression coefficients provide clear evidence that outsider 
shareholders are completely unprotected in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. However, as many 
companies are controlled by the insiders and as lower levels of law enforcement in the 
market, the insiders are indeed enjoying every facility for stealing profits in the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange. These results, moreover, strongly support the previous study on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (Mollah et al. 2000). 
The coefficients of debt-equity ratio negatively and size positively related to 
dividend pay-out ratio. These results indicate that firms with higher levels of leverage pay 
lower amount of dividends because of higher burden of transaction cost and large firms 
pay higher dividends because these firms face lower issuance cost. However, these results 
are consistent with previous empirical studies (e. g., Higgins, 1972; and Fama, 1974) and 
support a significant influence of transaction costs on dividend pay-out ratio. 
In addition, the coefficients of investment opportunity variable are negatively related 
to dividend pay-out ratio but the relationship is not highly significant. These results 
indicate that the firms with higher growth generally pay lower dividends. These results are 
consistent with the previous empirical studies. However, these results also narrowly 
Chapter Eleven 235 Summary and Conclusion 
support residual theory of dividend and Myers and Maj luf s (1984) pecking order theory 
of dividend. 
Finally, the empirical study identifies leverage; size, insider ownership, and 
collateralizable assets as the major determinants of dividend pay-out ratio in an emerging 
market. 
11.1.2. Empirical Phase Two: Dividend Policy and Behaviour: An Empirical Investigation 
on the Partial Adjusted Dividend Behaviour Models 
This phase of the empirical study tested the partial adjusted dividend behaviour 
models to identify the dividend policy and behaviour and to identify the best-fit partial 
adjusted dividend behaviour model in an emerging market. The empirical study begins 
with the Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted dividend behaviour model that the current 
earnings after tax and dividends paid in the previous years primarily govern dividend 
decisions. However, this study also tested the extended work of Paul Darling (1957), and 
John Brittain (1966). And this study ends at Fama and Babiak's (1968) partial adjusted 
dividend behaviour model. The empirical study finds Brittain's (1966) partial adjusted 
dividend behaviour model as the best-fit dividend behavioural model in an emerging 
market and concludes that dividend decision is primarily governed by cash flow for 
measuring the capacity of the companies to pay dividends and dividends paid in the 
previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. Moreover, empirical results also document strong 
support of Lintner"s (1956) partial adjusted dividend behaviour model in the emerging 
markets. 
11.1.3. Empirical Phase Three: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of Dividends 
This phase of the empirical study investigates the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends (cash dividends) in an emerging market. This study employs 
event study methodology and conducts the measurement of abnon-nal performance with T 
- test approach to compare abnormal returns of the event study periods (± 60 days, ± 30 
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days, ± 20 days, ± 10 days). The T-test shows that the mean abnormal returns of the 
observation period and comparison period are not significantly different from zero, i. e., 
securities do not gain abnormal returns for the announcement of dividends. However, the 
empirical investigation document that security price falls after the announcements of 
dividends and this behaviour is regardless of the nature of the announcements (i. e., good 
news, bad news, and no news). The empirical results evidence that there is no significant 
impact of dividend announcement on the security prices of an emerging market because as 
insiders trade in the market, so, the information used to be adjusted with the share prices 
before announcement. Therefore, announcement of dividends do not carry any new 
information to the market. However, these results also strongly reject signalling theory of 
dividend. Besides, one of the most important reasons for the ineffectiveness of the 
announcements of dividend in an emerging market is the insider's motivated trading 
before and after the announcement of dividends. As we have already been mentioned 
earlier that insiders are holding higher proportion of stocks of the DSE, so, usually insiders 
start to buy back the shares before the AGM for higher voting rights that causes higher 
demand of shares and consequently higher share returns. Moreover, insiders off load 
shares after the AGM that also causes higher supply of shares and consequently returns 
fall. 
However, as we have already been mentioned in the empirical phase one of this 
study that the DSE listed companies follow stable dividend policy but they do not adjust 
profits to the payment of dividends perfectly, so, dividend does not contain accurate 
information and as a result security prices do not react properly for the announcement of 
dividends. 
Moreover, insider trading causes asymmetric information in the market and as 
insiders have private information, so, outsiders love to follow the insiders to buy or sell 
shares. Therefore, shareholders always misled because of asymmetric information and 
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consequently positive information about dividend also became an ineffectiN-e deý, ice in the 
market. 
As we know that the DSE is still in the speculation and manipulation stage and the 
speculators play their role in the market for a short-term period. However, it is notable that 
insiders, brokers, and the exchange employees are the speculators of the market. And as 
these informed speculators play their role in the market for short-term gain that causes 
dividend information ineffective. 
However, ineffectiveness of dividend announcements also causes for many other 
reasons including companies announce dividends but they often do delay in paying 
dividends to shareholders, after the book closure sometimes the companies take a long 
time to transfer the ownership, etc. For these and many other reasons, the shareholders are 
always sceptical about the activities of the management and they do not trust management 
with full confidence. However, the lower level of law enforcement in the market and 
ineffectiveness of the regulatory bodies also became a cause of distortion in the market. 
Finally, these empirical results clearly indicate that the DSE is an inefficient 
market because security prices do not react to the announcement of dividends. 
11.2. Empirical Findings Compared to the Previous Studies: 
11.2.1. Empirical Phase One: Determinants of Dividend Policy in an Emerging market 
11.2.1.1. Developed Markets Studies vs. This Study 
A great many of the studies have been conducted on dividend policy in the 
developed markets to date but a few are on the determinants of dividend policy. However, 
the main difference between this study and the previous empirical studies on the 
determinants of dividend policy is the approach. This study focused on the major dividend 
theories to identify the determinants of dividend policy but most of previous studies 
selected the variables based on the previous studies and then analyse the data to identify 
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the determinants of dividend policy. However, the previous studies tested the dividend 
theories indirectly rather than considering the theories as the basis of the studies except 
Alli et al. (1993). Although, the previous studies support dividend theories but the 
researchers neither took all the major dividend theories altogether into account nor tested 
the dividend theories directly. 
The previous empirical studies conducted on determinants of dividend policy in the 
developed markets (e. g., Michaelsen, 1961; Gillespie, 1971; Rozeff, 1982; Gerber, 1988; 
Partington, 1989; Jensen et al. 1992; Alli et al. 1993; Holder et al. 1998; and Saxena, 
1999) support all of the dividend theories. However, the empirical phase of this thesis 
strongly supports agency cost and transaction cost theory and narrowly supports tax 
clientele, residual, and pecking order theory. However, this study also strongly rejects 
dividend signalling theory. These results indicate the consistency between these two 
markets except some aspects of dividend policy. 
11.2.1.2. Emerging Market Studies vs. This Study 
Only two (e. g., Gerg et al. 1996, and Mollah et al. 2000) recognised study 
conducted on determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market until now. Gerg et 
al. (1996) selected the variables traditionally and then tested the selected variables on the 
Indian data and their selected variables are the proxies of transaction cost and residual 
theory of dividend. However, Mollah et al. (2000) worked only on the agency cost theory 
but tested the model on the Dhaka Stock Exchange data. Furthermore, Gerg et al. (1996) 
took transaction cost and residual theory into account to identify the deten-ninants of 
dividend policy and Mollah et al. (2000) took agency cost theory into account to identify 
the influence of agency cost on dividend policy. In contrast, as we have already been 
mentioned earlier that this study took all the major dividend theories into account to 
identify the detenninants of dividend policy. While Mollah et al. 's (2000) empirical study 
strongly supports agency cost theory, Gerg et al. 's (1996) empirical study does not support 
residual and transaction cost theory. On the other hand, the empirical part of this thesis 
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strongly supports agency cost and transaction cost theory but strongly rejects signalling 
theory of dividend. However, this study also narrowly supports tax clientele, residual and 
pecking order theory. Therefore, these are the evidence of complete consistencly of the 
empirical results of this study with Mollah et al. 's (2000) but complete inconsistencý, of 
the empirical results of this study with Gerg et al. 's (1996). The main reason for the 
inconsistency between this study and Gerg et al. 's study is that Gerg et al. (1996) 
conducted their study on the selected 44 Indian textile companies but this study conducted 
on the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed 153 non-financial sector companies. 
11.2.2. Empirical Phase Two: Dividend Policy and Behaviour in an Emerging Market 
11.2.2.1. Developed Markets Studies vs. This Study 
While, most of the previous studies find some difficulties ni the partial adjustment 
model and suggested further improvement and addition to the model, e. g., Doran and 
Griffiths (1978) mentioned the inconsistency of the OLS estimation of the partial 
adjustment model, Djarraya (1980) identified the difficulty of partial adjustment model to 
distinguish between the coefficients, and Djarraya and Lee (1981) and Lee et al. (1987) 
mentioned partial adjustment model as an inadequate model to explain the dividend 
behaviour and suggested a more generalised model, but none of studies disagrees with 
partial adjustment models. However, the empirical investigation of Fama and Babiak 
(1968) identified Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted model as the best-fit model. The 
empirical phase of this thesis supports Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment model but 
identifies Brittain's (1966) model as the best-fit partial adjusted model in an emerging 
market. Therefore, the consistency of the empirical evidence indicate the similarity of 
dividend behaviours between these two markets. 
11.2.2.2. Emerging Market Studies vs. This Study 
Only two recognised study conducted on dividend behaviour models in emerging 
markets (e. g., Garg et al. 1996; and Mishra and Narender, 1996) until now but both the 
studies tested only Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted dividend behaviour model. However, 
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both of these studies agree that Lintner's model fit I Indian market. In contrast, the in the I 
empirical phase of this thesis tested all the partial adjusted dividend behaviour models 
(from Lintner, 1956 to Fama and Babiak, 1968). The empirical part of this study supports 
Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted dividend behaviour model but identifies Brittain's (1966) 
partial adjusted dividend behaviour model as the best-fit model in an emerging market. 
Therefore, these consistencies suggest the similarity of the empirical findings and divIdend 
behaviours in the emerging markets. 
11.2.3. Empirical Phase Three: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of Di'vidends 
in an Emerging Market 
11.2.3.1. Developed Markets Studies vs. This Study 
A number of studies conducted in the developed markets on the security price 
reaction to the announcement of dividends. Even though the researchers used event study 
methodology but each and every researcher adapted separate data analysis techniques. 
However, the previous studies conducted on security price reaction to the announcement 
of dividends in the developed markets (e. g., Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and 
Mullins, 1983; Woolridge, 1983; Fehrs et al. 1988; Woolridge and Ghosh, 1988; Eddy and 
Seifert, 1992; Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Michaely et al. 1995; Abeyratna et al. 1996; 
and Impson, 1997) suggest that security price increases for increasing dividends and 
security prices falls for dividend cuts, i. e., announcement of dividend convey some 
information to the market. On the other hand, the empirical results of this study suggest 
that security prices decrease after the announcement of dividends in the emerging markets. 
This behaviour of stock returns are irrespective of the nature of announcements (i. e., good 
news, bad news, and no news). However, it is observed a negative relationship between 
the returns of observation and comparison period in all the cases. In addition, t-statistics 
are not highly significant either of the case, which indicate the ineffectiveness of dividend 
announcements to influence the security prices in the emerging markets. Therefore, the 
empirical phase of this study does not support that security price increases for increasing 
dividends and security price falls for dividend cuts. And these results obviously indicate a 
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great inconsistency between these two markets. However, the empirical findings of this 
study reject dividend signalling and information content hypothesis of N1,11er and 
Modigliani (196 1) in the emerging markets, which is the complete opposite findings of tile 
developed markets. 
11.2.3.2. Emerging Market Studies vs. This Study 
There is no study found on the security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends in the emerging markets yet. So, there is no chance to compare the empirical 
findings of this study with the empirical findings of the emerging markets. Therefore, it is 
worthy to note that this study could be used as the benchmark for the further studies on the 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in the emerging markets. The 
empirical results on the security price reaction to the announcement of dividends M the 
emerging markets suggest that dividends do not convey any information to the market 
because informed traders trade in the market, so , information used to be adjusted with the 
share prices before announcement. Therefore, announcement of dividends do not carry any 
new information to the market and that's why announcement of dividends do not help to 
make any abnormal returns. 
11.3. Contribution to the Corporate Finance Theories and to the Existing Research 
11.3.1. Empirical Phase One: Determinants of Dividend Policy in an Emerging Market 
11.3.1.1. Agreement with the Previous Studies: 
The empirical phase one (i. e., determinants of dividend policy in an emerging 
market) is basically the identification of the determinants of dividend policy based on 
dividend theories. The empirical investigation on determinants of dividend policy mostly 
agrees with previous empirical findings in the developed niarkets except dividend 
signalling theory. The empirical results strongly support agency cost and transaction cost 
theory and narrowly support tax clientele theory, residual and pecking order theory of 
dividend. These results are consistent with the previous empirical studies. 
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11.3.1.2. Disagreement with the Previous Studies: 
Despite the empirical findings agree with the previous empirical studies and 
support the dividend theories, this study strongly disagrees with the signalling theory of 
dividend. The empirical results indicate that dividends do neither signal about future 
profitability of the company nor convey any information to the capital market. Howevcr, 
the empirical results also reject the information content hypothesis of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). Moreover, the empirical study disagrees with the empirical findings of 
Gerg et al. (1996). Although, this is quite unexpected that the empirical findings of this 
study are opposite to Gerg et al. 'S (1996) empirical investigation but there is a very good 
reason behind it. Gerg et al. (1996) worked on 44 Indian Textile Industries, therefore, 
considering only Textile sector and a very small sample could be the main reason for the 
opposite findings. 
11.3.1.3. Contribution to the Finance Theory and to the Existing Research: 
Regarding the contribution of this research to the finance theory and to the existing 
research, there are two major contributions of this research. Firstly, this research strongly 
support agency cost theory and transaction cost theory but narrowly support tax clientele 
theory, residual, and pecking order theory of dividend. However, the empirical results also 
strongly reject dividend signalling theory. Secondly, this research identifies leverage, size, 
insider ownership, and collateralizable assets as the major determinants of dividend policy 
in an emerging market. 
11.3.2. Empirical Phase Two: Dividend Policy and Behaviour in an Emerging Market 
11.3.2.1. Agreement with the Previous Studies: 
This phase of the thesis tested the partial adjusted dividend behaviour models to 
identify the best-fit dividend behaviour model in an emerging market. The empirical results 
identified Brittain's (1966) partial adjustment dividend behaviour model as the best-fit 
dividend behaviour model in an emerging market. While, Doran and Grifths (1978), 
Djarraya (1980), Djarraya and Lee (1981), and Lee et al. (1987) identified some problems 
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of partial adjustment model, Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted dividend behaviour model is 
mostly accepted partial adjusted dividend behaviour model until now in the developed 
markets and as well as in the emerging markets. Although, the empirical results of this 
study identified Brittain's (1966) partial adjusted model as the best-fit model, the empirical 
results also document strong support of Lintner's (1956) partial adjusted dividend 
behaviour model. Therefore, these results indicate the consistency of this study with the 
previous empirical studies both in the developed and emerging markets. 
11.3.2.2. Contribution to the Finance Theory and to the Existing Research: 
This research contributes to the finance theory and as well as to the existing 
researc in two aspects. Firstly, the empirical investigation identifies Brittain's (1966) 
partial adjusted dividend behaviour model as the best-fit model in an emerging market. 
This study supports and agrees with the previous studies (e. g., Fama and Babiak; 1968; 
Garg et al. 1996; and Mishra and Narender, 1996) on partial adjusted dividend behaviour 
models. Secondly, the empirical investigation also identifies that dividend decision is 
primarily governed by cash flow as the capability of paying dividends and lagged 
dividends. However, the empirical results also strongly support Lintner's (1956) partial 
adjusted dividend behaviour model that dividend decision is primarily governed by the net 
current earnings after tax and dividends paid in the previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. 
11.3.3. Empirical Phase Three: Security Price Reaction to the Announcement of Dividends 
in an Emerging Market 
11.3.3.1. Disagreement with the Previous Empirical Studies: 
This phase of the thesis tested the security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends in an emerging market and this research especially took only the cash dividend 
announcements into account. The empirical results suggest no significant impact of 
dividend announcements on the security prices in an emerging market. The empirical 
studies are quite inconsistent with the previous empirical studies (e. g., Aharony and Swary, 
1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Woolridge, 1983; Fehrs et al. 1988; Woolridge and 
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Ghosh, 1988; Eddy and Seifert, 1992; Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Michaely et al. 1995; 
Abeyratna et al. 1996; and Impson, 1997) that dividend announcement conNey some 
information to the market. While these empirical findings are seem to be unacceptable but 
there is a strong logic behind this, i. e., as insiders trade in the market, so, the information 
used to be adjusted with the share prices before announcement, therefore, announcement of 
dividends do not carry any new information to the market. As dividend does not convey 
any signal to the market or dividend does not contain any information, so, that is a very 
good reason not to have abnormal returns for the announcement of dividends. Apart from 
these, as we have mentioned earlier that companies announce dividends but they often 
make delay in paying dividends to shareholders, after the book closure sometimes the 
companies take long time to transfer the ownership, etc. For these and many other reasons, 
the shareholders are always sceptical about the activities of the management and they do 
not trust management with full confidence. 
11.3.3.2. Contribution to the Finance Theory and to the Existing Research: 
In spite of the disagreement of the current research with the previous studies, this 
research contributes to the finance theory and as well as to the existing research in several 
aspects. Firstly, the empirical results indicate a negative relationship between the 
abnormal returns of observation period and comparison period, i. e., stock price falls after 
the announcement of dividends. These results indicate unexpected behaviour of security 
prices to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. These results, however, 
indicate that security price falls irrespective of the announcements (i. e., good news, bad 
news, and no news) in an emerging market. Secondly, dividend announcement does not 
carry any positive information in the emerging markets. However, this behaviour of the 
market also proves through rejection of dividend signalling theory of dividend in empirical 
phase one. Therefore, it is an established contribution that dividend does not signal and 
carry any information to the market in an emerging economy. Thirdly, the empirical 
results also find no significant impact of dividend announcements to the security prices in 
an emerging market. Actually, this is the effect of rejection of signalling theory and 
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information content hypothesis in the emerging markets. Fourthly, the empirical results 
also suggest that emerging markets are inefficients. Finally, the empirical investigations of 
this thesis have uncovered institutional aspects of the emerging markets and behavioural 
aspects of the market participants, which was not identified by the previous emerging 
market researchers. 
11.4. Implications of the Research: 
As the DSE is a newly established emerging market, the regulatory system and the 
trading mechanism are not operating smoothly in comparison to the well equiped 
developed markets. However, as we hardly find empirical studies conducted on emerging 
markets, this study has many implications for the participants and regulators. First4i% the 
researchers could use this study as a benchmark for further research. Secondly, this study 
will obviously be used as a source of reference for further research and the researchers will 
get proper guideline from this study. Thirdly, this study will help all the interested parties 
of the market such as investors, policy making and regulatory bodies, and portfolio 
analysts of the emerging markets by providing some directions. Fourthly, as the 
ineffectiveness of the regulatory bodies and lower levels of law enforcement are the major 
causes of distortions in the emerging markets, so, this study will help the regulatory bodies 
to notice their weaknesses and will help them to take corrective measures. Hence, it is an 
important issue to concentrate on the legal aspects of the emerging markets regarding 
information disclosure requirements, protection of outside investors' interests. This study 
will also provide the source of reference to the law enforcing agencies for taking proper 
actions at the targeted points to prevent the irregularities from the market. Fifthly, as 
already mentioned, the Dhaka Stock Exchange listed companies are the insiders controlled 
closely held firms, so, the outsiders are really unprotected and consequently insiders are 
doing most of the worst things including profit stealing, profit channelling and effectively 
companies are bearing higher levels of debt burden. Therefore, this study will provide 
some alarming information to the outsiders so that they would be careful about the insiders 
in the emerging markets. However, this study will also help the regulatory bodies to take 
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necessary steps for outsiders protection. Sixthly, as already mentioned earlier that because 
of insider trading, the information becomes ineffective in the market. However, it has also 
mentioned earlier that insiders, brokers, and exchange employers play in the market as the 
speculators and consequently that makes the uninformed investors losers and effectively 
uninformed investors lose confidence about the market as a whole, which is ultimately 
affecting the economies in the emerging markets. Therefore, this study will help the law 
enforcing agencies to take proper care of the market and the economy effectively. 
Seventhly, the listed companies show carelessness about the interest of shareholders and 
indeed because of this they are engaged with different unexpected activities, e. g., not 
timely holding AGM, irregularity of declaring dividends, delay to issue dividend warrants 
and refund warrants, etc. Therefore, this study will give some guidelines to the regulatory 
bodies about the activities of different associated bodies of the emerging markets so that 
they could be able to take proper action against the wrong doings. Finally, this research 
will explore the avenues of further research on dividend policy of an emerging market. It 
is also believable that this study will help the policy-making bodies, regulatory bodies, and 
law enforcing agencies to take proper actions and steps to save the interest of all the 
associated parties in the emerging markets and consequently that will guide the market 
towards the maturity. 
11.5. Limitations of the Study: 
The major limitation of the study is the exclusion of financial sector. Consideration 
of only ten year period and specially not incorporation of the period of 1976-87 and use of 
only secondary data are the most remarkable limitations. Besides these, parallel study on 
the different emerging markets for the strengthen empirical investigation. Among others, 
conduct empirical investigation only on partial adjustment behaviour models, consider 
only cash dividend announcements and exclusion of joint and contemporaneous 
announcements are remarkable limitations. 
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However, as already mentioned earlier that the ineffectiveness of the regulatorý- 
bodies and lower levels of law enforcement are the major causes of distortions in the 
emerging markets, so, it is an important issue to concentrate on the legal aspects of the 
emerging markets, which this research does not consider. 
While the institutional aspects and behavioural aspects of the emerging markets 
emerged as the important issues through this research, on which this thesis does not give 
adequate emphasis. 
Finally, this study basically concentrates on certain econometrics techniques to 
analyse the secondary data rather than using altenative econometrics techaniques at the 
same time. 
11.6. Suggestions for Further Research: 
It is suggested to conduct further research on dividend policy by incorporating the 
financial sector and considering 1976-87 period. It is also suggested to conduct further 
research on primary data, which will provide management and investors views about the 
dividend policy and behaviour, and security price reaction to the announcement of 
dividends in an emerging market. It is also suggested to conduct further studies on the 
different emerging market, which will strengthen the empirical findings of this study. It is 
also suggested to conduct further research by taking other dividend behaviour models, e. g., 
adaptive exception models, and integrated models into consideration. It is suggested to 
conduct further research on the announcement effect in an emerging market by considering 
other announcements like earnings announcement, stock dividend, rights offering, stock 
split, etc. However, it is also suggested to conduct further research on the security price 
reaction to the contemporaneous and joint announcements. 
Besides, it is suggested to conduct further studies on the legal aspects of the 
emerging markets, which will help to identify the levels of law enforcement in the 
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emerging markets. However, further study on the legal aspects of emerging markets NN'ould 
appropriately be able to recommend the law enforcing agencies and the regulatory bodies 
to enforce the specific laws, which would be able to save the market from the current 
irregularities. 
In addition, it is suggested to conduct further research in giving adequate emphasis 
on the institutional and behavioural aspects of the emerging markets alongside the aspects 
have been considered in this thesis, which will particularly be able to identify the influence 
of these aspects on the dividend policy and behaviour, and security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividends in the emerging markets. However, further study will also be 
able to identify whether institutional and psychological aspects are the major cause of the 
difference between developed and emerging markets. 
Finally, it is suggested to use appropriate econometrics in the further research. It is 
also suggested to use alternative regression analysis techniques (e. g., system equation, 
optimum/equilibrium equation) and other data analysis techniques (e. g., factor analysis, 
discriminant analysis, and rank correlation, etc. ). It is also suggested to use alternative data 
analysis techniques in the event study (e. g., cumulative effect of the abnormal returns, buy- 
and-hold strategy, comparison period return approach, regression analysis, and mean 
adjusted return method, etc. ). 
11.7. Conclusion: 
The first section of this thesis was organised to state the general outline of the whole 
study. The first part of this section explains the overall position of Bangladeshi capital 
markets as the members of the emerging markets including the comparison of Bangladeshi 
markets with the world emerging markets and the emerging markets in Asia. However, the 
second part of this section provides an extensive description of the Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Moreover, third part of this section describes the general research methodology of the 
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thesis including the justification of choosing quantitative research method and data 
analysis techniques. 
The second section of this thesis was organised to provide the detail description of 
the empirical phase one (i. e., determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market). The 
first part of this section reviews the major dividend theories including the review of 
previous empirical studies for and against the dividend theories. And the second part 
provides the detailed explanation of the empirical results of the detenninants of dividend 
policy of the companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. This phase of the empirical 
study was conducted on the dividend theories to identify the determinants of dividend 
policy in an emerging market. The empirical study strongly supports agency cost and 
transaction cost theory but narrowly supports tax clientele, residual, and pecking order 
theory. However, the empirical result also strongly rejects dividend signalling theory. 
Finally, the empirical investigation also identifies leverage, size, insider ownership, and 
collateralizable assets as the major determinants of dividend policy in an emerging market. 
The third section of the thesis was framed to state the description of the empirical 
phase two (i. e., dividend policy and behaviour in an emerging market). The first part 
provides an extensive literature review on the major studies of dividend policy and 
behaviour. And the second part provides the detailed explanation of the empirical results 
on the partial adjustment dividend behaviour models. This phase of the empirical study 
conducted an empincal investigation on the partial adjustment dividend behaviour models 
to identify the best-fit partial adjusted dividend behaviour model. The empirical results 
identify Brittain's (1966) partial adjustment dividend behaviour model as the best-fit 
dividend behaviour model in an emerging market. The empirical results conclude that 
dividend decision is primarily governed by cash flow as the capabilities of paying 
dividends and dividends paid in the previous years, i. e., lagged dividends. 
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The fourth section of this thesis was fon-nulated for the empirical phase three (i. e.. 
security price reactions to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market). The first 
part of this section provides an extensive literature review on the security price reaction to 
the announcement of dividends. And the second part explains the empirical results of the 
security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emerging market. This 
phase conducted an event study methodology to identify the security price reaction to the 
announcement of dividend in an emerging market. The empirical study document that 
stock price falls after the announcement of dividends. However, the interesting thing is that 
the stock prices behave the same way irrespective of the announcements (i. e., good news, 
bad news, and no news). The empirical evidences clearly indicate that dividend 
announcements do not convey any information to the market. The empirical evidences also 
provide the support of the rejection of dividend signalling in the emerging markets, which 
is the same as empirical phase one. Finally, empirical results indicate that emerging 
markets are inefficient because security prices do not react to the announcement of 
dividends in these markets. 
Even though many limitations, this study will open up new horizons in the area of 
capital market research in the emerging markets. However, it is believable that this 
research would be the pioneering study on this area in the emerging markets. Furthermore, 
obviously this is the starting point of the capital market research in the emerging markets 





Abeyratna, G., A. A. Lonie, D. M. Power, and C. D. Sinclair (1996), "The Influence of 
Company Financial Performance on the Interpretation of Dividend and 
Earnings Signals: A Study of Accounting and Market Based Data ", British 
Accounting Review 28, pp. 229-247. 
Agtmael, A. W. (1984), "Emerging Security markets", EuroMoney Publications, 
London. 
Aharony, J. and 1. Swary (1980), "Quarterly Dividend and Earning Announcements 
and Stockholders' Returns: An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Fitiance 35, 
pp. 1- 12. 
Aharony, J., H. Falk, and 1. Swary (1988), "Infonnation Content of Dividend 
Increases: The Case of Regulated Utilities", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 15, pp. 401-414. 
Ahmed, F., H. R. Khan, and S. Islam (1993), "Industrial Financing Through Capital 
Market in Bangladesh: A Case Study on the Demand Side ", The Asia 
Foundation (Dhaka) and the Bureau of Economic Research (the University of 
Dhaka), Bangladesh. 
Akhigbe, A., and J. Madura (1996), "Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance", 
Journal ofBusiness Finance and Accounting 23, pp. 1267-1287. 
Allij K. L., A. Q. Khan, and G. G. Ramirez (1993), "Determinants of Corporate 
Dividend Policy: A Factorial Analysis", The Financial Review 28, pp. 523- 
547. 
Ang, J. S. (1975), "Dividend Policy: Informational Content or Partial Adjustment? ", 
Revicit, of Economics and Statistics 5 7, pp. 65-70. 
Annual Reports, (1976 -1998), "The Dhaka Stock Exchange: Dhaka, Bangladesh- 
252 References 
Annual Reports, (1995-1998), "The Chittagong Stock Exchange: Chittagong, 
Bangladesh". 
AsiaMoney, (1997), "Leading Magazine for Reports on Im, cstment and Business 
Situations, Trends and News in Asia", August, Website: 
http: //www. asiamoney. com 
Asquith, P. and D. Mullins (1983), "The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payment on 
Stockholders' Wealth", Journal of Business 56, pp. 77-96. 
Atkinson, T. R. (1956), "The Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership Wisconsin 
Individuals, 1949", Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Bajaj M., and A. M. Vijh (1995), "Trading Behavior and the Unbiasedness of the 
Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements", Journal of Finance 50, pp. 
255-279. 
Barclay, M. J., and R. H. Litzenberger (1988), "Announcement Effects of New Equity 
Issues and the use of Intraday Price Data", Journal of Financial Economics 2 1, 
pp. 71-99. 
Bartholdy, J., and R. Allan (1994), "Thin Trading and the Estimation of Betas: The 
Efficiency of Alternative Techniques", The Journal of Financial Research 17, 
pp. 241-254. 
Bar-Yosef, S., and L. Huffinan (1986), "The Infonnation Content of Dividends: A 
Signalling Approach", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anali-sis 21, pp. 
47-58. 
Bar-yosef, S., and 0. H. Sarig (1992), " Dividend Surprises Inferred from Option and 
Stock Prices", Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1623-1640. 
253 References 
Benesh, G. A.; A. J. Keown; and J. M. Pinkerton (1984), "Examination of Market 
Reaction to Substantial Shifts in Dividend Policy", Jourtial of Fitiaiwial 
Research 7, pp. 131-142. 
Benishay, H. (1961), "Variability in Earnings-Price Ratio", Americatz Ecoizomic 
Review 5 1, pp. 81-94. 
Berle, A. A., G. C. Means (1932), "The Modern Corporation and Private Propero"', 
New York: Macmillan. 
Bernard, V. L., and J. K. Thomas (1989), "Post-earnings Announcement Drift: 
Delayed Price Response or Risk Premium ? ", Journal of Accounting Research 
27, pp. 1-36. 
Bernard, V. L., and J. K. Thomas (1990), "Evidence that Stock Prices do not Fully 
Reflect the Implications of Current Earnings for Future Earnings", Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 13, pp. 305-340. 
Bhattacharya, S. (1979), "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the Bird-in-the- 
hand Fallacy", Bell Journal ofEconomics 10, pp. 259-270. 
Black, F. (1976)) "The Dividend Puzzle", Journal of Poq/blio Management 2, pp. 5-8. 
Black, F. and M. S. Scholes, (1973), "The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities", Journal ofPolitical Economy 8 1, pp. 637-659. 
Black, F. and M. S. Scholes, (1974), "The Effect of Dividend Yield and Dividend 
Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns", Journal of Financial 
Economics 1, pp. 1-22. 
Blume, M., J. Crockett, and I. Friend (1974), "Stock Ownership in the United States: 
Characteristics and Trends", Sun, ey of Current Busitiess, pp. 16-40. 
254 References 
Blume, M. (1980), "Stock Returns and Dividend Yields: Some More Evidence", 
Review ofEconomics and Statistics 52, pp. 567-577. 
Blumer, M. (1984), "Sociological Research Methods: An Introduction ", Basing Stoke: 
McMillan. 
Booth, L. D., and D. J. Johnston (1984), "The Ex-dividend Day Behavior of Canadian 
Stock Prices: Tax Changes and Clientele Effects", Journal of Finance 39, pp. 
457-476. 
Born, J. A. (1988), 'Insider Ownership and Signals: Evidence from Dividend Initiation 
Announcement Effect", Financial Management 17, pp. 38-45. 
Boyd, J., and R. Jagannathan (1992), "Ex-dividend Price Behavior of Common 
Stocks", Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank ofMinneapolis. 
Brennan, M. (1970), "Taxes, Market Valuation, and Corporate Financial Policy", 
National Tax Journal 23, pp. 417-427. 
Brennan, M., and A. Thakor (1990), "Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy", 
Journal ofFinance 45, pp. 993-1018. 
Brickley, J. A. (1983), "Shareholder Wealth, Inforniation Signalling and the Specially 
Designated Dividend: An Empirical Study", Journal of Financial Economics 
12, pp. 187-209. 
Brittain, J. A. (1964), "The Tax Structure and Corporate Dividend Policy", American 
Economic Review 54, pp. 272-287. 
Brittain, J. A. (1966), "Corporate Dividend Policy", Washington, D. C.,: The Brooking 
Institution. 
Brown, S., and J. Warner (1980), "Measuring Security Price Perfonnance ", Journal of 
Financial Economics 8, pp. 205-258. 
255 References 
Brown, S., and J. Warner (1985), "Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event 
Studies", Journal ofFinancial Economics 13, pp. 3-3 1. 
Bryman, A. (1988), "Quantity and Quality in Social Science Research ", 
Contemporary Social Research: 18, Series Editor: Martin Bulmer, Routledge: 
London and New York. 
Bryman, A., and D. Cramer (1997), "Quantitative Data Analysisfor Social Scientists ", 
London: Routledge. 
I Budget Speech (1998-99), "Budget Speech of the Finance Minister ofBangladesh' . 
Burrell, G. and G. Morgan (1979), "Sociological Paradigms and Organizational 
Analysis ", Heinemann: London. 
Campbell, J. A., and W. Beranek (1955), "Stock Price Behavior on Ex-dividend 
Dates", Journal ofFinance 4, pp. 425-429. 
Chaplinsky, S., and H. N. Seyhun (1990), "Dividend and Taxes: Evidence on Tax 
Reduction Strategies", Journal ofBusiness 63, pp. 239-260. 
Charest, G. (1978), "Dividend Infonnation, Stock Returns, and Market Efficiency", 
Journal ofFinancial Economics 6, pp. 297-330. 
Choe, H., R. W. Masulis (1991), "Measuring the Impacts of Dividend Capture 
Trading: A Market Microstructure Analysis", Working Paper 91-13, Vanderbilt 
University. 
Chowdhury, G. and D. K. Miles (1987), "An Empirical Model of Companies' Debt 
and Dividend Decisions: Evidence from Company Accounts Data ", Bank of 
England Discussion Paper, No. 28. 
256 References 
Christie, A., and V. Nanda (1994), "Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value and the 
Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and 1937", Journal of Finance 49, pp. 1727- 
1754. 
Classens, S., S. Dusgupta, and J. Glen (1996), "The Cross-section of Stock Returns: 
Evidence from the Emerging Markets", Working Paper, IFC 
Creswell, J. W. (1994), "Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks. 
Crutchley, C., and R. Hansen (1989), "A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial 
Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends", Financial 
Management 18, pp. 36-46. 
Daily Price Quotations (1976-1998), "The Dhaka Stock Exchange", Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
Daily Price Quotations (1995-1998), "The Chittagong Stock Exchange", Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
Dale, A., S. Arber, and M. Proctor (1988), "Doing Secondary Analysis", Allen & 
Unwin: London. 
Dann, L. (1981), "Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to 
Bondholders and Stockholders", Journal of Financial Economics 9, pp. 113- 
138. 
Darling, P. G. (1955)ý "A Surrogative Measure of Business Confidence and Its 
Relation to Stock Prices", Journal ofFinance 10, pp. 442-45 8. 
Darling, P. G., 1957, "The Influence of Expectations and Liquidity on Dividend 
Policy", Journal ofPolitical Economy 65, pp. 209-224. 
257 References 
DeAngelo, H. (1991), "Payout Policy and Tax Deferral", Joumal of Fitiatice 46, 
pp. 357-368. 
DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo (1990), "Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An 
Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Finns", Journal of Finance 45, pp. 
1415-1431. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner (1996), "Reversal of Fortune Dividend 
Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth", Jourtial of 
Financial Economics 40, pp. 341-3 7 1. 
DeAnglo, H., and R. Masulis (1980), "Leverage and Dividend Irrelevancy Under 
Corporate and Personal Taxation", Journal of Finance 35, pp. 453-464. 
DeBondt W. F. M. and R. H. Thaler, (1985), "Does the Stock Market Overreact? ", 
Journal ofFinance 40, pp. 793-805. 
DeBondt, W. F. M. and R. H. Thaler (1987), "Further Evidence on Investors 
Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality" , Journal of Finance 42, pp. 557- 
580. 
Denis, D. J. (1990), "Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share 
Repurchases and Special Dividends", Journal of Finance 45, pp. 1433-1456. 
Denis, D. J., D. K. Denis, and A. Sarin (1994), "The Infonnation Content of Dividend 
Changes: Cash Flow Signalling, Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles", 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29, pp. 567-587. 
Dhillon, U., and H. Johnson (1994), "The Effect of Dividend Changes on Stock and 
Bond Prices", Journal offinance 49, pp. 281-289. 
Dhryn-ies, P. J., and M. Kurz (1964), "On the Dividend Policy of Electric Utilities", 
Review ofEconomics and Statistics 4 1, pp. 76-8 1. 
258 References 
Dhrymes, P. J., and M. Kurz (1967), "Investment, Dividend and External Finance 
Behavior of Finns", National Bureau Committee for Economic Research" in 
Determinants ofInvestment Behavior: A Conference, edited by Robert Ferber. 
Dielman, T. E. and H. R. Oppenheimer (1984), "An Examination of Investor Behavior 
During Periods of Large Dividend Changes", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 19, pp. 197-216. 
Dimson, E., (1979), "Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent 
Trading", Journal ofFinancial Economics 7, pp. 197-226. 
Divecha, A. and D. Morse (1983), "Market Responses to Dividend Increases and 
Changes in Payout Ratios", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18, 
pp. 163-73. 
Djarraya, M. (1980), "Behavioral Models of Dividend Policy and ImplicatIons to 
Financial Management", Ph. D. Dissertation, The University of Illinois at 
Urbana- Champaign. 
Djarraya, M., and C. F. Lee (1981), "Residual Theory, Partial Adjustment, and 
information Content of dividend-payment Decision: An Integration and 
Extension", Working Paper, The University ofIllinois at Urbana- Champaign. 
Dobrovolsky, S. P. (1951), "Corporate Income Retention", National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc., New York. 
Dobrovolsky, S. P. (1958), "Economics of Corporate Internal and External Financing", 
Journal of Finance 13, pp. 35 -47. 
Donaldson, G. (1961), "Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy, 
and Detennination of Corporate Debt Policy", Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate school of Business Administration, Harvard Universitv. 
259 References 
Doran, H. E., and W. E. Griffith (1978), "Inconsistency of the OLS Estimator of the 
Partial Adjustment: Adaptive Expectations Model", Jourtial of Ecoiionietrics 7, 
pp. 133-146. 
Drake, P. J. (1980), Money, Finance and Development, Martin Robertson, Oxford. 
Eades, K. (1982), "Empirical Evidence on Dividends as a Signal of Firm Value", 
Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis 17, pp. 471-500. 
Eades, K. M., P. J. Hess, and E. H. Kim (1984), "On Interpreting Security Returns 
During the Ex-dividend Period", Journal of Financial Economics 12, pp. 3-34. 
Eades, K. M., P. J. Hess, and E. H. Kim (1985), "Market Rationality and Dividend 
Announcements", Journal ofFinancial Economics 13, pp. 581-604. 
Eades, K. M. ) P. J. Hess, and E. H. Kim (1994), "Time -Series Variation in Dividend 
Pricing", Journal ofFinance 49, pp. 1617-163 8. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), "Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends", Americati 
Economic Review 74, pp. 650-59. 
Easterby-Smith, M., R. Thorpe, and A. Lowe (1991), "Management Research: An 
Introduction ", SAGE Publications: London. 
Easton, S. (199 1), "Earnings and Dividends: Is There an Interaction Effect ? ", Journal 
ofBusiness Finance and Accounting 18, pp. 255-266. 
Eddy, A. and B. Seifert (1988), "Finn Size and Dividend Announcements ", Journal of 
Financial Research 11, pp. 295-302. 
Eddy, A. and B. Seifert (1992), "Stock Price Reactions to Dividend and Earnings an 
Announcements: Contemporaneous -versus Noncontemporaneous 
Announcements", Journal of Financial Research 15, pp. 207-217. 
260 References 
Elton, E., and M. Gruber (1970), "Marginal Tax Rates and the Clientele", Review of 
Economics and Statistics 52, pp. 68-74. 
Emerging Market Factbook, (1995-1998), "International Finance Corporation. - USA ". 
Emory, C. W. (1980), "Business Research Methods", Richard D. Invin. Inc., USA. 
Farna, E. (1970), "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work", Journal ofFinance 25, pp. 383-420. 
Fama, E. (1974), "The Empirical Relationships Between the Dividend and Investment 
Decisions of Firms", American Economic Review 64, pp. 304-318. 
Fama, E. (1991), "Efficient Capital Markets: 11", Journal of Finance 46, pp. 1575- 
1617. 
Fama, E., L. Fisher, M. Jensen, and R. Roll (1969), "The Adjustment of Stock Prices 
to New Inforrnation", International Economic Review 10, pp. 1-2 1. 
Fama, E. F., and H. Babiak (1968), "Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis ", 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 63, pp. 113 2-116 1. 
Fama, E., and G. W. Schwert (1977), "Asset Returns and Inflation", Journal of 
Financial Economics 5, pp. 115-146. 
Farrar, D., and L. Selwyn (1967), "Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and Return to 
Investors", National Tax Journal 20, pp. 444-454. 
Feenberg, D. (1981), "Does the Investment Limitation Explain the Existence of 
Dividends", Journal offinancial Economics 9, pp. 265-269. 
Felus, D. H., G. A. Benesh and R. Peterson (1988), "Evidence of a Relation Between 
Stock Price Reactions Around cash Dividend Changes and Yields", Journal of 
Financial Research 11, pp. 111-23. 
261 
Finance Minister's Budget Speech (1998-99): Bangladesh. 
Rcicroices 
Freund, R. J., and W. J. Wilson (1998), Regression Analysis: Statistical Afodelling of 
Response Variable, London: Academic Press. 
Friedman, M. (1957)) "A Theory of the Consumption Function", Princeton. 
Friend, 1. (1986), "Some Comments on Dividend Policy", Presented at Southern 
Methodist University Conference, May. 
Garg, M. C., and H. L. Verma, and S. Gulati (1996), "Determinants of Dividend 
Policy in Developing Countries -A Study on Indian Textile Industry", 
Finance India 10, pp. 967-986. 
Gerber, G. (1988), "An Investigation of the Determinants of Dividend Policy and 
the Effects of Dividends on Stock Returns", PhD Dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania, ProQuest Digital Dissertation, Publication No. AAT8816173. 
Ghauri, P., K. Grýnhang, and 1. Kristianslu (1995), "Research Methods in Business 
Studies -A Practical Guide ", Printcehall: London. 
Ghosh, C. and J. R. Woolridge (1988), "An Analysis of Shareholder Reaction to 
Dividend Cuts and Omissions", Journal offinancial Research 11, pp. 281-94. 
Ghosh, C. and J. R. Woolridge (1991), "Dividend Omissions and Stock Market 
Rationality", Journal ofBusiness Finance and Accounting 18, pp. 315-330. 
Gill, J. and P. Johnson (1997), "Research Methods for Managers", Paul Chapman: 
London (Second Edition). 
262 References 
Gillespie, T. H., 11. (1971), "The Determinants of Dividend Policy: A Discriminant 
Analysis Approach", PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, ProQuest Digital 
Dissertation. 
Glen, J. D., Y. Kannokolias, R. P. Miller, and S. Shah (1995), "Dividend Policy and 
Dividend Behavior in Emerging Markets- To Pay or Not to Pay", International 
Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper 26. 
Gonedes, N. (1978), "Corporate Signalling, External Accounting and Capital Market 
Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends Income and Extraordinary Items", 
Journal of Accounting Research 16, pp. 26-79. 
Gordon, M. J. (1959), "Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices", Review of 
Economics and Statistics 41, pp. 99-105. 
Gordon, M. J. (1962), "The Savings, Investment and Valuation of the Corporation", 
Review of Economics and Statistics 45, pp. 37-5 1. 
Gordon, M. J. (1963), "Optimum Investment and Financing Policy", Journal of 
Finance 18, pp. 264-272. 
Gordon, M. J., and E. Shapiro (1956), "Capital Equipment Analysis: The Required 
Rate of Profit", Management Science 3, pp. 102-110. 
Gordon, R. H., and D. F. Bradford (1980), "Taxation and Stock Market Valuation of 
Capital Gains and Dividends: Theory and Empirical Results", Journal of 
Public Economics 14, pp. 109-136. 
Graham, B., and D. L. Dodd (1934), "Security Analysis", New York: McGraw Hill 
Company (I" Eds. ). 
Graham, B., and D. L. Dodd (195 1), "Securitv Analysis", New York: McGraw Hill 
Company (3 rd Eds. ). 
263 References 
Grammatikos, T. (1989), "Dividend Stripping, Risk Exposure, and the Effect of the 
1984 Tax Reform Act on the Ex-dividend Day Behavior" , Jounzal of 
Business 62, pp. 157-174. 
Griffin, P. A. (1976), "Competitive Information in the Stock Market: An Empirical 
Study of Earnings, Dividends and Analysts Forecast", Jotimal of Fitzaiwe 3 1, 
pp. 631-650. 
Hair, J. P., R. E. Anderson, R. L. Tatham, and W. C. Black (1995), "Multivariate 
Data Analysis ", Fourth Edition, Engle Wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Printice 
Hall. 
Hakim, C. (1982), "Secondary Analysis in Social Research: A Guide to Data Sources 
and Methods with Examples ". Allen & Unwin: London. 
Hamada, R. S. (1971), "The Effect of the Finn's Capital Structure on the Systematic 
Risks of Common Stocks", Journal offinance 26, pp. 435-452. 
Handjinicolaon, G., and A. Kalay (1984), "Wealth Redistributions or Changes in Finn 
Value: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders Around 
Dividend Announcements", Journal of Financial Economics 13, pp. 35-63. 
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu (1988), "Earnings Infonnation Conveyed by Dividend 
Initiations and Omissions", Journal ofFinancial Economics 2 1, pp. 149-175. 
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (1990), "Effectiveness of Accounting-Based Dividend 
Covenants", Journal ofAccounting and Economics 12, pp. 97-123. 
Hess, P. (1981), "Dividend Yields and Stock Returns: A Test of Tax Effects", 
Working Paper, Ohio State University, USA. 
264 Rclerences 
Higgins, R. (1972), "The Corporate Dividend-Saving Decision", Jounial of 
Financial and Quantitative Methods 7, pp. 1527-1541. 
Higgins, R. (1974), "Growth, Dividend Policy and Capital Costs in the Electric 
Utility Industry ", Journal of Finance 49, pp. 1189-120 1. 
Holder, M. E. 5 F. W. Langrehr, and J. L. Hexter (1998), "Dividend PoIjc%, 
Detenninants: An Investigation of the Influences of Stakeholder Theory", 
Financial Management 2 7, pp. 73-82. 
Howe, K. M., J. He, and G. W. Kao (1992), "One-Time Cash Flow Announcements 
and Free Cash- Flow Theory: Share repurchases and Special Dividends", 
Journal ofFinance 47, pp. 1963-75. 
Huberman, G. (1990), "Dividend Neutrality with Transaction Costs", Journal of 
Business 63, pp. 93-106. 
Impson, M. (1997), "Market Reaction to Dividend Decrease Announcements: Public 
Utilities vs. Unregulated Industrial Finns", The Journal of Financial Research 
20, pp. 407-422. 
Jain, P. C. (1989), "Equity Issues and Changes in Expectations of Earnings by 
Financial Analysis", Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Jayaraman, N. and K. Shastri (1988), "The Valuation of Specially Designed 
Dividends", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, pp. 301-312. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993), " The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems", Journal of Finance 48, pp. 831-880. 
Jensen, G. R., D. P. Solberg, and T. S. Zorn (1992), "Simultaneous Determination of 
Insider Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies", Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 27, pp. 247-263. 
265 References 
Jensen, M. C. (1986), "The Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeover", American Economic Review 76, pp. 323-329. 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the Firrn: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3, 
pp. 305-60. 
Jensen, M. C., and C. W. Smith, Jr. (1985), "Stockholder, Manager and Creditor 
Interests: Applications of Agency Theory", in E. Altman and M. 
Subrahmanyam eds., Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Homewood: 
Richard Irwin, pp. 93 -13 1. 
John, K., and J. Williams (1985), "Dividends, Dilution and Taxes: A Signalling 
Equilibrium", Journal ofFinance 40, pp. 1053-1070. 
John, K., and H. P. Lang (1991), "Insider Trading Around Dividend Announcements: 
Theory and Evidence", Journal ofFinance 46, pp. 1361-1389. 
Joy, 0. (1980), "Introduction to Financial Management", Homewood, Illinois: Irwin. 
Kalay, A. (1979a), "Corporate Dividend Policy: A Collection of Related Essays", 
Ph. D. Dissertation, University ofRochester, Rochester, NY. 
Kalay, A. (1979b), "Towards a Theory of Corporate Dividend Policy", Working 
Paper, New York University, New York. 
Kalay, A. (1979c), "Earnings Uncertainty and the Payout Ratio: Some Empirical 
Evidence", Working Paper, New York University, New York. 
Kalay, A. (1980), "Signalling, Infomiation Content and the Reluctance to Cut 
Dividends", Jounial ofFitiaticial and Quatititatav Atiall, sis 15, pp. 855-869. 
266 References 
Kalay, A. (1982a), "Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints". 
Journal ofFinancial Economics 10, pp. 211-33. 
Kalay, A. (1982b), "The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re- 
examination of the Clientele Effect", Journal of Finance 37, pp. 1059-70. 
Kalay, A., and U. Loewenstein (1985), "Predictable Events and Excess Returns: The 
Case of Dividend Announcements", Jourtial of Finaticial Ecotioniics 14, pp. 
423-450. 
Kaldor, N. (1957), "A Model of Economic Growth", Econondc Journal 67, pp. 591- 
624. 
Kale, J., and T. Noe (1990), "Dividends, Uncertainty and Underwriting Costs under 
Asymmetric Information", The Journal o Financial Research 13, pp. 265-277. ýf 
Kane, A., Lee, Y. K. and Marcus, A. (1984), "Earnings and Dividend Announcements: 
Is There a Corroboration Effect ? ", Journal of Finance 39, pp. 1091-1099. 
Kaplains, C. (1986), "Option, Taxes and Ex-dividend Day Behavior", Jourtial of 
Finance 41, pp. 411-424. 
Karpoff, J. M., and R. A. Walking (1988), "Short Term Trading Around Ex-dividend 
Days", Journal ofFinancial Economics 21, pp. 291-298. 
Karpoff, J. M., and R. A. Walking (1990), Dividend Capture in NASDAQ Stocks", 
Journal ofFinancial Economics 28, pp. 39-65. 
Kim, 0., and R. E. Verrecchia (1991 a), "Trading Volume and Price Reactions to 
Public Announcements", Jouriial ofAccowiting Researcli 29, pp. 302-32 1. 
Kim, 0., and R. E. Verrecchia (1991b), "Market Reaction to Anticipated 
Announcements", Journal of Financial Econoinics 30, pp. 273-309. 
267 References 
Kim, 0., and R. E. Verrecchia (1992), "Market Liquidity and \'olume Around 
Earnings Announcements" Working Paper, University of Califoriiia, Los 
Angles. 
Klein, R., and V. Bawa (1977), "The Effect of Limited Information and Estimation 
Risk on Optimal Portfolio Diversification", Journal of Financial Economics 5, 
pp. 89-111. 
Kolin, M. (1961)ý "A Model of the Relative Price of Corporate Equity: Particular 
Attention to Investor Valuation of Retained Earnings and Dividends using Test 
on Seven Cross-sections, 1951-57", in the Report of St. Louis Meeting 1960, 
Econometrica 29, pp. 442-482. 
Korajczyk, R. A., D. J. Lucas, and R. L. McDonald (1989), "The Effect of Infon-nation 
Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues: Theory and Evidence", 
Working Paper No. 284, University of Chicago. 
Koshi, J. (1990), "Market Segmentation and the Identification of Marginal Traders on 
Ex-dividend Days: A Microstructure Analysis", Working Paper, Stanford 
University. 
Kumar, P. (1988), ShaTeholder-Manager Conflict and the Information Content of 
dividends", Review offinancial Studies (Summer), pp. II 1- 13 6. 
Kwan, C. (1981), "Efficient Market Tests of the Inforination Content of Dividend 
announcements: Critique and Extension", Journal and Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 16, pp. 193-206. 
Lakonishok, J., and T. Vermaelen (1983), "Tax Reform and Ex-dividend Day 
Behavior", Journal of Finance 38, pp. 1157-79. 
Lakonishok, J., and T. Vermaelen (1986), "Tax Induced Trading Around Ex- 
dividend Days", Jounial of Firmcial Economics 16, pp. 287-320. 
268 References 
Lang , L. H. P. and R. H. Litzenberzer (1989), "Dividend Announcements- Cash F]oN,,, 
Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ?" Journal of Finwicial Ecoizomics 
24, pp. 181-91. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (2000), Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial Economics 58, 
pp. 3-27. 
Laub, P. M. (1976), "On the Informational Content of Dividends" Journal of Biisiness 
49, pp. 73-80. 
Lee, B. (1992), "Causal Relationships Among Stock Returns, Interest Rates, Real 
Activity, and Inflation", Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1591-1602. 
Lee, B. (1995), "The Response of Stock Prices to Permanent and Temporary Shocks to 
Dividends", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, pp. 1 -22. 
Lee, C. F., C. Wu, and M. Djarrya (1987), "A Further Empirical Investigation of the 
Dividend Adjustment Process", Journal o Econometrics 35, pp. 267-285. ýf 
Lev, B. (1974), "On the Association between Operating Leverage and Risk", Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9, pp. 627-641. 
Lintner, J. (1956), "Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, 
Retained Eamings, and Taxes", American Economic Review 61, pp. 97-113. 
Lintner, J. (1962), "Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock pnces and the Supply of 
Capital to Corporations", The Review of Economics and Statistics 44, pp. 243- 
269. 
Lintner, J. (1963), "The Detenninants of Corporate Savings", in Savings in the 
Afodern Economy, edited by W. W. Heller (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), pp. 230-55. 
269 References 
Litten-nan, R., and L. Weiss (1985), "Money, Real Interest Rates and Output, A 
Reinterpretation of Post-war US Data"), Econometrica 53, pp. 129-156. 
Litzenberger, R. H., and K. Ramshamy (1979), "The Effect of Personal Taxes and 
Dividends on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence", Jourizal 
offinancial Economics 7, pp. 163-195. 
Litzenberger, R. H. and K. Ramshamy 1980, "Dividends, short Selling restrictions, 
Tax-Induced Investor Clienteles and Market Equilibrium", Jourizal of Finatice 
35, pp. 469-482. 
Lizenberger, R. H., and K. Ramaswarny (1982), "The Effect of Dividend on Common 
Stock Prices-Tax Effects or Infonnation Effects? ", Journal of Finance 37, 
pp. 429-443. 
Loderer, C., J. W. Cooney, and L. D. Van Druner (1991), "The price Elasticity of 
Demand for Common Stock", Journal of Finance 46, pp. 621-65 1. 
Loderer, C. F., and D. C. Mauer (1992). "Corporate Dividends and Seasonal Equity 
Issues: An Empirical Investigation", Journal o Finance 47, pp. 201-225. ýf 
Long, J. (1978), 'The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends: A Case to Consider', 
Journal of Financial Economics 6, pp. 235-264. 
Long, M. S., 1. B. Malitz, and S. E. Sefcik (1994), "An Empirical Examination of 
Dividend Policy Following Debt Issues", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 29, pp. 131-144. 
Lonie, A. A., C. D. Sinclair, and D. M. Power (1992), "Interest Rates and Short- 
tennism", Universiýy of Wales Business and Econonlic Review, December, pp. 
39-46. 
270 References 
Maanen, V. (1983), "Qualitative Methodologies "fi Edited Book: Beverly Hills London: 
SAGE. 
Makhiija, A. K., and H. E. Thompson (1986), "Some Aspects of Equilibrium for 
Cross-section of Firms Signalling Profitability with Dividends: A Note", 
Journal ofFinance 41, pp. 249-253. 
Marquardt, D. (1963), "An Algorithm for Least Square Estimation of Non-linear 
Parameters", Journal of SIAM 2, pp. 431-44 1. 
Marsh, P. (1993), "Dividend Announcements and Stock Price Performance", Paper 
Presented at the Financial Markets Group Conference on Dividend and 
Earnings Forecasting and Valuation, London School of Economics, March 23. 
Masulis, R. W. (1980a), "The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: 
A Study of Exchange Offers", Journal ofFinancial Economics 8, pp. 139-178. 
Masulis, R. W. (1980b), "Stock Repurchases by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the 
Causes of Common Stock Price Changes", Journal ofFinance 35, pp. 305-319. 
Masulis, R. W., and B. Trueman (1988), "Corporate Investment and Dividend 
Decisions under Differential Personal Taxation", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 23, pp 369-385. 
McCabe, G. M. (1979), "The Empirical Relationship between Investment and 
Financing: A New Look", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 14, 
pp. 119-135. 
Mendenhall, W., and T. Sincich (1989), "A Second Course in Business Statistics: 
Regression Analysis ", Third Edition, San Francisco: Dellen Publishing 
Company. 
271 References 
Michaelsen, J. (1961), "Detenninants of Corporate Dividend Policy", PhD 
Dissertation, University of Chicago, ProQuest Digital Dissertation. 
Michaelsen, J. (1965), "Detenninants of Corporate Dividend Policies", Paper 
Presented at I" Annual Meeting of the Western Finance Association, August. 
Michaely, R. (1991), "Ex-dividend Day Stock Price Behavior: The Case of the 1986 
Tax Reform Act", Journal offinance 46, pp. 845-59. 
Michaely, R., R. H. Thaler, and K. L. Womack (1995), "Price Reactions to Dividend 
Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift ? ", Journal of Finance 50, pp. 
573-608. 
Michaely, R.., and J. L. Vila (1995), "Investors Heterogeneity, Prices, and Volume 
Around the Ex-dividend Day", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anaývsis 
30, pp. 171-198. 
Michaely, R.., and J. L. Vila (1996), "Trading Volume with Private Valuation: 
Evidence from the Ex-dividend Day", Review of Financial Studies 9, pp. 471 - 
509. 
Miller, M. (1977), "Debt and Taxes", Journal offinance 32, pp. 261-275. 
Miller, M. H. (1987), "The Infonnation Content of Dividends", in R. Dombusch, S. 
Fisher, and J. Bossons, eds., Macroeconomics and Finance: Essays in Honour 
of Franko Modigliani, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), pp. 37-58. 
Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani (1961), "Dividend Policy Growth and the Valuation 
of Shares", Journal ofBusiness 34, pp. 411-433. 
Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani (1966), "Some Estimates of the Cost of CapItal to the 
Electric Utility Industry, 1954-57", American Economic Review 56, pp. 333- 
91. 
272 References 
Miller, M., and K. Rock (1982), "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Informati on 
Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
Miller, M., and K. Rock (1985), "Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information", 
Journal ofFinance 40, pp. 1031-105 1. 
Miller, M., and M. Scholes (1978), "Dividends and Taxes", Journal of Fiiiaticial 
Economics 6, pp. 333-364. 
Miller, M., and M. Scholes (1981), "Dividends and Taxes: Empirical Evidence", 
CRSP Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
Miller, M., and M. Scholes (1982), "Dividends and Taxes: Some Empirical 
Evidence", Journal of Political Economy 90, pp. 1118-114 1. 
Mishra, C. S., and V. Narender (1996), "Dividend Policy of SOEs in India - An 
Analysis", Finance India 10, pp. 633-45. 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller (1958), "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and 
the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review 48, pp. 261-297. 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller (1959), "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and 
the Theory of Investment: Reply", American Economic Review 49, pp. 655- 
669. 
Mollah, A. S., K. Keasey, and H. Short (2000), "The Influence of Agency Costs on 
Dividend Policy in an Emerging Market - Evidence from the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange", Paper Presented at the Sixth Workshop of European Network of 
Bangladesh Studies, Oslo, May 14-16, Norway, Published at 
http: //www. bath. ac. uk/Centres/CDS/enbs-papers/mollah new. htm 
Monthly Reviews (1976-98), ''The Dhaka Stock Exchange ", Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
273 References 
Monthly Reviews (1995-98), "The Chittagong Stock Exchange ", Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Myers, S. (1977), "Detenninants of Corporate Borrowing", Jourtial of Fincnicial 
Economics 5, pp. 147-175. 
Myers, S. (1984), "The Capital Structure Puzzle", Journal ofFinance 39, pp. 575-592. 
Myers, S., and S. Majluf (1984), "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have", Jounial of 
Financial Economics 12, pp. 187-221. 
Ofer, A., and D. Siegel (1986), "Testing for the Infon-nation Content of Corporate 
Financial Policy using Expectations Data: An Empirical Investigation of 
Specially Dividends", BRC Working Paper, no. 144, North Western University. 
Ofer, A., and D. Siegel (1987), "Corporate Financial Policy, Infon-nation, and Market 
Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of Dividends", Journal of Finance 
42, pp. 889-912. 
Partington, G. H. (1989), "Variables Influencing Dividend Policy in Australia: 
Survey Results", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 16, pp. 165- 
182. 
Penman, S. (1983), "The Predictive Content of Earnings Forecasts and Dividends", 
Journal of Finance 38, pp. 1181-1199. 
Peterson, P. P., D. R. Peterson, and 1. S. Ang (1985), "Direct Evidence on the 
Marginal Rate of Taxation of Dividend Income", Journal of Financial 
Economics 14, pp. 267-282. 
Pettit, R. (1972), "Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital 
Market Efficiency", Jounial of Finance 27, pp. 993-1007. 
274 References 
Pettit, R. (1976), "The Impact of Dividend and Earnings Announcements: 
Reconciliation", Journal of Business 49, pp. 86-96. 
Pogue, T. F., (1968), The Corporate Dividend Decision: A Cross-section Study of tile 
Relationship between Dividend and Investment", Utipublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Yale University. 
Pogue, T. F., (1971), "A Cross-section Study of the Relationship Between Dividends 
and Investment", Yale Economic Essays (Spring-Fall), pp. 181-218. 
Poterba, J. M. (1986), "The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends", Jourtial of 
Financial Economics 15, pp. 395-405. 
Poterba, J. M., and L. H. Summers (1984), "New Evidence That Taxes Affect the 
Valuation of Dividends", Journal o Finance 39, pp. 1397-1415. )f 
Ramsey, J. B. (1969), "Tests of Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least 
Square Regression Analysis", Journal of Royal Statistical Society (Series B) 
31, pp. 350-371. 
Robin, A. (1991), "The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on Ex-dlvldend Day 
Retums", Financial Management 20, pp. 60-70. 
Rosenfeld, A. (1982), Repurchase Offers: Information Adjustment Premium and 
Shareholders' Response", Monographic Series in Economics and Finance, 
University of Rochester. 
Ross, S. A. (1977) "The Detennination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling 
Approach", The Bell Journal of Economics 8, pp. 23-40. 
Rozeff, M. S. (1982), "Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend 
Payout Ratios", Journal of Financial Research 5, pp. 249-259. 
275 Rejerenct's 
Samuelson, P. A. (1965), "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate 
Randomly", Industrial Management Review (Spring), pp. 41-49. 
Saxena, A. K. (1999), "Determinants of Dividend Policy: Regulated Versus 
Unregulated Firms", Paper Presented at the Financial Management 
Association Conference. 
Scholes, M., and J. Williams (1977), "Estimating Betas from Nonsynchronous Data", 
Journal ofFinancial Economics 5, pp. 309-327. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangladesh: www. secbd. org 
Seok, M. and 1. Park (1992), "Report on the Dhaka Stock Exchange", TIle Asia 
Foundation, (January). 
Sharpe, W. F. (1963), "A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis", Managelnent 
Science 9, pp. 277-293. 
Shefrin, H. M., and M. Statman (1984), "Explaining Investor Preference for Cash 
Dividends", Journal of Financial Economics 13, pp. 253-82. 
Short, H. (1996), "Finn Perfon-nance, Ownership, Financial Structure and 
Compensation: The Role of Institutional Shareholders in the Governance of 
UK Corporations", Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Leeds University 
Business School, University of Leeds, UK. 
Smith, C. W., Jr., and J. B. Warner (1979), "On Financial Contracting: An analysis of 
Bond Covenants", Journal offinancial Economics 7, pp. 117-16 1. 
Smith, C. W., Jr., and R. Watts (1992), "The Investment Opportunity Set and 
Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation", Journal of Financial 
Econoinics 20, pp. 263-292. 
27/6 Rejercnces 
Solomon, E., (1963), " The Theory of Financial Managenient ", New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Spence, M. A. (1974), "Competitive and Optimum Responses to Signals: An Analysis 
of Efficiency and Distribution", Journal of Economic Theoýv 8, pp. 296-332. 
Sterk, W., and P. Vandenberg (1990), "The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends 
and the Tax Differential Theory of Dividend Policy: A Case Revisited", 
Financial Review 25, pp. 441-455. 
Stem, J. (1979), "The Dividend Questjon", The Wall Street Joumal (July 16). 
Stewart, S. S., Jr. (1976), "Should a Corporation Repurchase its Own Stock? ", Jourtial 
offinance 3 1, pp. 911-92 1. 
Stickel, S. (1991), "The Ex-dividend Behavior of Non-convertible Preferred Stock 
Returns and Trading Volume", Journal o Financial and Quantitative Anah, sis 
26, pp. 45-62. 
Thaler, R., and H. Sheffin (198 1), "An Economics Theory of Self Control ", Journal of 
Political Economy 89, pp. 392-410. 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh: www. dsebd. org 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange (1998), "Bangladesh Capital Market - Prospects and 
Potewials ", The DSE Publication, August 13. 
The Chittagong Stock Exchange, Bangladesh: NvNvNv. csebd. org 
Thompson, G. C., and F. J. Walsh, Jr., (1963), "Companies Stress Dividend 
Consistency", National Industrial Conference Board Management Record 25, 
pp. 30-36. 
277 Rciorences 
Titman, S., and R. Wessels (1988), "The Determinants of Capital Structure 
Choice" , Journal of Finance 43, pp. 1- 19. 
Van Horne, J. C., and J. Wachowicz (2001), "Fundamental of Financial 
Management"', Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall (I I' Edition). 
Venkatesh, P. C., and R. Chiang (1986), "Information Asymmetry and the Dealers 
Bid-ask Spread: A Case Study of Earnings and Dividend Announcements", 
Journal of Finance 4 1, pp. 1089-1102. 
Venthienen, L., and T. Vennaelen (1985), "The Relevance of Corporate and Personal 
Taxes for Financing Decisions and Security Pricing: Evidence from the 1982- 
1983 Belgian Tax Refonn", Mimeo, Catholic Universiýy of Leuveii (Apnl). 
Ven-naelen, T. (198 1), "Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling ", Jourtial 
of Financial Economics 9, pp. 139-183. 
Vennaelen, T. (1984), "Repurchase Tender Offers, Signalling, and Managerial 
Incentives", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19, pp. 163-18 1. 
Waud, R. N. (1966), "Small Sample Bias Due to Misspecification in the 'Partial 
Adjustment' and 'Adaptive Expectations' Models", Journal of American 
Statistical Association 6 1, pp. 1130-1152. 
Walter, J. E., (1963), "Dividend Policy: Its Influence on the Value of the 
Enterprise", Journal of Finance 18, pp. 280-29 1. 
Wansley, J. W. and W. R. Lane (1987), "A Financial Profile of the Dividend Initiating 
Finn", Journal of Business Finance andAccounting 14, pp. 425-436. 
Watts, R. (1973), "The Information Contents of Dividend", Jourtial of Business 46, pp. 
191-211. 
278 Rejerences 
Watts, R. (1976a), "Comments on the Impact of Dividend and Earnings 
Announcements: A Reconciliation", Journal of Business 49, PP. 97-106. 
Watts, R. (1976b), "Comments on 'Infon-national Content of DIvidends", Jouriial of 
Business 49, p. 8 1. 
White, H. (1980), "A Heteroskedasticity Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica 48, pp. 817-838. 
Woolridge, J. R. (1982), "The Information Content of Dividend Changes", Jouriial of 
Financial Research 5, pp. 237-247. 
Woolridge, J. R., 1983, "Dividend Changes and Security Prices", Journal of Finance 
38, pp. 1607-1615. 
Woolridge, J. R., and C. Ghosh (1985), "Dividend Cuts: Do They Always Signal Bad 
News? ", Midland Corporate Finance Journal (Summer), pp. 20-32. 
World Bank Reports (1997-98), "The World Bank: USA". 
World Development Indicator (200 1), "The World Bank: USA ". 
Zeghal, D. (1983), "Industry, Market Structure, and Informational Content of 
Financial Structure", Journal ofAccounting and Public Policy 2, pp. 115-13 1. 
279 
Appendix 1: 
I. Background and Management 
AppendLT I 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. (DSE) is an organised market for share trading 
of the listed companies. Today's management of the DSE differs v6dely from that 
previous to 1976. The Exchange is now managed by a council consisting 24 elected 
and nominated members. As per Article 105B the Management is totally separated 
from the council and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the Head of Management team 
who is responsible for day to day affairs of the Exchange. 
The council is a policy making body while a full-time Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) is looking after the overall administration. The CEO shall not be a member or in 
any case whatsoever be associated with a Member of the Exchange and shall not 
engage himself in any business, directly or indirectly, including trading or dealing in 
shares and securities during the period he holds the office and he cannot be terminated 
without the consent of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEQ. 
The Exchange has undergone radical changes in terms of professionalism and 
transparency. The DSE is no longer a closed door organisation rather an institution with 
public accountability (see www. dsebd. org). 
2. Legal Control 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) is registered as Public Limited Company and 
its activities are regulated by its Articles of Association and own rules-regulations, bye- 
laws alongwith the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Companies Act 1994 and 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993 (see www. dsebd. org). 
3. Members 
The number of members of the Dhaka Stock Exchange at present is 195. 
However, provision has been made to increase the number up to 500. However, one 
thing is notable here that the membership of the Dhaka Stock Exchange is also open for 
foreigners (see wvvw. dsebd. org). 
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4. Functions of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
The major functions of the Dhaka Stock Exchange are as follows: 
- Listing of companies (as per listing regulations). 
- Providing the market place for trading of listed securities. 
- Settlement of trading (as per settlement of transaction regulations). 
- Publication of daily quotation, monthly review etc. 
4ppenAr I 
Monitoring the activities of listed companies (as per listing regulations) (see 
www. dsebd. org). 
5. Policy Making Body 
The Council is responsible for policy making body. 
It consists of 24 members [Article 74 (1) ]: 
12 Councillors to be elected from members. 
One Councillor to be nominated by the ministry of Finance (Finance Division) 
not below the rank and status of Joint Secretary; 
One Councillor to be nominated by the Bangladesh Bank from amongst its 
Officers of or above the rank of General Manager; 
President of Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh, ex-officio; 
President of Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ex- 
officio; 
President of Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ex-officio; 
President of Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ex-officio; 
One Councillor to be nominated by the Ministry of Industry not below the rank 
and status of Joint Secretary; 
One Councillor to be nominated by the Ministry of Commerce not below the 
rank and status of Joint Secretary; 
One Councillor to be nominated by the Ministry of Law not below the rank and 
status of Joint Secretary; 
President of Supreme Court Bar Association, ex-officio; 
President of Bankers/Insurance Association, ex-officio; and 
Head of the Department of Finance/Economics, Dhaka University, ex-officio 




The Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. now provides automated screen-based trading 
facilities for its members. This automation project helps the Exchange to move from an 
open outcry system to a computer based system. It facilitated traders to do online 
trading directly from their offices. The central trading engine is on Tandem, a system 
running 24 hrs and 7 days a week, popular for its fault tolerance reliability worldwide. 
All major financial system in the world is handled using Tandem platform. The 
application, which runs in the DSE for the traders, is called as TESA (Tandem 
Electronic Securities Architecture). TESA is a client server application programme 
developed by Indigo Technologies (India) Ltd. for Tandem Computers Ltd. The 
software was customised according to the DSE specification. The DSE trade will have 
a workstation, which runs on standard platforms like Windows 95, Windows NT etc. 
The TESA Trader Workstation has a stand-alone set-up and multi-user set-up. 
The stand-alone set-up is one trader placing orders to the market. Whereas, in the 
multi-user set-up, there will be multiple traders for a single broker company placing 
orders to the market. In the DSE, the single user and the multi-user work on an internal 
Local Area Network. The DSE infrastructure also provides a trader to communicate 
with the Trading Engine using telephone dial-up or leased lines and does their trading 
activities over a Wide Area Network. 
7. Trading and Settlement 
Shares are bought and sold through stockbrokers who are the licensed members 
of the DSE. Normally, the intending client to buy or sell shares opens an account with 
a broker. In the DSE, buy or sale order is processed by the computerised trading 
system. TESA is designed to match the best buy or sale order and to confirm the deal 
automatically. After the trade, broker sends a contract note giving details of the 
transaction to the client. Trades are settled by physical delivery of securities 
accompanied by transfer deeds. Under the present settlement system (T+3, T+5), in 
case of sale, shares are delivered on the third day xhile payment is received on the fifth 
day of the trade. In case of buy, payment is made on the third day while shares are 
received on the fifth day. In the DSE, trading session is held daily; Saturday to 
Thursday, from 10.30 am to 3.00 pm. 
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8. Reforms in the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
As a self-regulatory organisation, the DSE has initiated massive reform 
programmes designed to ensure the stockmarket a safer place to invest in. The 
identifiable reforms taken place in the Dhaka Stock Exchange are: 
- The Articles of Association has been amended to ensure transparency, reliability, 
efficiency and professionalism; 
- Management of the Exchange headed by CEO has been separated from the decisioll 
making body; 
- Number of Councillors has been increased from 12 to 24 witli 50 percent 
representative from non-brokers; 
- Steps have been taken to introduce Central Depository System (CDS) within the 
shortest possible time; 
- Chairman, Senior Vice-Chairman and Vice-Chairman are required to fumish their 
trading activities to the SEC every week; 
- Daily transaction details are being sent to the SEC through e-mail for close 
monitonng; 
- Relevant provisions have been amended to allow the foreigners to become members 
of the DSE; 
- Election procedure has been amended with a provision to retire one third of 
Councillors every year; 
Settlement Protection Fund (SPF) is being created to protect the interest of investors; 
Exhaustive educational programme on capital market has been designed to develop 
the awareness of the investors an other market players; 
-A panel of retired judges has been formed to settle the dispute between brokers and 
their clients; and 
-A strong surveillance term has been 
formed to ensure transparency and 
accountability of the trading of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (Bangladesh Capital 
Market 1998). 
9. The Dhaka Stock Exchange Organogram: 
As it has mentioned earlier that the policy making body of the DSE is the council, 
which is headed by the Chairman of the Exchange and the chief of the management is 
the Chief Executive Officer. However, the line managers are the secretaries of trading, 
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administration, and research and monitoring of listed companies. Besides, two financial 
controllers (clearing, and accounts) and one IT director work in the management team 
parallel to the secretaries (see Figure A. 1). 
10. Monitoring Activities of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
The monitoring cell acts as per Listing Regulations of the DSE for monitoringy the I 
activities of the companies such as: 
- To ensure holding of the AGM in time; 
- Send the Annual Reports, six months-unaudited reports as per provisions of listing 
regulations; 
Issue the dividend warrants, bonus share certificates within the time limit; and 
Utilisation of fund raised through right offer, etc (see www. dsebd. org). 
1. Vision of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
To disseminate market infori-nation to the investors in the easiest way; 
To amend listing regulations, binding the companies for more disclosure, e. g., 
disclose the latest status of the comPany by one month of the end of the financial 
year, and disseminating any development/sensitive news immediately etc; 
To run the Exchange professionally; 
To develop corporate broker house with all professional services; 
To modernise share management system of the listing companies by introducing 
Central Depository System (CDS); 
To assist the regulatory body in all respects to activate the intermediary market 
forces like merchant bank, private mutual funds etc; 
To strengthen the monitoring and surveillance activities; 
To enrich the research activities as well as the exchange library; 
To organise seminar, symposium to create investors awareness; 
To keep close relationship with other modem exchanges and update the knowledge 
level by sharing their experiences; and 
To help industnalisation through mobilising the investment from small savers (see 
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